28 April 2013

Leh: Those magnificent Kaoboys on mule back

Issue Net Edition | Date : 27 Apr , 2013

In the external intelligence division of the Intelligence Bureau, headed by B.N.Mallick, DIB, and subsequently post-1968 in the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), headed by R.N.Kao, Leh was a coveted posting for young officers.

Both Mallick as the DIB and Kao as the head of the external intelligence division of the IB and then as the head of the R&AW took a lot of interest in the collection of human and technical intelligence from Tibet through young officers posted in Leh.

The IB and the R&AW had set up a chain of Forward Intelligence Posts (FIPs) to collect Tibetan intelligence and these were supervised by an officer of the rank of Assistant Director (Superintendent of Police) based in Leh

The IB and the R&AW had set up a chain of Forward Intelligence Posts (FIPs) to collect Tibetan intelligence and these were supervised by an officer of the rank of Assistant Director (Superintendent of Police) based in Leh. The logistic and medical cover for the FIPs and the IB/R&AW offices in Leh was provided by the Army.

We had very close co-operation between the Army and the intelligence set-up. Except in Leh where the staff used to move around by jeep, in the interior areas for the collection of Tibetan intelligence the staff used to travel on mule-back.

Leh was considered a very difficult posting health-wise. Only officers medically cleared by the Wellington Hospital for travel or posting to Leh were sent there.

N.F Suntook, who was the head of Administration in the R&AW under Kao, was once medically cleared for going there on an inspection tour. He almost died there due to accumulation of water in the lungs and had to be airlifted in the nick of time to the Wellington Hospital.

Leh, and Hong Kong to learn the Chinese language and Beijing—used to be the career path of the Chinese hands in our intelligence community.

Young officers wanting to specialise in Chinese intelligence opted for their initial posting in Leh. They were the blue-eyed boys of Mallick, Kao and A.K.Dave. Leh, and Hong Kong to learn the Chinese language and Beijing—used to be the career path of the Chinese hands in our intelligence community.

Among the officers who distinguished themselves in Leh were K.C.Patnayak, a 1954 IPS officer from Orissa, the late R.Swaminathan, a 1954 IPS officer from Andhra Pradesh, N.Narasimhan, a 1957 IPS officer from Karnataka A.S.Syali, a 1958 IPS officer from Madhya Pradesh, and A.P.Verma, a 1959 IPS officer from Uttar Pradesh.

The road forward with China

India must keep talking, while building more border roads

India's ongoing build-up along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border with China, has run into trouble at Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh, where - as in the lead-up to 1962 - its operational ambitions have outpaced the country's logistics. Today, a strong patrol from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has parked itself on territory India claims, benefiting from easy access over a good Chinese road across the Depsang Plains. Meanwhile, the Indian army's access to that area is mainly through a recently reactivated, weather-dependent landing ground. Without the ability to build up force, the army has little choice but to negotiate. The PLA will demand operational concessions, most likely the withdrawal of Indian defences in some other contested sector.

While it is necessary to acknowledge this tactical weakness, it must not be allowed to persist. Over the preceding decade, New Delhi has taken steps to translate India's long-standing disadvantage on the LAC into parity. Additional forces have been sanctioned, including a mountain strike corps, two mountain divisions and two armoured brigades; and forces have been relocated to the LAC from Kashmir and the Indo-Pakistan border. Air power and air defence capabilities have been greatly enhanced and a network of roads sanctioned. 

But little of this has come up on the ground yet, especially communications infrastructure. Without a road network, the cruel Himalayan terrain reduces even the largest divisions to isolated groups of soldiers sitting on widely separated hilltops. For decades, New Delhi has failed to speed up road building, blaming in turn state governments for not providing land; the environment ministry for blocking construction; the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) for lacking capacity to take on so many projects at the same time; geological difficulties; and even the Chinese for blocking road construction close to the border.

New Delhi must initiate an emergency inter-agency drive to cut through the difficulties and cut the roads through the hills. A Strategic Roads Plan already exists, crafted by Shyam Saran, a former special advisor to the prime minister who invested years of tramping around the borders into this comprehensive document. The BRO roads, the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana and the special border area schemes need to be coordinated to optimise effort and expense. And a high-powered government panel, perhaps a group of ministers (GoM), must be charged with implementing the scheme in a time-bound manner. 

Until this network of new Indian roads substantially changes the military equation on the ground, India has little choice but to hasten softly in its military build-up. Beijing's proposal to freeze troop levels on the LAC stems from the confidence that its enviable infrastructure in Tibet acts as a force multiplier, permitting its relatively small number of troops to concentrate and disperse rapidly, running rings around India's immobile pickets. While Beijing can appear reasonable in asking for troop levels to be frozen, it cannot legitimately request a freeze on road building, which also benefits border populations. And as India changes ground realities, it must face the current ones, too - and keep talking with the Chinese army to ensure that tensions do not get out of hand.

India is Drowning in its Own Excreta-Can Science and Engineering Come to the Rescue?

By Joanne Manaster 
April 24, 2013

Just a few weeks ago, I flew into India to join other new media specialists and journalists with the International Reporting Project to examine issues of child survival and health. (Before I continue, I simply must extend thanks to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for providing a portion of the IRP funding to make this trip possible, the School of Integrative Biology at UIUC for supporting my participation in the project and GoPro Cameras for outfitting me with a Hero3 for documentation purposes.)

I have talked to many many people who have experienced India, I’ve read numerous books (fiction and non-fiction), and watched many documentaries, TV shows, and fictional movies about India, but knew that the experience of visiting would be something valuable. I was warned of the approximately “five people per square foot” population density in Mumbai, of the smell–a persistent sewer/trash odor, the pollution, the noise, the dogs, cattle, and goats, and the widespread extreme poverty. I discovered that the southern port city of India in Maharashtra State where we first landed, formerly known as Bombay, to be all that and even more. It was humid and warm during our visit, but actually in a relatively cool and dry streak, at least for India. The city, as I was exaggeratively informed by John Schidlovsky, founder and director of the IRP, “was built on mold” and with my allergy to mold so severe that I carry an epipen, I found myself taking more than the recommended dose of allergy meds just to breathe, each day grateful it wasn’t the rainy season. Thankfully, we traveled north to cooler, drier, and less moldy climes to a rural area outside Nagpur and later to New Delhi. I will discuss more of those destinations in future posts.

