6 August 2014

Force Projection and Rapid Deployment Forces: Need for Reassessment

03 Aug , 2014

As India’s regional and global aspirations grow with its increasing economic clout, it will be forced to build up its capacity to project power in its national interest to ensure that the region is not destabilised by outside elements that may be inimical to it. The establishment of an effective and responsive RDF towards this end is inescapable. To be able to do so requires that India take a long hard look at its requirements and reassess its capabilities. It needs to quickly put in place structures that will ensure that its RDF is able to provide what is required of it so that in the words of Rahul Gandhi, “We stop being scared about how the world will impact us, and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world.”1

Nation states aspiring to be regarded as regional or global powers, fully understand the necessity for an effective strategic force projection capability…

All skilled professionals, be they cardiac surgeons, car mechanics or carpenters, always have their own personalised tool kits from which they can choose the appropriate instrument with which to successfully complete their task. Similarly, “our national security system is the toolbox with which we navigate through an ever-changing international environment: It turns our overall capabilities into active assets, protects us against the threats of an anarchic international system and makes it possible to exploit its opportunities.”2

From within this toolbox, nation states aspiring to be regarded as regional or global powers, fully understand the necessity for an effective strategic force projection capability in time critical contingencies. This will provide them the requisite muscle when other diplomatic initiatives aimed at protecting national interests are not as effective as they need to be. This inescapable and essential requirement is best met by a suitably organised and capable Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF).

So what exactly does force projection imply? The US Department of Defense defines power projection as being, “the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power – political, economic, informational, or military – to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.”3

As Dr. Ladlow puts it, “Military power projection has been divided into nine different aspects based on the political goals being sought and the level of force employed. Four of these relate to the employment of ‘soft’ military power (securing sea lanes of communication, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian relief and peacekeeping), and five are primarily concerned with “hard” military power (showing the flag, compellence/deterrence, punishment, armed intervention, and conquest).”4

The air assault element must be based on the new generation of recently acquired air assets, the C-17s and the C-130s…

RDF Capabilities and Tasking

While it would appear to be a no brainer that RDF capability required to meet the hard military power options would be established based on the logical and reasonable view that such a capability needs to be developed based on what would be considered to be the nation’s area of interest, the contingencies that it may be required to tackle and the threat perception that would need to be neutralised.

However, invariably, this is not the case and such a capability tends to be established based on legacy structures and assets already available with some minor alterations or some additional capabilities being incorporated. This results in two major flaws with consequences that are fairly easy to visualise.

Firstly, it implies that we have a force that is looking for a mission that it can accomplish and not the other way around which means there will be situations in which intervention is not a viable option because the capability available cannot meet the requirement.

Secondly, RDF tasking tends to be treated not as the primary responsibility but as just another contingency that may arise resulting in the existing command and control hierarchy being neither attuned nor flexible enough to be able to respond as required. Unfortunately, this is the case in our context as well and needs corrective action at the earliest.

Before focusing on our RDF requirements, available capabilities and actions that require to be initiated to make them an effective tool of national security it would be worthwhile to understand how the RDF is organised and tasked. These forces are not homogeneous units but a Task Force consisting of a variety of specialised units with specific operational capabilities and mission profiles that are complementary and are utilised in a variety of combinations depending on the strategic and tactical requirement. Their synchronised and synergistic operational employment is aimed at ensuring successful mission termination.

Our ability to influence events within the Indian Ocean littoral region should be considered satisfactory…

Primarily, these forces consist of units that act as ‘tripwire’ elements capable of immediate response to developing situations within a nation’s area of interest. These are followed by ‘heavier forces’ that are transported into a safe zone within the area of interest by air, sea or surface transport where they reorganise themselves for deployment as required. There may, however, be situations where they may be required to establish themselves against opposition to be able to proceed with their mission. It is for one contingency within such a scenario that there is a necessity to have amphibious capabilities as well.

