21 December 2013

Tackling Energy Security

Teri’s report ‘National Energy Map for India :Technology Vision 2030’ estimates that in the Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario, our commercial energy consumption is estimated to increase from 285 Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent) in 2001 to 2123 Mtoe and 3351 Mtoe in 2031 if the economy grows at 6.7 percent and 10 percent respectively. Although hydro, nuclear, and renewable energy forms are expected to increase around six times in period 2001–31, these would contribute to mere 4.5 percent of the total commercial energy requirements over the modeling time frame. Hence, pressure coal, oil, and gas will continue to remain high in coming decades. The report details requirements of four key interventions: enhancing end-use efficiencies; adopting advanced coal- and gas-based power generating technologies; enhancing the exploitation of renewable energy and nuclear energy resources, and; enhancing efficiency in the transport sector by modal shifts. The study also estimates enormous possible reductions applying such interventions. However, the bottom-line is thatIndia would need to increase its imports of coal, oil, and gas in the future. More importantly, in order to minimise import dependency, it is imperative to focus on increasing the supply of indigenous energy resources including through R&D in exploration and production of energy.

Interestingly, the world’s first 10 MW Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation (OTEC) plant is being set up in USA, Ocean holding infinite potential for producing terawatts of energy. It is also green energy fully meeting climate conservation requirements. With large oceanic fronts, India must research this technology and establish a chain of coastal energy plants based on OTEC duly linked to the national power grid. Then is the shale gas revolution that has also transformed need versus resource debate with far reaching strategic ramifications. Speculation is rife that energy self-sufficiency may lead the US to let more regions submerge in chaos, while resorting to controlled engagement from the background. Increased energy self-sufficiency may lead China to become even more aggressive. Globally, major shale gas prospects are in US, China, Argentina, Australia, Europe, and New Zealand. A joint US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Advanced Resources International (ARI) report of 17 June 2013 makes a joint India-Pakistan regional assessment of “risked” technically recoverable Shale Gas Resources as 114 tcf assessed in 2011, which has been hiked to 201 tcf as per 2013 assessment. As per another assessment, India has shale gas reserves of 63 tcf, which may increase as drilling progresses. In January 2011, ONGC had discovered shale gas in its pilot drilling venture in Damodar basin. While ONGC and OIL are undertaking pilot projects to assess the shale gas potential, Reliance and GAIL have entered US shale industry to gain technical expertise. There are reports of the US offering shale gas to India ostensibly to reduce energy dependence on Iran. Shale gas can help India meet its growing energy demand, besides reducing its dependence on expensive energy imports and the energy import bill. Incidentally, natural gas prices in the US are at record lows as the surge in shale gas production coupled with lower demand has lowered the average price of gas.

India’s Afghan muddle

December 18, 2013
Shashank Joshi

If New Delhi is serious about its concerns over rapid western withdrawal from Afghanistan, it should along with other governments form a multinational joint working group to assess the points of vulnerability for Afghan forces

Afghan President Hamid Karzai cannot get enough of Delhi. He has just concluded his third visit to the capital in the space of a year, a remarkable tally that underscores the great potential of the India-Afghanistan relationship. But India is at risk of wasting opportunities to build on what has been one of its greatest diplomatic successes in the past decade.

For over a year, India has warned that the NATO-led western coalition in Afghanistan erred in announcing a departure date; that the coalition is drawing down combat forces too quickly; and that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are being left ill-equipped to fight insurgent and terrorist threats that remain entrenched in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. Today, India is in a strong position to shape each of these factors to its advantage, but its policies are marked by indecision and confusion.

Security agreement

First, consider the question of western troops. Contrary to the popular Indian understanding, western forces do not intend to “withdraw” from Afghanistan next year. Kabul and Washington have agreed on the text of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), which would allow a force of 8,000 to 10,000 troops to remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014 for training purposes and limited counterterrorism missions, albeit under strict conditions. Mr. Karzai initially convened a largely hand-picked Loya Jirga (tribal assembly), which overwhelmingly urged the President to sign the agreement. But now, he has changed his mind. He wants new and implausible concessions from the U.S., and also insists that the BSA should be signed by his successor after the Afghan presidential elections in April 2014, perhaps hoping to maintain leverage over Washington in case the elections are as flawed and contested as those of 2009.