Throughout most of India, I found myself delighted at the fact that women still wear colorful sarees on a daily basis, not yet succumbing to western trends, and impressed that men and boys generally wear button-down shirts, slacks, and nice shoes everyday, no matter their income level or age (try convincing a young boy to do that in America day to day–no way!)

Niramaya Health Foundation

If you have seen the movie “Slumdog Millionaire”, it begins in Mumbai, in one of the largest slums located near the airport and situated right at the largest dumping ground in India. This area was our first stop in order to visit the Niramaya projectdrop-in health center. We toured the slums and received an overview of healthcare and educational awareness work Niramaya does in the community.

A scene in a Mumbai slum. While many journalists took photos of people, I was uncomfortable invading their space

Many sights, sounds, and smells impacted, and even impressed me, but nothing I encountered really surprised me as I realized that poverty is poverty everywhere and people in India are just trying to live their lives as they go about their day, as anywhere else. Despite this acceptance of the state of living of slum dwellers, as someone who has an immense appreciation for modern plumbing, and armed with a good working knowledge about micro-organisms, I found myself uneasy at the thought of open defecation as practiced so widely in India.

Bullies only heed the voice of force

Sunday, 28 April 2013 | Rajesh Singh 

In the past fortnight, we have had the bizarre spectacle of 50 odd Chinese soldiers crossing the Line of Actual Control, entering more than 15 kilometres deep into Indian territory in the Ladakh sector, and brazenly staying put there.

Even more bizarre has been the insipid response of the Government of India to the incursion. Union Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid has called the incident an “acne” that will go away with application of an “ointment”. He has trivialised the matter by saying that such developments are a part of “growing up”.

The foreign policy of a Government — as its policies on defence, economy and internal security — reflects the regime's firmness of resolve and its belief that under any circumstances, the country's dignity must not be compromised with. Given that the Congress-led UPA Government has long abandoned to govern, let alone govern in a determined fashion, the official response to Beijing's provocation should not come as a surprise. The UPA regime is not interested in maintaining India's stature but only in ensuring that it somehow completes its remaining term. All its energies are targeted in that direction. Tough Governments take tough measures, and spineless regimes cringe and crawl. The tragedy is not that the ruling combine has been shamed by this episode; it is that the country's honour and prestige has been severely compromised.

Because of the Government's pusillanimous approach, the Indian Army is unable to take the kind of measures it ought to be taking in such situations. The best that the Army has been allowed to do is to place its soldiers right across the Chinese position some 400 metres away, and stare at them. Perhaps New Delhi believes that we can, if nothing else, win at the staring game and make the Chinese blink. The Army has no orders to take action of any kind — so much so that our soldiers have been asked to even allow the flow of supplies that are coming from across the border to the Chinese soldiers.

The Government wants us to believe that there is little that it can do in the given circumstances, except organise flag meetings at the military level and speak politely to the new Chinese leadership so that it sees reason. Khurshid has placed great hope on the “existing joint mechanism” that will enable China and India to resolve the issue. He must remember that, despite this ‘existing joint mechanism', Chinese troops have pitched their tent deep inside Indian territory. Also, despite the ‘existing joint mechanism', the People's Liberation Army of China has on several occasions in the recent past intruded into India, etched its presence on rocks and left mementos, and then departed. Perhaps New Delhi fondly believed that the Chinese would behave in a similar obliging fashion this time around too. After all, we seem to have got accustomed to the incursions by our neighbour. That is why the Government initially downplayed the incident, but then put up a façade of action after the media highlighted the intrusion.

The ‘what really can we do' exasperation and ‘let tempers cool down; we must not over-react' dovish approach have not worked in the past, and they never will. China is essentially a bully, and a bully does not understand the language of reason; it understands the language of assertion. Smaller countries such as Japan and Vietnam have used that tactic with success with Beijing. But New Delhi under the UPA regime simply cannot muster the courage.

Ideally, of course, the Government should have directed the Indian Army to secure the region that the Chinese troops have occupied in Daulat Beg Oldie in Ladakh. It is inconceivable that a country should allow uninvited foreign soldiers to camp in its territory, more so when a border dispute is on with the latter's nation. The first response to the crisis should have been a military one, with Indian soldiers asking the intruders to vacate, and if the latter did not comply, use force to get them out or take them into custody. This would not have been an extreme reaction, as some would argue, but the very first step to resolve the matter. Dialogue could have come into play thereafter. Instead, we are now seeking a diplomatic solution from a position of weakness. If the Chinese eventually vacate, be sure that they will do so on their own terms, part of which is the humiliation of India in the eyes of the world.

Deal with China in a language it understands

Sunday, 28 April 2013 | Kanchan Gupta

Pusillanimity and pious declarations are not going to get the PLA out of Indian territory. If we let Manmohan Singh have his way, it’ll be 1962 redux

There is understandable national concern over the sudden surge of belligerence in China’s attitude towards India, most notably visible in the marked shift in its approach to resolving the border issue which has been festering for half-a-century now. Although talks on demarcating the border to the mutual satisfaction of India and China have been dragging on without any resolution in sight, both New Delhi and Beijing have remained committed to maintaining peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control, thus preserving the status quo in the interregnum. Seen against this backdrop, China’s sudden smash-and-grab adventurism in Ladakh has come as a surprise, though many who have been warning about Beijing’s true intentions would disagree with that proposition: The Dragon was never to be trusted.