The tripwire elements tend to be lightly equipped airborne units capable of speedy mobilisation and deployment at the target area within a matter of hours. As first responders, their primary mission is to provide boots that can stabilise the developing situation on the ground, real time accurate intelligence and assessment of the prevailing ground situation and provide a firm base for follow-up forces and logistic echelons.

In addition they may also be required to provide asset protection or recovery and undertake direct action missions to neutralise elements inimical to our national interest. These forces are limited by the quantum and type of equipment and personnel and logistics that they can carry or be supplied with based on available air assets, the prevailing air defence environment and the ground tactical situation.

All these factors including distance of the target area directly impact their mission profile and threat neutralisation capabilities. The heavier follow on forces are based on infantry and supporting arms and services units suitably modified, equipped and trained for either employment in the amphibious role or for air movement. These are normally based on a standard Infantry or Mechanised Division or Brigade group.

It is likely that economic strength, rather than military prowess, will be the real measure of state power…

In 1990, for example, after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, rapid deployment by the US to Saudi Arabia was carried out sequentially with the first troops to arrive being a Brigade of the 82nd Airborne which got there in less than three days after the decision to go was made. Within a week, the combat elements of a full division were on the ground, complete with air-landed light armor. In three weeks, combat-loaded M1 tanks of the Army’s 24th Mechanised Division began rolling out of fast sea-lift ships at Dhahran. And in two months the entire XVIII Airborne Corps, to include an airborne, an air assault and a mechanised infantry division, plus Corps troops and a Special Forces group, were on the ground.5

Whether the US capability continues to be maintained is a moot point as there have been some public pronouncements in recent months that go on to suggest that some of this transportation capacity, especially in terms of Fast Sea Lift ships, had been greatly degraded.

RDF in the Indian Context

What then should be our consideration with regard to the RDF capabilities we need to maintain? We do need to keep in mind that a substantial portion of our trade, especially energy requirements, are wholly dependent on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and our core business interests along with Indian communities have been rapidly growing globally. Ideally, our areas of interest and areas of influence should coincide which would require us to effectively intervene wherever our national interests are at stake. This however, is impractical, given our military, economic and developmental constraints as also our influence on the global stage.

Thus, in practical terms, our ability to influence events within the Indian Ocean littoral region and our immediate neighbourhood should be considered satisfactory. In addition, the ability to work as a part of a Multi-national Force, whether under UN flag or otherwise, also needs to be maintained to meet contingencies such as providing support to Indian Peacekeepers as was required in Sierra Leone during OP Khukri. For example, keeping in view the forthcoming withdrawal of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, contingencies that may require intervention within the Central Asian Region in conjunction with other affected states in the area needs to be given serious consideration and capacities developed accordingly.

The most urgent and important issue that needs to be faced would be with regard to over-all command and control structures…

Thus, in our context, we need to ensure that we have air assets capable of covering approximately 4,000 km with standard payloads without refueling, apart from being capable of carrying out mid-air refueling. With regard to the Airborne Task Force (ABTF), keeping in view likely tasks and expected threats a mechanised and anti-tank heavy parachute battalion group with its standard components of artillery, combat engineers, communications, air defence and logistic elements would meet the requirement.

In addition inclusion of a Special Forces Team will further enhance flexibility. This air assault element must be based on the new generation of recently acquired air assets, the C-17s and the C-130s. In some scenarios, this force will not have the ability to sustain itself and hold the firm base it establishes, in all likelihood an airfield, for longer than 12 to 18 hours. The ability to launch a follow up ABTF along with a Brigade level controlling headquarter within 12 hours thus becomes essential. This implies that keeping in view routine administrative and training commitments an airborne Brigade of three battalions along with one Special Forces battalion must form part of the RDF.

As regards the ‘heavy element’ of the RDF, the option exists to have a suitably tailored infantry division along with utility and helicopter assets nominated and trained for the role. Another option could be to have one armour heavy independent Mechanised Brigade and one independent Infantry Brigade group organised and trained for an amphibious role nominated as a part of the RDF. The latter option would require maintenance of a permanent tri-services controlling headquarters that could assume control over an expeditionary force, if required.

