24 March 2014

Closer scrutiny on Service Chiefs’ selection

Kanwar Sandhu

Adhering to the seniority principle ensures a smooth change-over. However, in the wake of numerous controversies involving the Service Chiefs, either when in service or after retirement, many security analysts suggest that an element of merit should be considered along with the principle of seniority. Many countries, including the USA, follow a system of deep selection.


THE appointment of the new Chief of Army Staff, a process that draws a lot of interest, is still some months away. However, the resignation of Admiral DK Joshi as Chief of Naval Staff at least 18 months before his term was to end has put the government in a quandary: should it follow the seniority principle or dig deeper to select the next Navy Chief? Either way, there is bound to be a debate yet again on the manner of selecting Service Chiefs. 

For the appointment of the Army Chief (and likewise for the equivalent in the Navy and Air Force), all seven Army commanders, besides the Vice Chief are considered 

The immediate Naval appointment apart, the present system of appointment is based broadly on the principle of seniority among the top-ranking officers, though there is no written ruling to that effect. However, governments have deviated from this practice a few times and, in some cases, supersession and sidestepping of officers invited criticism. This includes the sidestepping of Lt Gen PS Bhagat by giving Gen GG Bewoor one year’s extension. Later, in 1983 when Lt Gen SK Sinha was overlooked to make Gen AS Vaidya the Chief, the move drew wide criticism. However, there have been times when the government invited criticism for ignoring certain officers who clearly stood out professionally. In 1961, for example, many thought that Lt Gen SPP Thorat – and not his senior, Gen PN Thapar – should have been appointed to the coveted post. One wonders, though, if this would have changed the course of the 1962 war with China.

In the Navy and Air Force too, seniority has generally been upheld. However, there have been some supersessions, including that of Air Vice Marshal Shiv Dev Singh by Air Marshal OP Mehra in 1972, of Air Vice Marshal MM Singh by Air Marshal SK Mehra in 1988 and of Vice Admiral Tony Jain by Admiral L Ramdas in 1990. The government of course had an explanation in each case.

In India, while making top-level appointments, two major bodies come into play in India – the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) of which the Prime Minister is the chairman, and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). In the case of the appointment of Service Chiefs, the file is moved by the Defence Secretary to the Government wherein the service dossiers of the officers being considered are enclosed. The Home Minister and Defence Minister must necessarily be members of the ACC. In the CCS, besides the PM, who is obviously the chairman, its members are ministers of Defence, Finance, Home and External Affairs. Thus for appointment of Service Chiefs, between the two bodies, the Minister of External Affairs is the only addition in the CCS.

Unlike other senior posts, the appointments of the Service Chiefs are the only ones which require prior approval of the President, who is also the Commander-in-Chief, before they are announced.

Adhering to the seniority principle ensures a smooth change-over. However, in the wake of numerous controversies involving the Service Chiefs, either when in service or after retirement, many security analysts suggest that an element of merit should be considered along with the principle of seniority. Many countries, including the USA, follow a system of deep selection.

Although the exact system followed in appointment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the USA is not known, General Hugh Shelton (retd) in his book Without Hesitation, provides an insight into the process. It indicates an intense scrutiny of the possible contenders at three or four levels. And this scrutiny is not just limited to the professional level but extends to officers’ private lives, including their financial and moral conduct.

As in India, where for the appointment of the Army Chief (and likewise for the equivalent in the Navy and Air Force), all seven Army commanders besides the Vice Chief are considered, in the US, the selection of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is narrowed down to 13 officers. This is laid down in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These include Vice-Chairman, a Service Chief, Commander of a Unified Command and the Commander of the Combatant Command. Of course, there is a proviso that if the President determines that it is in the national interest to do otherwise, he could go beyond these officers. An almost similar selection system is used for picking the Service Chiefs. For example, in 1970, for the post of Chief of Naval Operations, President Richard Nixon picked up the 49-year-old Admiral Elmo Zumwalt over 42 of his seniors. This discretion is used rarely and it reflects extraordinary circumstances and strong necessity. In one case, General Peter J Schoomaker was recalled from retirement and appointed Army Chief of Staff in 2003.

The US model

In the US, the first level of scrutiny, as explained by Gen Shelton, was by the office of the Secretary of Defence. The second level was by the Chief of Staff, Secretary of Defence, who checked on his willingness for the top job. This was followed by a meeting with the Secretary of Defence in the Pentagon, his Chief of Staff and Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy – a man responsible for all US international security policy. During an informal luncheon meeting, strategies and policies were discussed. Among the issues discussed then was a possible exit strategy for the US in the Balkans, and shutting down of certain military bases. They talked about gays in the military, his position on the role of NATO, the need to transition to joint modes of warfare etc.

This was followed by an interaction with President’s National Security Advisor before a one-to-one meeting with the President in the White House. In Gen Shelton’s case, the interaction with the President was about the fighting in Bosnia, the state of the Army and putting the capabilities of the Special Operations Command to better use. The questions were specific to the tactics of Delta Force, Navy SEALS and other top-tier Special Mission Units. The President even asked a specific question on what strategy he would recommend if he were to pinpoint the hiding place of terrorists responsible for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that targeted Americans in Saudi Arabia.