Nearly a fortnight after a platoon of PLA soldiers — 30 of them, we are told — marched across the LAC 15 km into Indian territory and set up camp, thus occupying a strategic height which had proved advantageous for India during the 1962 war, that concern is fast turning into anger. The mounting rage is directed as much against China’s new leaders who appear to be far more cavalier than the lot that stepped down earlier this year, seemingly intent upon recreating the flawed relationship that faltered and collapsed so horribly 50 years ago and took several decades to nurse back to health , as the weak congress – let UPA regime in New Delhi . Then, as now, Beijing sneered at New Delhi’s concerns and refused to countenance its objections while spurning India’s sovereign claim over its territory. If memories of India’s humiliation in 1962 had dimmed, they were adequately revived last year when the sordid saga of China’s loathsome treachery and India’s stunning incompetence to protect its land and people was told all over again, reopening the wound of defeat that was presumed to have healed.

Between April 15 and Saturday, April 27, we have seen nothing but a clueless Ministry of External Affairs and an impotent Ministry of Defence trying to hide their failure in dealing with the situation effectively by taking recourse to inanity and worse. Flailing arms and wringing hands are unlikely to deter an adventurist PLA backed by an aggressive CPC with its leaders at the helm of affairs in China. Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid laughably believes that his scheduled visit to Beijing will help restore status quo ante in the Daulat Beg Oldie sector of Ladakh while Minister for Defence AK Antony touchingly places his trust in achieving a “peaceful resolution through negotiation and consultation”.

Meanwhile, providing much-needed comic relief in these tense times, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has assured the nation that he has a plan in place to deal with the situation without accentuating it. “We do have a plan. We do not want to accentuate the situation. It is a localised problem. We do believe that it is possible to resolve this problem,” he told newspersons on Saturday. If there is indeed a plan, as he claims, it is only fair that he should share it with the nation rather than expect us to believe him. In the past our effete Prime Minister has proved to be singularly incapable of defending India’s national interest while dealing with Pakistan. There is no reason why he should be trusted on dealing with China without compromising our national interest. Also, there is nothing ‘local’ about the problem: Chinese soldiers have been intruding into Indian territory across the 4,057 km LAC; this time they have stayed put. There have been 600 instances of Chinese troops intruding (our Government coyly refers to it has ‘transgressing’) into Indian territory over the past three years. On no occasion did this Government, more so the Prime Minister who virtually runs the Ministry of External Affairs, so much as wag its little finger at China. To expect the nation to be calmed by Manmohan Singh’s claim of having a ‘plan’ now that the Chinese troops are refusing to budge after ‘transgressing’ 19 km into Indian territory is a bit thick. Only the naïve and the untutored would feel reassured; even Congress loyalists would feel alarmed.

Talibanised Surge

S. Binodkumar Singh 
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On April 6, 2013, in the biggest-ever show of force by Islamists in the country in recent times, hundreds of thousands of members of the Chittagong-based radical Islamist group Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI), organized a ‘Long March’ from Chittagong to Dhaka, and held a massive rally in the Bangladesh capital. Over two million people are estimated to have participated in the rally. The HeI demanded enactment of blasphemy laws by authorities to punish people who ‘insult Islam’. In a written statement, HeI Ameer (Chief) Shah Ahmad Shafi declared, “Our current movement is not political. Government has to agree to our 13-point demand in order to continue in office.” HeI gave the Government an April 30, 2013, deadline to meet its demands or face a ‘Dhaka Siege’ programme from May 5, 2013.

Earlier, on March 9, 2013, Shafi had put forward a 13-point demand at the Olama-Mashayekh(Islamic Scholars) Convention organized at the Darul Uloom Hathazari Madrassah (Islamic Seminary) Convention Hall in Chittagong District. On the same day, HeI’s “central joint secretary general” Maulana Moinuddin Ruhi, gave the call for the April 6 rally.

The Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League (AL) Government initially attempted to clamp down on the Long March, with Security Force (SFs) arresting 30 HeI cadres from a bus in Palashbari area of Gaibandha District on April 5, 2013, while they were going towards Dhaka to join the rally. This, however, led to a rise in tensions, culminating in large scale violence. Notably, Junaed Babunagri, HeI ‘secretary general’, addressing a Press Conference in Dhaka on April 5, 2013, warned, “(the) Long March towards Dhaka will be spread across the country if the Government resists the HeI cadres on their way to Dhaka.” According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management, since that incident, at least five AL activists have been killed and 286 others have been injured across the country (all data till April 21, 2013) in incidents involving HeI. Some of the violent incidents include:

April 5: HeI cadres killed AL activist Shahidul Islam (36) at Dhaka’s Kamrangirchar.

April 6: An AL activist identified as Nowsher Ali (25) was killed by HeI cadres at Bhanga Chourasta in Bhanga sub-District of Faridpur District.

April 11: Three AL activists were killed as HeI and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) cadres clashed with AL men in Fatikchhari sub-District of Chittagong District.

The HeI-provoked violence and success of the rally forced the Government to announce that it would “consider the demands” of the fundamentalist formation, and emboldened Shafi, who, on April 11, 2013, declared that the Islamists had united under the HeI banner after a long time, and threatened the AL regime, “If you want to stay in power, you will have to meet our demands. Or else, there will be dire consequences.” 

Formed some time in 2010 under Shafi’s leadership, the HeI only came to prominence after it raised its 13-point demands and subsequently provoked violence. Reports suggest that some HeI leaders have close links with the Pakistani Army as well as various Islamist terrorist and fundamentalist organizations. HeI’s chief, Shafi, moreover, had allegedly collaborated with the Pakistan Army during the 1971 Liberation War. Maulana Habib ur Rahman, the principal organiser of the April 6, 2013, Long March, was a leader of the terrorist Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and has links with international Islamist terrorist formations, a fact he personally confirmed in an interview in a special bulletin of Islami Biplob (Islamic Revolution), published in Sylhet on August 20, 1998.

More worryingly, HeI maintains close ties with the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) as well as JeI, which, along with its student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), has brought the nation to a standstill since the beginning of 2013, and many of whose top leaders are at the centre of the War Crimes Trials. South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data shows that Bangladesh has recorded 145 fatalities related to Islamist extremism since January 21, 2013, when the first verdict in the War Crimes Trials was delivered against JeI leader Maulana Abul Kalam Azad aliasBachchu Razakar. Razakar was sentenced to death.