The U.S. has retorted that this would not give them enough time to prepare for such a large mission, and that U.S. troops might therefore have to leave altogether — the so-called “zero option.” This would also put at risk the many billions of dollars of American aid that will flow to Kabul for several years after 2014. Without this money, the survival of Afghan security forces and the Afghan state itself is in question. After all, it was not the departure of Soviet forces in 1989 that produced the collapse of the Communist government in Kabul to the Mujahideen, but the withdrawal of Soviet funds three years later. As the Afghan National Security Advisor put it, Kabul without the BSA “would be isolated again, like a lamb stuck among wolves in the desert.”

Khalid Kidwai: Pakistan gets a new nuclear-weapons chief

20 December 2013

In the fifteen years that Pakistan has been an overtly nuclear-armed state, one man has been a near-continuous presence at the heart of the country's weapons program. Now, he's leaving.

Artillery officer Lt General Khalid Kidwai was appointed as the first head of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in 2000. SPD is a large and powerful secretariat that manages all things nuclear- and missile-related. Kidwai has held the job ever since, even after his formal retirement in 2007 (since which he has been granted twelve extensions of tenure). In that time, he has overseen the world's fastest growing and diversifying nuclear arsenal. He may very well be one of Pakistan's longest serving officials in history.

In June, Michael Krepon wrote this about Kidwai's central role:

Every nation's nuclear weapon-related programs have elevated a few individuals into positions of extraordinary authority. Some have remained in the shadows, a few have become national embarrassments, and others have gained public renown. The “father” of the US nuclear navy, Admiral Hyman Rickover, had such a high profile and was deemed to be so essential by his supporters on Capitol Hill that his retirement from active duty was postponed until the ripe old age of 81. Pakistan's closest approximation to Admiral Rickover is...Kidwai. 

As Pakistani journalist Wajahat Khan put it two years ago in a profile, 'Kidwai is the Birbal of the Akbar that is Pakistan's great nuclear arsenal', referring to a famously wise advisor who served in the court of Mughal Emperor Akbar. The New York Times' David Sanger profiled Kidwai in 2009, looking at his efforts to reassure the US that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were safe in the face of insider threats and rampant militancy. (These efforts were largely unsuccessful: the Snowden files show that US intelligence considers Pakistan's nuclear program to be a major and 'intractable' target).

This week, after years of rumours that he was about to go, Kidwai finally passed the baton. His successor is Lt General Zubair Mahmood Hayat, previously commander of the Pakistan Army's unremarkable XXXI Corps.

This transfer of power is a crucial test of whether Kidwai's long tenure has overly personalised the SPD or whether he has built an institution capable of adapting to the challenges Pakistan will face as it moves towards emphasising short range tactical nuclear weapons (a controversial shift; even former SPD officials have expressed concern about the severe risks). There is unlikely to be any radical break with these doctrinal trends.

Indian, American and other officials will be watching Hayat closely for any clues about his intentions.

Japan: Land of the Rising Gun

December 20, 2013

Japan’s first-ever national security strategy, released this week, may prove to be an inflection point in twenty-first-century Asia’s young history. Not only had Japan abided by a strict interpretation of its U.S.-written pacifist constitution over the last six decades, but Japan’s people had adopted pacifism as an important part of their national identity. And yet, somewhat suddenly, a country that has been not just wary of but eager to avoid foreign military entanglements is now implementing a more “proactive” national security policy. Its plans are good for Japan, good for Asia, and good for U.S. interests.

While Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is owed Washington’s thanks for his steely leadership, congrats are also in order for Beijing. China has done what North Korean belligerence and American goading have long failed to do: awake Japan from its Rip Van Winkle-like postmodern slumber. Just four years ago, Japan’s then prime minister Yukio Hatoyama was seeking to distance Tokyo from Washington and pushing the formation of an Asians-only “East Asian Community.”