A rising and more nationalistic China, growing Islamic fundamentalism along with the gradual shift in economic power to the Asia-Pacific region only add to problems…

Our Sri Lanka experience during OP Pawan does clearly point to such a requirement. In addition, this force must also be able to support own operations in other contingencies in conventional war and disaster management contingencies in any sector within the country including the island territories. This could also include internal stabilisation operations. In view of their being required to operate in high altitude areas there will be a requirement for some elements to be pre- located in high altitude areas to ensure that they are fully acclimatised for operations at short notice.

In terms of availability of assets, especially within the IAF and the IN it is fortuitous that earlier perspective plans have ensured that required air assets to be able to drop two ABTFs simultaneously is presently available or will be so by end of 2014 with the induction of additional C130s and C-17s. The ability of the IN to move up to one infantry Brigade with a regiment worth of armour for amphibious operations has been in place for some time and is likely to be enhanced within the decade with the induction of additional indigenous Landing Platform Docks (LPD)6 and Landing Ship Tanks (LST)7.

As regards the army capability while amphibious and airborne capability are already in place there is an urgent need to reassess the organisational and equipment profile of these units. For example, in respect of the Parachute Brigade, there is an urgent need for a Path Finder and Intelligence and Surveillance component being added. The parachute battalions need to shed the BMPs and replace them with wheeled All-Terrain Vehicles (ATV) such as Land Rovers which should be able to mount the next generation of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, 0.50 Calibre Heavy Machine Guns and Air Defence Launchers. The artillery needs 105mm or 155mm Light Guns while the engineer component also requires an additional increment to be able to get occupied airfields functional.

The artillery needs 105mm or 155mm Light Guns while the engineer component also requires an additional increment to be able to get occupied airfields functional.

However, the most urgent and important issue that needs to be faced would be with regard to over-all command and control structures. To ensure a responsive and effective deployment there is little choice but to adopt one of the controlling options suggested earlier. Ideally, the RDF should function either under the special Operations Command that is likely to be established at some future date or function directly under the Chief of Defence Staff as and when established.

Conclusion

We live in extremely difficult and testing times. Our neighbourhood confronts some of the most challenging and complex issues that directly impact the stability of the region. A rising and more nationalistic China, growing Islamic fundamentalism along with the gradual shift in economic power to the Asia-Pacific region only add to the problems that policy planners in the region need to deal with. While it is likely that economic strength, rather than military prowess, will be the real measure of state power, especially in the increasingly integrated world that we live in, military force will undoubtedly continue to play an important role in ensuring nations are able to maintain an autonomous foreign policy.

As India’s regional and global aspirations grow with its increasing economic clout, it will be forced to build up its capacity to project power in its national interest to ensure that the region is not destabilised by outside elements that may be inimical to it. The establishment of an effective and responsive RDF towards this end is inescapable. To be able to do so requires that India take a long hard look at its requirements and reassess its capabilities. It needs to quickly put in place structures that will ensure that its RDF is able to provide what is required of it so that in the words of Rahul Gandhi, “We stop being scared about how the world will impact us, and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world.”8

Notes 
Op Cit; Walter C Ladwig III. 
Bliddal, Henrik; Reforming Military Command Arrangements: The Case of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force; http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/; 2011 
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 
WALTER C. LADWIG III; India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi become a Conventional Great Power? Asian Survey Vol 50 Issue 6, Nov 2010 ;pp 1162-1182 
Robert Killebrew; Deployment: The Army Rapid and American Strategy: An Analysis; December 9, 2013 
Defense News, 12 Dec 2013; http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131212/DEFREG03/312120012/India-Construct-4-LPDs 
Warfare Sims.Com ; Indian Amphibious Capability, May 2009; http://www.warfaresims.com/p=647 
Op Cit; Walter C Ladwig III. 







Brig Deepak Sinha is a second generation para trooper and author of “Beyond the Bayonet: Indian Special Operations Forces in the 21st Century.” He is currently a consultant with the Observer Research Foundation.

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