Indeed, State Minister for Law Quamrul Islam on April 5, 2013, observed, “There are JeI-BNP men in HeI. They may unleash terrorism and create anarchy under the guise of HeI.” He warned, however, “No matter who you are, action will be taken if you are used by JeI-BNP men in creating anarchy.” Further, on April 11, Syed Ashraful Islam, AL General Secretary and Local Government and Rural Development Minister, while addressing a Roundtable Conference, stated, “The April 6 grand rally was not HeI’s; BNP-JeI had organized the programme under the banner of HeI, and had hoped that the rally would have continued for four days, and that the Government would have been forced to step down within this period.”

Sleeping Tiger, creeping Dragon

Sunday, 28 April 2013 | Swapan Dasgupta

Since the Indian Parliament is lucky enough to have a quizmaster among its members, it would be instructive if he posed a perplexing question to a Government Minister, preferably one whose answer is likely to be taken seriously.

The question is this: If 19km of Chinese incursion into Indian territory leaves both the Government and society completely unruffled, how much territory does Beijing have to occupy before the country feels well and truly shafted?

Maybe this question need not be confined to representatives of the UPA Government and the presiding deities of the so-called "strategic community" that are so visible in seminars and international airport lounges. This Saturday's Delhi editions of the English language dailies were conspicuous by their perfunctory treatment of this official admission by the Defence Secretary to the parliamentary standing committee on defence. Only one publication chose to place this news on its front page; the rest chose to give greater play to the newest version of a mobile phone produced by Samsung.

Whether the relegation of the border tensions have anything to do with discreet suggestions from (what are quaintly described in media-speak as) 'sources', is a matter of conjecture. But as I have long maintained, the newshounds on the South Block beat have for long adjusted to their new role as stenographers to the Ministry of External Affairs. No wonder readers are compelled to digest a lot of gobble about "perceptional mismatch", "calibrated" overtures and "nuanced" approaches to an opaque and inscrutable dispensation in Beijing. Thank God the TV channels are little less squeamish.

China, to its eternal credit, has very successfully created a mystique around itself. India's China experts-with some honourable exceptions-have, by and large, devoured the piffle that is routinely dished out by its post-Confucian mandarins and, in fact, added their own sprinkling of soya sauce. Those who were exposed to China studies in the Indian Universities in the 1970s may recall the gush-gush endorsements of crazy schemes such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The post-Mao U-turn should, ideally, have left them red-faced by the inclination to be Sinophiles, rather than Sinologists, had struck such deep roots that the shifting sands of China had little impact.

I recall attending a lecture by the notorious fellow-traveller Han Suyin at the London School of Economics sometime in the late-1970s where she held forth on the treachery of the Gang of Four, particularly Mao's widow Jiang Quin. It was all very erudite and convincing until an insolent Briton stood up to remind her that barely a year or so ago she was singing praises of those very people she was now denouncing with gusto.

Actually, for the China-watchers, it is a simple case of access. Their profession demands frequent visits to China and it just doesn't do to get on the wrong side of the present dispensation. And remember, China isn't just another country: it is the most powerful nation of Asia blessed with an unflinching determination to restore its place as the Middle Kingdom. To many of China's policy makers, India is a upstart that must periodically be shown its place. Certainly, Zhou Enlai was miffed by Jawaharlal Nehru's condescension and waited for an opportune moment to deliver a tight slap in 1962.

The 2013 Defense White Paper in Perspective

Publication: China Brief Volume: 13 Issue: 9
April 25, 2013

Chen Zhou, One of the Principal Drafters of the Newly-Released Defense White Paper

After every Chinese Defense white paper is released the first question invariably asked is “What’s new?” The unsatisfying, but accurate, answer is “It depends on what you already know about the Chinese armed forces.”

The white papers repeat long-established policy and usually contain some new information and updates to earlier versions. Their opening sections serve as a barometer for Chinese government’s views of the international security environment. Although military personnel have the lead in drafting the defense white papers, the text is coordinated with other central government ministries and the final product is issued by the Information Office of the State Council—not by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). White papers, however, are not the vehicle the Chinese government would use to announce new policies.

White papers build on information provided in previous editions. Readers studying a specific subject should examine each of the eight white papers, beginning in 1998, to see how that topic is or is not addressed in each one.

It is unfortunate, but true, that readers need to be familiar with the content in previously issued white papers to judge the latest edition [1]. While the Chinese government has provided a lot of information in the series of Defense white papers, knowledgeable readers always will find that subjects are not discussed at all or in sufficient detail to answer many longstanding questions, especially about the military budget or new weapons and equipment entering the PLA.

For a different perspective on many of topics covered by the Chinese and for significantly greater detail about weapons capabilities and numbers, readers also should consult the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual reports to Congress about the Chinese military.

A Taxonomy of “New” Information

Several types of “new” information may be found in each white paper. First, some “new” information simply brings readers up-to-date with developments concerning topics that had previously been discussed in prior white papers. This often is the most prevalent form of information, frequently addressing basic national security and military policy issues.

Second, some “new” information may be a “first” for inclusion in a white paper. This sort of information usually has already been released in the official Chinese media to less fanfare and attention.

Third, some white papers contain “new” information that is the first time the Chinese government has ever divulged this specific fact or figure. This information usually amounts to a very small proportion of any single white paper’s content.

Fortunately, the Chinese take the extra step of translating each white paper into English for the benefit of foreign readers, their main target audience. Comparing the Chinese and English versions can be a fruitful language exercise and helpful in understanding the exact meaning of some terms.

What’s “New” in the 2013 white paper?

The first new element in the 10,000-word white paper published on April 16, 2013 is not so much in its content, but in its form. The report’s main author, Major General Chen Zhou of the Academy of Military Science, points out that this edition is “a thematic white paper that focuses on the diversified employment of China’s armed forces,” as opposed to the comprehensive papers of previous years (China Military Online, April 18). As such, this year’s emphasis is on what the Chinese armed forces are doing to defend sovereignty, support national economic development as well as contribute to peace and stability.