After the President’s nod on the selection of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the appointee was required to appear before the Senate Armed Forces Committee where he was grilled on national and international security concerns and US involvement before the appointment was confirmed by the Senate.

In the UK, the recommendation of the outgoing First Sea Lord on his successor in the Navy to the Government is usually approved. In India, there has been no such tradition of the incumbent Service Chiefs making a recommendation to the Government on their successor.

At home in India, there are two or three issues that have come to be debated – indeed, hotly debated – in the selection of the top-level appointments in the Defence services. One, the extraordinary importance that has come to be attached to the date of birth and seniority in service determined at the time of the commission into service. Many feel that on the basis of their professional progression, the seniority of officers should be re-fixed at the rank of Brigadier. Of the officers promoted to the rank of Lt-Gen, only those who have at least three years of residual service get to command corps even though the normal tenure of Corps Commanders is just about one year. And among Corps Commanders, only those who have at least two years residual service make it to Army Commander.

The second issue which is often raised pertains to the need to evaluate comparative merit among the top contenders for the job of Service Chiefs. Presently, only the Corps Commanders are evaluated by their Army Commanders on the basis of war games that are usually conducted at least once during the tenure. The Special Report usually enables the Corps Commanders to be elevated to the next higher rank of Army Commanders. Except in a few cases, usually all officers in that rank make it to the next rank, provided they have the requisite residual service.

Appointment practices

However, as Army Commanders, there is no evaluation that precedes the appointment of the senior most among them to the next rank - the four-star rank of Service Chief. Intelligence input is reportedly provided by the Intelligence Bureau to the government – which is perhaps incorrect as few IB officers would have adequate insight into either the professional capability or personal conduct of senior military officers. One recalls how perhaps it was this input of the former IB Director, BN Mullick, that went against Gen Thorat when he was being considered for the Army Chief’s post before the 1962 war.

While the top job of the Service Chief definitely does not require any evaluation of Army Commanders in terms of operational tactics, those being considered ought to be assessed in terms of their view on organisational matters of the service, inter-service joint-manship, doctrinal issues, grand strategy vis-a-vis the security challenges facing the nation, and world view.

Since countries like the US and the UK have different forms of government, their appointment practices can’t be adopted wholesale in India. But, for appointment of Service Chiefs, it would be in the fitness of things to have the CCS formally invite the top three or four officers for separate briefings on matters of strategy, the state of the services and their world view on the security environment. Obviously, the CCS would need to be adequately prepared to interact with these officers. This would help the CCS to assess the professional capabilities of the top officers who are in the running for the top job and, in case the senior-most officer appears to be out of sync with the threat perspective and security concerns, the government may like to put that officer through a deeper scrutiny. Also, this would give the selected person an idea of the security concerns of the government.

While the Indian Parliament has nothing like the Senate Armed Forces Committee of the USA, it does have a Standing Committee on Defence, a rather large and labyrinthine body of about 36 members drawn from both Houses of Parliament. If this body were to play a role in the selection of the Service Chiefs it would have to be constituted differently. For example, its present chairman is Raj Babbar. While one has admiration for his acting skills, one wonders how well he fits into his Parliamentary role specific to defence.

Perhaps a smaller body from within the Standing Committee on Defence, with a provision for coopting former Service Chiefs as special invitees, could be a part of the selection process. The commanders being considered could make brief presentations to the Committee on various aspects, which currently could include a way forward on the border disputes, possible strategy for insurgency-prone areas (including an exit strategy), modernisation of services and even ways to insulate the services from wide-spread corruption that plagues society generally. Even an interaction of the prospective Chief with the Commander-in-Chief (President) before the finalisation of the appointment could be considered.

One of the positive spin-offs of this exercise would be the sharp focus it would provide to the officer who is ultimately promoted to Service Chief. He may not be required to take a call on many of the issues on which he has been examined, but he would have a crystal-clear understanding of the security and other concerns facing his men and less likely to pursue personal agendas during his tenure.

SUPERSESSIONS IN DEFENCE

* In 1983, Lt Gen SK Sinha was overlooked to make Gen AS Vaidya the Chief.

* Air Marshal OP Mehra superseded Air Vice Marshal Shiv Dev Singh in 1972.

* Air Vice Marshal MM Singh was superseded by Air Marshal SK Mehra in 1988.

* Admiral L Ramdas superseded Vice Admiral Tony Jain in 1990.

1 comment:

\NB Singh said...

I agree with the suggestion made by the author at the end of the article about a group of senior Service Chiefs and a few retired Chiefs to form a selection committee to interview the prospective candidates in an informal manner over a lunch or dinner which should be after the interview and during the lunch or dinner alcohol should be served to those who wish to consume alcoholic drink. This would provide better opportunity for closer inter-action and enable a more realistic assessment of the candidates. assessment of thecandidates