Nov 27, 2012
For the immediate present the US would be immersed in managing its own internal political contradictions, with not much time left for issues overseas
The re-election of Barack Obama on November 6, 2012, for his second tenure as the 44th President of the United States rang down the curtain on what had become the “greatest show on earth”, running to packed audiences worldwide on television channels.
The intensity of media interest generated by the event demonstrated once again that love it or leave it, the US continues to command an irresistible fascination for the international audience, even amongst the most unreconstructed of hardline Maoists, jihadis or Islamists everywhere, who regard and refer to the US as the Great Satan.
Given the military capabilities and strategic reach of the US, the potential impact of Mr Obama’s re-election on India is certainly a matter of concern which requires to be kept under continuous analysis and scrutiny.
For the present, India enjoys excellent relations with the US and, barring totally unforeseen developments (as in Libya), these will continue smoothly on their present trajectory given the required political support and adequate diplomatic nurturing on both sides. These requirements would appear to be forthcoming with the present governments of both the countries.
Quite naturally under the prevalent circumstances, the outcome of the elections in the US were based overwhelmingly on the middle class of the country and their perceptions of their travails on issues of the country’s economy and illegal immigration from Mexico and Latin America. However, the sudden attack on the American consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, resulting in the death of the American ambassador and three other American citizens, also burst into the electoral spotlight, leading to heated accusations against the government of intelligence failure, lack of leadership and general incompetence. All in all a typical election-time political scenario very familiar to the Indian public as well.