Before discussing these topics, the white paper starts with a section on the international situation and the missions of the armed forces. Though “peace and development remain the underlying trends of our times” (a theme first identified in the 1998 white paper), these trends are faced with “new opportunities and challenges.” The preface reiterates China’s basic defense policies, such as China’s defensive posture and its commitment not to seek hegemony, military expansion or interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Foreign audiences frequently dismiss such statements as “boilerplate” or the “party line,” but, for Beijing, they serve as a statement of China’s strategic intentions.

The new Chinese puzzle

Raj Chengappa 

India must make the right moves on the Chinese intrusion, for its actions on this incident would set the tone for its dealings with the new Chinese leadership over the next decade. And it has to assert its national interests.

Daulat Beg Oldie — the name has a curious origin. Located far north in the cold desert region of Ladakh, abutting the forbidding but strategic Karakoram range, the place reportedly gets its name from a 16th century Yarkandi merchant, who died there while traversing the Silk Route.

Ever since India’s dispute with China over the border issue, that resulted in the 1962 conflict, Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) has been viewed by Delhi as critical to its defence fortifications on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Recently, apart from refurbishing the airstrip, one of the highest in the world, the Indian government has been making efforts to connect DBO by a road to Leh.

Dr Manmohan Singh with China’s President Xi Jinping at BRICS Summit in Durban. File Photo

That’s why last week when a platoon of China’s People’s Liberation Army pitched tents and set up a camp 10 km from the LAC on the Indian side, it was viewed by the Indian government as a serious transgression. It sparked a diplomatic and military row on the 50th anniversary of the India-China war. Initially, a volley of hot words was exchanged and the Indian Army flew in reinforcements.

China, on its part, played down the incident and denied it had violated the LAC, pointing out that since the border remains undefined in many sectors, both sides have frequently intruded into each other’s zone. A spokesperson of the Chinese Defence Ministry is quoted to have said, “Chinese border troops have strictly observed the relevant agreements between China and India and have been working to safeguard border peace and tranquility.”

India, too, then began toning down the tenor of its statements. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid announced that he was not cancelling his planned trip to China on May 8, stating that both sides were keen that the dispute does not “destroy” the substantial progress they have made in their ties. And the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, on Saturday described the DBO intrusion as “a localised problem” and that “we do believe that we can solve this problem.”

Clearly, there are efforts being made to de-escalate the crisis arising out of the recent Chinese intrusion. China had earlier indicated that its new premier Li Keaqiang would make his first foreign visit after assuming office to India, signalling the importance that the new Chinese leadership, which took the reins in March, places on its relationship with India. The new President, Xi Jinping, seemed to have got off to a good start with Manmohan Singh when they met for the first time on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Durban in March.

That’s why the recent DBO intrusion remains a Chinese puzzle. Before the intrusion, the new Chinese leadership had sent the right signals. Before he arrived in Durban, Xi Jinping had outlined Panchsheel type of policy principles in relations with India. Among them was to “maintain strategic communications and keep bilateral relations between the two countries on track.” The others were to expand cooperation in infrastructure and investment, strengthen cultural ties and people-to-people contact, increase collaboration in multi-lateral affairs to tackle global challenges, apart from accommodating each other’s core concerns and handling differences existing between the two countries.

China’s Defense White Paper: A New Conceptual Framework for Security

April 25, 2013
Publication: China Brief Volume: 13 Issue: 9

China organized this year’s defense white paper around the historic missions concept as the principal framework for understanding the mission and activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The concept of “core interests,” a key driver of the historic missions, featured prominently in the white paper as well [1]. The high profile accorded these concepts reflects their enhanced authoritativeness as well as China’s increased power and influence. For these reasons, Beijing can be expected to step up efforts to both consolidate control of its sovereignty claims and shape a favorable international order.

The title of this year’s defense white paper, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” refers to the “diversified tasks” (duoyanghua renwu) the heart of the “historic missions of the armed forces in the new period of the new century,” often referred to simply as the “historic missions.” The missions concept refers to strategic guidance that then-Central Military Commission (CMC) Chair Hu Jintao provided to the military in late 2004 and which has been mentioned in defense white papers since 2006. The historic missions consist of four requirements: (1) provide an important security guarantee for the party to consolidate its ruling position; (2) provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for national development; (3) provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests; and (4) play an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development" (Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP]). As the PLA essentially provides the ultimate backstop for the first requirement, it is not really addressed in the paper. The other elements, however, frame the main content of the white paper.

Core Interests Elevated in Importance

This year’s white paper similarly elevated the importance of the core interest (hexin liyi) concept. This concept has appeared in some form in defense white papers since 2002. The term is a party concept which refers to the most important national interests, which Chinese analysts define as the collective “material and spiritual demands of a state and people.”

Chinese media has explained consistently how the evolving definition of national interests has driven the military to update its mission. The most recent development has been the addition of “developmental interests” to the older groups of security and sovereignty interests, as well as a refinement of the meaning of all three groups in light of China’s growing power and integration into the global economy. A typicalPLA Daily article explained that China’s economic growth now required the PLA to protect national “developmental interests” (fazhan liyi) as well as “survival interests” (shengcun liyi). It contrasted the missions and functions of the military in the “agricultural and industrial age,” which focused on “manning the frontiers and defending the territories,” with new mission requirements to “protect China’s peaceful development and great power status” in the “information age” (PLA Daily, December 8, 2005).

Like the historic missions, the core interest concept offers a clearer way to organize thinking about security than the political language of the Mao and Deng eras. Discussing security threats in wildly hyperbolic, rigidly ideological terms are a luxury that economically enfeebled, autarkic communist countries might indulge in, but something that a rising great power can ill afford, especially when surrounded by wary, heavily armed, modern nations. The modernizing PLA of the Deng and early Jiang eras avoided this pitfall, but the lingering influence of communist orthodoxy contributed to a low level of rigor and clarity of thought. By contrast, delineating categories of core interests that tie directly to China’s higher strategic priorities facilitates more precise analysis and allows the PLA to prioritize responsibilities, evaluate threats, and develop plans and capabilities in a rational manner more appropriate for the needs of a great power with global interests.