But now, according to the National Security Strategy, Japan lives in a “severe security environment.” Leaving little doubt as to the responsible party, the strategy document accuses China of “attempts to change the status quo by coercion,” intruding “into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku islands,” and “unduly [infringing] the freedom of overflight above the high seas.”

Recent years have seen the Chinese navy regularly transit through the Japanese islands to the Pacific Ocean. In the fiscal year ending March 2013, Japan scrambled fighter jets 306 times in response to Chinese aircraft, a record high and the first time Chinese-induced scrambles outpaced Russian-induced ones.

Chinese and Japanese maritime forces, moreover, have been playing an ongoing game of cat-and-mouse in the East China Sea, the result of a Chinese effort to change the reality of Japan’s administrative control over the disputed Senkaku islands. Most recently, Beijing declared an “air defense identification zone” over much of the East China Sea, including the Senkakus, claiming that civilian and military aircraft within the ADIZ are required to file flight plans with China and are subject to Chinese directions. While many point to the Japanese government’s purchase of three of the islands last year as the starting point for the latest round of tension, Chinese pressure on the islands had been a near constant before then.

Beijing’s approach to the Senkakus is often attributed to Chinese nationalism and a new president, Xi Jinping, more inclined to act on nationalistic sentiment than his predecessor. But there is more to it than that. Indeed, Chinese actions in the East China Sea, including regular Chinese submarine passage through the Miyako Strait, highlight what Beijing sees as a key vulnerability—its lack of control over the waterways through which its exports, natural resource imports, and naval vessels must pass.

The Rhyme of History: Lessons of the Great War

Margaret MacMillan
Published 12/14/2013

Earlier this year I was on holiday in Corsica and happened to wander into the church of a tiny hamlet in the hills where I found a memorial to the dead from World War I. Out of a population that can have been no more than 150, eight young men, bearing among them only three last names, had died in that conflict. Such lists can be found all over Europe, in great cities and in small villages. Similar memorials are spread around the globe, for the Great War, as it was known prior to 1940, also drew soldiers from Asia, Africa, and North America. 

World War I still haunts us, partly because of the sheer scale of the carnage—10 million combatants killed and many more wounded. Countless civilians lost their lives, too, whether through military action, starvation, or disease. Whole empires were destroyed and societies brutalized.

But there’s another reason the war continues to haunt us: we still cannot agree why it happened. Was it caused by the overweening ambitions of some of the men in power at the time? Kaiser Wilhelm II and his ministers, for example, wanted a greater Germany with a global reach, so they challenged the naval supremacy of Great Britain. Or does the explanation lie in competing ideologies? National rivalries? Or in the sheer and seemingly unstoppable momentum of militarism? As an arms race accelerated, generals and admirals made plans that became ever more aggressive as well as rigid. Did that make an explosion inevitable?

Or would it never have happened had a random event in an Austro-Hungarian backwater not lit the fuse? In the second year of the conflagration that engulfed most of Europe a bitter joke made the rounds: “Have you seen today’s headline? ‘Archduke Found Alive: War a Mistake.’” That is the most dispiriting explanation of all—that the war was simply a blunder that could have been avoided.

The search for explanations began almost as soon as the guns opened fire in the summer of 1914 and has never stopped. Scholars have combed through archives from Belgrade to Berlin looking for the causes. An estimated 32,000 articles, treatises, and books on World War I have been published in English alone. So when a British publisher took me out to lunch on a lovely spring day in Oxford five years ago and asked me if I would like to try my hand at one of history’s greatest puzzles, my first reaction was a firm no. Yet afterward I could not stop thinking about this question that has haunted so many. In the end I succumbed. The result is yet another book, my own effort to understand what happened a century ago and why.

It was not just academic curiosity that drove me, but a sense of urgency as well. If we cannot determine how one of the most momentous conflicts in history happened, how can we hope to avoid another such catastrophe in the future? 

