19/01/2014
Afghanistan is the war that Barack Obama thought was the ‘good war’ which now he cannot wait to leave. He set a time to which NATO agreed and subsequently powers with stakes in the country set their watches. With the Presidential elections and the eminent pull out of Western troops, 2014 is turning out to be a landmark year for Afghanistan and the region. Series of assumptions and rough calculations are underway to deal with the situation flowing from the inevitable drawdown of financial and technical assistance and the formidable challenges those developments might pose for a country like India. Afghanistan has bearing on India’s security and economic interest. Post 2001, it provided India an opportunity to underscore its role as a regional power. Having invested $2 billion already and being aware of the security challenge an unstable Afghanistan can pose, India is resetting its Afghan policies and exploring avenues of regional cooperation.
The recent India visit of President Karzai is the fifth one in last three years and is extremely significant for the bilateral relations. Afghanistan pressed India for stepping up military aid including lethal and non-lethal weapons and after negotiations President Karzai told media that his talks with Indian PM were “very productive, resulting in satisfaction for Afghan side”. In the last 12 years, India has attempted to support and complement allied efforts. It adopted a “soft power” approach aimed at striking a chord with ordinary Afghans through developmental initiatives and stayed away from internal politics. It also wisely refrained from sending troops for engaging in security operations. However, Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in 2011 indicated, “India agrees to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces.” December 2013 talks further agreed on deepening security cooperation and military aid that would increase their operational capabilities and mobility.
Considering the delicate geopolitical situation of the region neither Delhi nor Kabul would be inclined to push the envelope of defence cooperation and tread on Pakistani sensitivities. Friendship and cooperation with India creates diplomatic space for Karzai to negotiate with Pakistan. Afghans have always dealt with India-Pakistan issue rather smartly by remaining terribly neutral.
India has much to consider. Afghanistan cannot forever remain an economic basket case and a burden on international community. An unstable Afghanistan could revert to becoming a safe haven for terrorists and the brunt of escalating terror¬ism could be borne by India, which already has been described as “the sponge that protects” the West. US has primarily focused on dismantling Al-Qaida networks, but other terrorist groups which have been India’s major concerns (like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Hizbul-Mujahideen) have been relatively unaddressed.
For India, stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan is beneficial, as it could enable integrating the region in a larger economic framework. To that extent, India is looking at Afghanistan in a larger construct, encompassing a free trade area ranging from Kabul to Dhaka and Colombo and extending westward to Maldives to link up to India’s larger Look East Policy vision. India is working closely with Iran, Russia and US to put in $ 10.8 billion investment in development of Afghanistan’s natural resources.
As far as Afghanistan is concerned the symbiotic relationship that exists between Taliban on one hand and Al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, various Arab groups and their contacts in Islamic world on the other, cannot be wished away. The on-going negotiations with Taliban could result in the release of large numbers of Taliban leaders, revival of trans-national terrorist activities and spread of Salafi ideology and groups. These changed circumstances could be conducive for launching a fresh round of attacks, the Taliban being emboldened by their ability to “defeat” two superpowers. India would have to deal with possible restrictions on energy security, increase in drug trafficking and an expanded role for Pakistan in post 2014 Afghanistan.
The nature of US-Afghan relations post 2014 also assumes significance. Prior to Karzai’s India visit in December 2013, Washington expressed the hope that the Indian leadership would persuade Karzai in favour of signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). However, India has distanced itself from direct involvement and stated that it shares Karzai’s wish to have the BSA, but will not be “prescriptive”, “intrusive” or be “judgmental.” India also recognises the need to coordinate more closely with Russia and Iran with which it shares convergent interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan. India wants continued commitment by the international community to the stabilisation of the Afghan situation and is not averse to US involvement in Afghan security; however it does not share Washington’s vision that without the US and NATO to guide the Afghan nation, the country has no future.
Indian interests in Afghanistan revolve around three major issues. The first is maintaining the sovereignty and integrity of Afghanistan by strengthening institutions, both civilian and military, and by facilitating a smoother political transition. The second is to prevent militant groups and external forces from subverting the country's progress towards stability. The third is to integrate Afghanistan into the regional economic framework. Internally, it is time that India addresses the issues of Afghan refugees in India. It still does not have a refugee policy and deals with the situation on an ad hoc basis. A significant population flow from Afghanistan is currently underway and a good number of them are seeking refuge in India. Talking about the plight of Afghans would hardly make little sense if Indian government chooses to ignore the plight of Afghans currently inside India. Post 2014 Afghanistan will be a litmus test as to how India navigates with global and regional powers to build up a consensus by calibrating their differences and competing interests, yet securing its own. But India should be wary of committing to more than what it can deliver.
(Author is a Doctoral Fellow at Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany)
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