Why the Concepts Have Risen in Importance

Both the core interests and the historic missions derive from assessments formalized around the year 2000—the start of what the CCP refers to as the “new period in the new century.” Two important developments led to the current elevation in importance of the concepts in the current paper: an increase in political authoritativeness; the relative growth in Chinese power, which has raised the feasibility and urgency of implementing the new guidance.

Returning to the Land or Turning Towards the Sea? India’s

Role in America’s Pivot
Evan Braden Montgomery, April 25, 2013

China's rise is pushing America & India closer. But are they focusing on the wrong set of challenges?

Few diplomatic overtures have generated loftier expectations in recent years thanWashington’s rapprochement with New Delhi. Frequently at loggerheads during the Cold War, then kept apart by the US commitment to counter-proliferation and India’s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent, the two sides have never had a warm relationship. That began to change during the George W Bush administration, a transformation that was symbolized by a controversial agreement allowing the US to sell civilian nuclear technology to India, despite its status as a nuclear-armed nation that is not recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Obama administration has since picked up where its predecessor left off. The president, for example, has called India a “natural ally” of the US, while his former secretary of defense, Leon Panetta, declared that India was “a linchpin” of America’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific.

While there were many reasons for the world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest democracy to mend fences, perhaps the most important reason was the one that few officials could point to in public: the rise of China. In modern times, tensions between New Delhi and Beijing date back to their border war in 1962. In fact, the contested boundaries between these two powers are some of the only land border disputes that China has yet to resolve. To keep up with Beijing’s growing military power, India needs to modernize its armed forces, which means moving away from its reliance on Russian hardware and looking towards Europe and the US. Meanwhile, Washington is searching for ways to preserve its position in the Asia-Pacific as China’s strength continues to increase. Having the region’s other rising power on its side is a good place to start.

If a partnership between the US and India makes sense on paper, so far improved relations between the two nations have hardly been game changing. There are a host of explanations why the fruits of strategic collaboration have been relatively modest, from bureaucracies on both sides that have impeded potential arms sales, to broader considerations such as the fear of antagonizing China. One important factor, though, is the mismatch between what the US wants India to do and what New Delhi is best suited to do.

Proponents of closer ties between Washington and New Delhi often view India as abudding maritime power. As then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared in 2010, “India can be a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.” For example, with a bigger and better navy, India could help patrol vital sea-lanes, deter or counter smuggling operations, combat piracy, provide humanitarian assistance far from home, and respond quickly when natural disasters strike. All of this could help relieve some of the burdens shouldered by the US Navy, which is juggling its day-to-day role as a global security provider and first responder with the longer-term challenge of a shifting military balance in the Western Pacific. Not surprisingly, areas like counter-piracy and humanitarian assistance are at the center of US -India security cooperation today.

The only problem is that India isn’t a maritime power: it’s a land power. To be sure, New Delhi is building and buying new ships and submarines, and seems determined to bolster its naval capabilities, which is hardly surprising given its location astride some of the world’s most important sea-lanes. But the major military challenges it faces come from on shore, and the Indian Army continues to be the nation’s dominant military service in terms of size, influence, and budget share.

Out with the New, In with the Old: Interpreting China’s ‘New Type of International Relations’

Publication: China Brief Volume: 13 Issue: 9
April 25, 2013

President Xi Speaking in Moscow

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to the United States last year in February, he urged Beijing and Washington to “set a good example of constructive and cooperative state-to-state relations for countries with different political systems…an example that finds no precedent and offers inspiration for future generations.” Then the acknowledged leader-in-waiting, Xi emphasized the importance of building “a new type of relationship between major countries in the 21st century”—a phrasing that would become “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2012). Last year, this phraseology could have been an opening answer, subject to negotiation, to then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s challenge to write a new story about “what happens when an established power and a rising power meet” (U.S. State Department, March 7, 2012). Xi Jinping’s speech in Moscow during his first overseas trip as president and the subsequent elaboration of a “new type of international relations” (xinxing guoji guanxi), however, suggests Beijing is putting forth a new idea about the international system that challenges at least some of the tenets of the existing order (International Herald Leader, April 11;People’s Daily, March 23).

Following Xi’s first mention of the need to recalibrate U.S.-China relations toward a more positive vision of great power relations, his predecessor Hu Jintao elaborated four sets of actions both sides needed to continue. They were assuage mistrust through senior-level dialogues and regular communications among principals; continue and expand win-win cooperation in traditional fields, such as law enforcement, and non-traditional fields, such as energy and the environment; minimize the impact of outside factors and third parties on the U.S.-China relationship; and share international responsibilities to maintain a “healthy interaction” in the Asia-Pacific (Xinhua, June 20, 2012).

Shortly thereafter, Cui Tiankai, then-Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and now Chinese Ambassador to the United States, along with co-author Pang Hangzhao provided a lengthy and official elaboration of a “new type of great power relations.” Cui and Pang unsurprisingly echoed Xi and Hu’s basic framework, but highlighted at least three obstacles to achieving this new vision for U.S.-China relations. The first was strategic mistrust. The second was conflicts over China’s “core interests” or, rather, U.S. interference in those interests. The third was brewing competition in the Asia-Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2012).

Although Beijing and Washington both had important roles to play in managing a “new type of great power relations,” Cui and Pang placed the responsibility for resolving the aforementioned problems squarely on the United States. China’s commitment to the U.S.-China relationship, as always, was never in doubt. They wrote “what the United States has done in matters concerning China's core and important interests and major concerns is unsatisfactory.” In most respects, according to Cui and Pang, Beijing was not part of the problem: “There have been some problems recently in China's neighborhood. China is not the maker of these problems, and still less the perpetrator of the harm. Rather, it is a victim on which harm has been imposed” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2012). Overall, the message appeared to be a statement that Washington needed to accommodate China’s rise without reciprocal Chinese concessions to similarly long-standing U.S. principles and policies (“China’s Search for a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship’,” China Brief, September 7, 2012).