Just look at the actual and potential conflicts that dominate the news today. The Middle East, made up largely of countries that received their present borders as a consequence of World War I, is but one of many areas around the globe that is in turmoil, and has been for decades. Now there’s a civil war in Syria, which has raised the spectre of a wider conflict in the region while also troubling relations among the major powers and testing their diplomatic skills. The Bashar al-Assad regime’s use of poison gas—a weapon first deployed in the trench warfare of 1914, then outlawed because world opinion viewed it as barbaric—nearly precipitated American airstrikes. Commentary on these developments was filled with references to the guns of that long-ago August. Just as policymakers then discovered they had started something they could not stop, so this past summer we feared that such airstrikes might lead to a wider and more long-lasting conflict than anyone in President Barack Obama’s administration could foresee. 

Why Sunnis Fear Shiites


The recent Arab revolts in the Middle East and the concomitant “Islamic Awakening” have not merely shaken up the order of an already violent and unstable region. They have reanimated the bloodiest and longest-running dispute in Muslim politics: which branch of Islam, Sunni or Shia, is to rule the Muslim polity. This rivalry dates back some 1,300 years to the death of Muhammad, and while it has occasionally been set aside for reasons of expedience, it has never been resolved. The continuing conflagrations following the mislabeled Arab Spring, increasingly shaped by this ancient Sunni–Shia tension, are set to rage on indefinitely. Affairs in the Middle East are accelerating back to the old normal: a state of hot holy war.

The seemingly internal conflict in Syria has become the war’s central front. Sunni and Shia alike have been drawn into the conflict as the Syrian tragedy has unfolded. Inspired by the revolts in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, in March 2011 Syrians—a predominantly Sunni population—mounted initially peaceful protests against the rule of the Shia-offshoot Alawite regime headed by Bashar al-Assad. Secure in his support from the extremist Iranian regime, Assad responded with great brutality. His opponents responded in kind, fueled by money and arms from their Sunni patrons in the Gulf Arab states and by Sunni Islamists from both the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda. They fear what they have taken to calling, with alarm, the “Shia crescent.” The term connotes a swath of Iranian Shiite influence across the Arab world and, via Syria, to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Syria functions as Iran’s direct operational link to its terrorist arm Hezbollah and to the Shiite plurality in Lebanon. It borders Iraq, whose Shiite majority may be radicalized, and Turkey, whose Sunni leadership can be monitored and checked.

As the Syrian revolt proceeded, sectarian elements came to the fore. The momentum frequently shifted back and forth between the Iranian-backed Assad and the Sunni rebels. But this past spring, when Assad’s fortunes waned, Iran doubled down. It arranged for Shiite Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite “volunteers” to join the fray directly and massively, tipping the battle for Syria into Shiite hands. Iran is now winning what one Iranian officer has described as “an epic battle for Shiite Islam.”

As this has gone on, the willful retraction of American influence in the region has fanned both Iranian ambitions and Sunni fears. The Middle East is well versed in the posturings and weaknesses of foreign sovereigns. In Shiite and Sunni eyes alike, President Barack Obama’s proposed deals relating to Syrian chemical weapons and Iran’s nuclear program translate into large gains for radical Shiism.

Can a China-Russia Axis Bankrupt the US?

Russia and China have studied the end of the Cold War and how the US ultimately defeated the USSR by bankrupting it.
December 20, 2013

According to Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev, 2013 was“a year of harvest” for Sino-Russian relations. It was also a year of new lows for the countries’ relations with the West — and from the look of it, things could get worse in 2014.

Much has been said in recent years about how two difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a sagging economy cut the U.S. at the knees and created space for China. During this same period, China was enjoying double-digit economic growth and a relatively stable security environment, emerging as a hegemon in Asia. As the U.S. was struggling to extricate itself from, and was pouring billions of dollars into, unwinnable wars, Beijing was reaping the benefits of its “peaceful rise” by building its economy, resolving longstanding territorial disputes with neighbors, consolidating ties with smaller powers within the region, and neutralizing Taiwan as a potential source of armed conflict.