Fierce Debate Erupts over the Meaning of the “China Dream”

Publication: China Brief Volume: 13 Issue: 9
April 25, 2013

The China Dream

Since becoming General Secretary at the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) last November, Xi Jinping has talked about the “China Dream” (zhongguo meng) at least five times. On all these occasions, Xi has equated the China Dream with “fulfilling the great renaissance of the Chinese race,” adding that “this is the greatest dream of the Chinese race in recent history.” Given that Xi lacks the reputation of a theorist, the China Dream already has been considered as a major slogan of the Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang era, which is set to run until the 20th Party Congress of 2022. Questions, however, have arisen as to whether the “fulfillment of the China Dream” can be raised to the same level as seminal dictums pronounced by Xi’s predecessors, such as ex-presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Hu coined catchphrases such as “constructing a harmonious society” and implementing the “scientific outlook on development,” while Jiang is best remembered for his “Theory of the Three Represents” (Tianya.cn [Beijing], April 1; Sina.com [Beijing], March 13). Of much more significance is the fact that, owing to the vague yet all-embracing connotations of the China Dream, cadres and intellectuals of different persuasions are locked in a fierce debate about the slogan’s relevance to the future of reform, particularly political liberalization.

At its simplest level, the China Dream or the renaissance of the Chinese race simply means an economically prosperous and militarily strong China. When Xi first put forward his pet idea while inspecting an exhibition of recent history at the China National Museum in last November, he laid down two specific objectives about economic progress. By 2021, the centenary of the CCP’s establishment, China should meet the target of “constructing a xiaokang [moderately prosperous] society.” Furthermore, by 2049—the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic—China will have developed into a “modernized socialist country that is rich, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious” (Xinhua, November 29; People’s Daily Online, November 29). According to Wang Yiming, a senior economist at the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s GDP is expected to hit 90 trillion yuan ($14.6 trillion) by 2020, at which point per capita GDP may breach the psychologically important watershed of $10,000 per capita. Wang further projected that by 2050, the country’s GDP could reach 350 trillion yuan ($56.6 trillion), and per capita GDP could reach 260,000 yuan ($42,000) (China News Service, March 7; sme.gov.cn [Beijing] March 6).

How about socio-political development, particularly the flowering of democratic ideals? Upon being elected State President at the National People’s Congress (NPC) last March, Xi dropped hints about some form of commitment to egalitarianism when he revisited the China Dream leitmotif. He indicated that “the China Dream is the dream of the [Chinese] race as well as the dream of every Chinese [person].” The supremo further pledged that all Chinese should “have the chance of distinguishing themselves in their lives.” “They should enjoy opportunities of having their dream come true,” he added, “They should have the opportunity of growing up and making progress in tandem with the motherland and the times” (CCTV News, March 17; China News Service, March 17).

It is apparent, however, that Xi, who is also Chairman of the policy-setting Central Military Commission (CMC), was not referring to Western or universal precepts of equality and democratic rights. After all, Xi has vowed that while the CCP administration “will avoid old roads that are closed and fossilized, it will also not go down the slippery path that involves changing the flags and colors” of socialism with Chinese characteristics (China.com.cn, December 14, 2012; Southern Daily[Guangzhou], November 17, 2012). Indeed, in his NPC speech, Xi laid down three prerequisites for attaining the China Dream: “The China Dream can only be fulfilled via going down the China road; realizing the China Dream necessarily means propagating the China spirit; and realizing the China Dream requires concentrating and crystallizing China’s strength” (Xinhua, March 17; People’s Daily Online, March 17). This essentially ruled out the introduction of Western ideas and institutions of governance. Moreover, the Xi-Li administration has through a series of administrative restructuring concentrated more power than ever in a few high-level, non-transparent party organs, such as the Central Committee Secretariat (“Centralized Power Key to Realizing Xi’s ‘China Dream’,” China Brief, March 28).

Conservative opinion-makers have warned that Xi’s slogan must not be interpreted as an endorsement of “bourgeois-liberal” values. Wang Yiwei, a political scientist at Beijing’s Renmin University, has laid into liberal intellectuals “who want to equate ‘the China Dream’ with all-out Westernization.” It was wrong to equate the China Dream with ideals such as “the dream of constitutional governance or the dream of human rights and democracy,” he noted. Professor Wang added that the China Dream actually meant “the Sinocization of Marxism through taking into consideration China’s own conditions, so as to open up the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Xinhua, April 16; Global Times, April 16). In a commentary on the same subject, the usually hard-line Beijing Daily pointed out that Xi’s rallying cry was aimed at promoting patriotism as well as obedience to CCP edicts. The paper noted “We must meld together the country’s dream and the dream of the [Chinese] race with each individual’s dream.” The commentary went further, adding “The China Dream is about goals that Communist party members struggle hard to achieve...It also represents the [collective] aspirations of all Chinese men and women” (People’s Daily Online, December 19, 2012; Beijing Daily, December 18, 2012).

China May Have Helped Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Design, Newly Declassified Intelligence Indicates

Posted - April 23, 2013
Edited by William Burr
For more information contact:
William Burr - 202/994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

CIA in 1977 Correctly Estimated South Africa Could Produce Enough Weapons-Grade Uranium "to Make Several Nuclear Devices Per Year"

Report on the Libyan Nuclear Program Found that "Serious Deficiencies," "Poor Leadership" and Lack of "Coherent Planning" Made it "Highly Unlikely to Achieve a Nuclear Weapons Capability "Within the Next 10 years"

Intelligence Estimates on Argentina and Brazil Raised Questions About Their Nuclear Programs and Whether they Sought a Weapons Capability

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 423

Khushab plutonium production reactor, Pakistan, 1998 (Photo fromspaceimaging.com, courtesy of Institute for Science and International Security)

Washington, D.C., April 23, 2013 – China was exporting nuclear materials to Third World countries without safeguards beginning in the early 1980s, and may have given Pakistan weapons design information in the early years of its clandestine program, according to recently declassified CIA records. The formerly Top Secret reports, published today by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, are the CIA's first-ever declassifications of allegations that Beijing supported Islamabad's nuclear ambitions.