Thus, when China began flexing its muscles in the East and South China Seas, Beijing was not cowed by the U.S. “pivot,” or “rebalancing,” to Asia. For one thing, it was apparent that Washington’s renewed interest in East Asia would not — at least not in the medium term — be accompanied by a willingness to allocate sufficient capital and resources to make the pivot a credible counter to China. As Beijing and many U.S. defense experts saw it, the rebalancing was more a wish list and academic exercise than an actual strategy, let alone one that was anywhere near implementation. That is the reason why Beijing suffered little consequences when it threatened to alter the status quo within the region, such as with the November 23 declaration of its extended Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. (There is every reason to believe that a credible U.S. pivot to Asia would have deterred Beijing, which ostensibly does not seek war at this point in time, from embarking on such adventurism.)

Now by working together, China and Russia could make sure that the U.S. rebalance to Asia, if it ever materializes, remains a diluted, and therefore ineffective, affair. They could do so by enlarging the spatial scope of U.S. security responsibilities and further stretching its military’s diminished resources. A few years ago, Bobo Lo, an associate fellow at Chatham House, proposed the term “axis of convenience” to describe the relationship between China and Russia. Five years after the publication of his book of the same title, the relationship has never been more convenient. For the time being at least, Beijing and Moscow appear to have set their own territorial disputes aside, and by cooperating at the strategic level they are hoping to force the U.S. out of Asia altogether.

A substantial amount of attention has been paid to China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, with the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) serving as one of its principal components, and to which we can now perhaps add the ADIZ. Less, however, has been said of Russia’s ongoing efforts to keep the U.S. out of its backyard. It is interesting to note that two weeks after China’s ADIZ announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin, meeting top military officers, stated that Russia would bolster its presence in the potentially resource-rich Arctic. Earlier that month and a little more than a week after China sprung its ADIZ surprise, the Russian navyannounced that the Arctic would be its priority in 2014. As The Diplomat reported earlier this month, Russia is currently deploying aerospace defense and electronic warfare units to the area, and is now building a comprehensive early-warning missile radar system near Vorkuta in the extreme north, among other developments.

A Raid on Iran?

Published on The Weekly Standard (http://www.weeklystandard.com)
Don’t count out the Israeli military. It has a record of pulling off daring, surprise strikes.
Uri Sadot
December 30 - January 6, 2014, Vol. 19, No. 16

As world powers debate what a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran should look like, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to maintain that Israel is not bound by the interim agreement that the P5+1 and Iran struck in Geneva on November 24. Israel, says Netanyahu, “has the right and the obligation to defend itself.” One question then is whether Netanyahu actually intends to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. The other question, no less important, is whether Israel could really pull it off.

American analysts are divided on Israel’s ability to take effective military action. However, history shows that Israel’s military capabilities are typically underestimated. The Israel Defense Forces keep finding creative ways to deceive and cripple their targets by leveraging their qualitative advantages in manners that confound not only skeptical observers but also, and more important, Israel’s enemies. 

Military triumphs like the Six-Day War of June 1967 and the 1976 raid on Entebbe that freed 101 hostages are popular Israeli lore for good reason—these “miraculous” victories were the result of assiduously planned, rehearsed, and well-executed military operations based on the elements of surprise, deception, and innovation, core tenets of Israeli military thinking. Inscribed on one of the walls of the IDF’s officer training academy is the verse from Proverbs 24:6: “For by clever deception thou shalt wage war.” And this has been the principle driving almost all of Israel’s most successful campaigns, like the 1981 bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor, the 1982 Beka’a Valley air battle, and the 2007 raid on Syria’s plutonium reactor, all of which were thought improbable, if not impossible, until Israel made them reality. 

And yet in spite of Israel’s record, some American experts remain skeptical about Israel’s ability to do anything about Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities. Even the most optimistic assessments argue that Israel can only delay the inevitable. As a September 2012 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies contends: “Israel does not have the capability to carry out preventive strikes that could do more than delay Iran’s efforts for a year or two.” An attack, it continued, “would be complex and high risk in the operational level and would lack any assurances of a high mission success rate.” Equally cautious is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, who argued that while “Israel has the capability to strike Iran and to delay the production or the capability of Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons status,” such a strike would only delay the program “for a couple of years.” The most pessimistic American assessments contend that Israel is all but neutered. Former director of the CIA Michael Hayden, for instance, said that airstrikes capable of seriously setting back Iran’s nuclear program are beyond Israel’s capacity.

Part of the reason that Israeli and American assessments diverge is the difference in the two countries’ recent military histories and political cultures. While the American debate often touches on the limits of military power and its ability to secure U.S. interests around the globe, the Israeli debate is narrower, befitting the role of a regional actor rather than a superpower, and focuses solely on Israel’s ability to provide for the security of its citizens at home. That is to say, even if Israel and the United States saw Iran and its nuclear arms program in exactly the same light, there would still be a cultural gap. Accordingly, an accurate understanding of how Israelis see their own recent military history provides an important insight into how Israel’s elected leaders and military officials view the IDF’s abilities regarding Iran. 

Any account of surprise and deception as key elements in Israeli military history has to start with the aerial attack that earned Israel total air supremacy over its adversaries in the June 1967 war. Facing the combined Arab armies, most prominently those of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, Israel’s Air Force was outnumbered by a ratio of 3 planes to 1. Nonetheless, at the very outset of the war, the IAF dispatched its jets at a time when Egyptian pilots were known to be having breakfast. Israeli pilots targeted the enemy’s warplanes on their runways, and in two subsequent waves of sorties, destroyed the remainder of the Egyptian Air Force, as well as Jordan’s and most of Syria’s. Within six hours, over 400 Arab planes, virtually all of the enemy’s aircraft, were in flames, with Israel losing only 19 planes.

The Israeli Programs That Help The NSA Organize Its Intelligence Data

“We were maybe ahead of the U.S. in giving up our private data, but we’ve also been ahead of them in organizing that data,” says a former member of Israel’s secretive 8200 unit.posted on December 19, 2013 at 11:57am EST
Sheera FrenkelBuzzFeed Staff

An undated aerial handout photo shows the National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters building in Fort Meade, Maryland. Handout . / Reuters / Reuters

JERUSALEM, Israel — Nestled between the Glilot highway junction and a multiplex cinema in central Israel is a hill that looks like it doesn’t belong. Underneath the grass sits the underground headquarters of 8200, the Israeli Intelligence Corps Unit, which has grown over the past 60 years to accommodate the thousands of soldiers it needs for decrypting codes and collecting signal intelligence. The unit, secretive and elite, outgrew its Tel Aviv headquarters just two years after its inception in 1984, and over the past decade has massively expanded its intelligence-gathering installation in southern Israel’s Negev desert.

“We’re one of the largest units in the Israeli military, we’re bigger than the navy. We’re arguably more important than the navy too,” said Shlomo, a soldier who recently retired from the 8200 unit to take a job in the private sector. He agreed to be interviewed by BuzzFeed if only his first name was used. “What we do is at the forefront of how our country will fight and defend itself in the future.”

As the U.S. begins to consider curbing some of the vast spying powers allotted to the National Security Agency (NSA), in Israel the presence of a big brother-type of intelligence agency is not only largely accepted by the public, it’s a popular career choice for high-tech entrepreneurs. As the Obama administration begins to debate the recommendations of the panel of presidential advisors who this week reviewed the NSA’s surveillance practices and recommended that data should not be stored wholesale by the NSA, Israel’s intelligence apparatus continues to focus on how to collect even greater caches of data, and — more importantly — how to organize and peruse that data through complex computer programs they develop.

Dozens of private companies have been founded by veterans of Unit 8200, many of them based on the work they did for Israeli intelligence. They have turned Unit 8200 into an incubator for so many successful security companies that Yossi Vardi, who founded Israel’s first software company in 1969, said “more high-tech millionaires have been created from 8200 than from any business school in the country.”