The newly released records, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and Mandatory Declassification Review process, indicate growing U.S. concern from the 1960s to the early 1990s about the intentions of other embryonic or potential nuclear states, including Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and Libya. Among the disclosures in these reports:
  • A 1966 estimate discussed what would become an important problem: the possibility of "covert" nuclear programs and the prospect that a "country could go far toward a weapons program" under the disguise of a "peaceful program."
  • On South Africa, a 1977 CIA analysis of the uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba included the estimate that South Africa would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium "to make several nuclear devices per year."
  • According to a 1982 estimate, nuclear proliferation could become a "greater threat to US interests over the next five years." Nuclear R&D alone, without producing any weapons, could contribute to regional instability and the "disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States."
  • In 1981, U.S. intelligence became aware of a "secret nuclear facility" at Pilcaniyeu that the Argentines later announced was a uranium enrichment (gaseous diffusion) pilot plant.
  • A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) prepared after the 1982 Argentine-British conflict over the Falkland Islands professed "great uncertainty" over Argentina's nuclear intentions: "emotionally" the Argentine military leadership was interested in a weapons option, but it had "reduced capability to fulfill this desire." By 1985, uncertainty had passed: U.S. intelligence believed that Argentina had no program to develop nuclear weapons.
  • According to the estimates on Brazil, the leaders of the nuclear establishment sought to "keep … options open to develop a nuclear weapons capability." The 1985 estimate asserted that the prominent role of the Brazilian military in nuclear activities, "the direction of Brazil's nuclear r&d," and the "reputation" of the National Nuclear Energy Commission's president for "favoring a nuclear option" all posed a "danger to US interests."
  • A report on Indian efforts to purchase nuclear-related supplies in world markets described it as a "direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls" over sensitive technologies. Japan and Western Europe resisted U.S. pressure by arguing that "they will be replaced by the Soviets in the Indian market if they are curtailed."
The analysis of the Libyan nuclear program was severe: the program's "serious deficiencies," including "poor leadership" and the lack of both "coherent planning" and trained personnel made it "highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years."

Image of South African nuclear facilities near Pretoria in 1991. The uranium enrichment plant at Valindiba is indicated as the Y-Plant. (Courtesy of Institute for Science and International Security andwww.terraform.com)

Since its inception, the U.S. intelligence community has been investigating and analyzing overseas nuclear activities, whether explicitly weapons-oriented or simply suspicious.[1] At the heart of the earliest effort was the monitoring of the former Soviet Union and its European allies for signs of a weapons program. Beginning in the late 1950s, however with concern about France, China, Israel, and other countries mounting, the Central Intelligence Agency began to focus on global trends. While the CIA has declassified dozens of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on the former Soviet Union and its nuclear forces, NIEs and other detailed reports on proliferation issues have been relatively scarce, especially for the 1970s and 1980s, and often heavily excised. Nevertheless, the Agency has been taking a more forthcoming approach to nuclear proliferation intelligence and the releases are significant. NIEs have had the reputation, sometimes disputed, of being the most authoritative intelligence product on a given topic and their declassification is important for understanding how the intelligence establishment understood this problem during various time periods. [2]

These intelligence estimates alert us to the challenge of interpreting the motives of other countries. Some of the estimates present a rather pessimistic view of the future of the nuclear nonproliferation system, raising questions about the intentions of countries that did not actually seek a nuclear weapons option. With more information available from overseas archives and other sources it is becoming possible to evaluate the acuity of U.S. intelligence analysis for understanding nuclear motivations. For example, new sources in Brazil indicate that the country's leadership did not want a weapons capability but aimed instead for major accomplishments in advanced technology. Like Iran today, Brazil had initiated a gas centrifuge program (although without the international opprobrium). Nevertheless, the NIEs pointed to a "determination" to have a weapons option, although it also more accurately cited the quest for technological progress. Indeed, Brazil and Argentina, another suspect country, eventually signed off on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty despite longstanding objections (which persist in Brazil). Determining the intentions of the leadership in such countries as Iran and North Korea remains a continuing and important challenge because the outcome will have profound implications for the future of the nonproliferation system. Declassified NIEs can serve as a primary source data set for illuminating contemporary proliferation controversies and for drawing lessons from earlier ones.

Except for a few items, the CIA released these documents as a result of Freedom of Information and mandatory declassification review requests by the National Security Archive. Some of the estimates appear on the CIA FOIA Web site and the editor of this posting requested a new review to see if more information would be declassified. In some cases, that happened: the CIA released more details, for example, on Argentina and Brazil. In some instances, as in Pakistan, the CIA released no new information and the estimates are under appeal. Other pending requests and appeals, if successful, will illuminate CIA and intelligence community perspectives on the problem of nuclear proliferation.


Document 1: "Covert Programs"

National Intelligence Estimate, "The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation," NIE 4-66, 20 January 1966, Secret, Excised copy, released on appeal by Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel

This estimate, previously released in massively excised form, updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel's program. This assessment followed the same pattern-predicting India would produce a weapon within a "few years" and also putting Israel in the "might" category, although treating it as a "serious contender" nonetheless. Sweden was also in the "might" category, although the estimators acknowledged the strong opposition of public opinion to a weapons program. Why Israel was in the "might" category, even though it would have weapons by mid-1967, must have reflected debate among U.S. government experts as to the purposes of the Dimona reactor.

The estimate ruled out nuclear programs by a number of countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, etc.) for the "foreseeable future," while it found that other countries "warranted more detailed discussion" because their "incentives" could be strong enough to acquire nuclear weapons in the next 10 years. In addition to India, Israel, and Sweden, these included Japan and South Africa, among others. For plausible reasons (lack of incentive and ample disincentives) the estimate ruled out Italy from the second list, but it is worth noting that in early 1967 its top officials were so angry about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that they briefly debated whether to initiate a national nuclear weapons program. [3]