A first of its kind, this book—of, by, and for the noncommissioned officer and petty officer—is a comprehensive explanation of the enlisted leader across the U.S. Armed Services. Written by a team of Active, Reserve, and retired senior enlisted leaders from all Service branches, this book defines and describes how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the Profession of Arms, explains their dual roles of complementing the officer and enabling the force, and exposes their international engagement. 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency operations.

This publication provides doctrine for religious affairs in joint operations. It also provides information on the chaplain’s roles as the principal advisor to the joint force commander on religious affairs and a key advisor on the impact of religion on military operations. It further provides information on the chaplain’s role of delivering and facilitating religious ministries in joint operations.

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint operations in an urban environment.

This publication sets forth standard US military and associated terminology to encompass the joint activity of the Armed Forces of the United States. These military and associated terms, together with their definitions, constitute approved Department of Defense (DOD) terminology for general use by all DOD components.

This publication is the keystone document for joint intelligence. It provides fundamental principles and guidance for intelligence support to joint operations.

This publication is the keystone document of the joint logistics series. It provides overarching joint doctrine on logistic support to joint operations. It provides commanders and staff guidance and considerations for planning, execution, and assessment of joint operations. It also discusses responsibilities, authorities, and control options available to a joint force commander and provides precepts to influence the commander’s decisionmaking process.

A new DOCNET course, drawn from JP 1, is now available. This course is designed to introduce military professionals to doctrine for unifed action by the Armed Forces of the United States. 

A new DOCNET course, drawn from JP 3-07, is now available. This course is designed to provide the military professional with knowldege of key doctrinal concepts related to Stability Operations. 

This publication provides doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing military operations in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environments.

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, employing, and assessing air mobility operations across the range of military operations.

In light of the ongoing developments in Syria, this issue considers Operation Odyssey Dawn, the 2011 United Nations mission to protect the Libyan people from their own leader. Three articles look at this operation from diverse angles and demonstrate how many questions still remain regarding the use of outside military force within sovereign nations.

The Shape of Things to Come

Hot Markets to Watch

(Foreign Affairs)
The idea that we live in an increasingly interconnected and turbulent world is something of a cliché -- yet true and important nevertheless. Decisions made by the U.S. Federal Reserve affect the purchasing power of villagers in southern Thailand; consumer demand in Europe and North America affects the output of factory workers in eastern China, which affects the jobs of oil workers in Brazil, Russia, and elsewhere. Elite investors now routinely send their capital abroad in a ceaseless quest for new opportunities and high returns; whether they realize it or not, hundreds of millions of less highflying people do the same indirectly, through their mutual or pension funds. So global economic forecasting -- trying to look past current events to glimpse what’s coming over the horizon -- has become an exercise of general, not specialized, concern.

A decade ago, the big story in the international economy was the so-called rise of the rest: the impressive growth of dozens of emerging markets around the globe. Poverty rates plummeted, the middle class exploded, and forecasters began talking of a great convergence, in which broad swaths of the developing world would catch up to the developed one. Then, the global financial crisis hit like a tidal wave, dousing almost everyone and redrawing the landscape. In its wake, many of the once-hot emerging markets have cooled. The BRICs are crumbling. China’s three-decade run of phenomenal growth seems to be ending, with the big question now being whether its landing will be hard or soft. And half a decade after the crisis began, Europe is still floundering. But not all the news is bad. The United States has surprised skeptics by making a slow but steady recovery, led by energy and manufacturing. And a whole new crop of green shoots is springing up.

Given the tumult, we decided that now would be a good time to survey these up-and-comers: countries and regions whose combination of size, recent performance, and economic potential will make them particularly interesting to watch and attractive to investors over the next half decade. All our choices -- Mexico, South Korea, Poland, Turkey, Indonesia and the Philippines, and the Mekong region -- are well positioned to thrive as China slows and the commodity boom cools. All have crucial strengths to draw on and will play increasingly important roles in the future of the global economy. And yet, as our expert authors show, each faces a distinctive set of challenges.