9 May 2015

The Arab-US Strategic Partnership in the Gulf

By Anthony H. Cordesman, with the assistance of Michael Peacock 
MAY 7, 2015 

The coming summit between the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the U.S. provides a key opportunity for both the Arab Gulf States and the U.S. to create a stronger strategic partnership, and address the need for common action in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The summit will provide the opportunity for the GCC countries to not only to deal with the threat of Jihadist extremism, but also the fact that each country is to some extent a failed state with far deeper problems that must also be addressed to offer any change of lasting future stability and development.

It also offers a chance to deal with the full range of challenges posed by Iran – which go far beyond its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. These challenges include: 
Iran’s nuclear programs, and the extent to which any final agreement not only meets the security needs of the CCC states as well as the U.S., but the potential threat posed by Iran’s chemical weapon sand capabilities to create biological weapons as a replacement for its nuclear programs. 

The broader threat posed by Iran’s steadily larger and more capable mix of cruise and ballistic missiles, and the risks posed by Iran’s efforts to develop long-range, conventionally armed strike systems using precision guidance – developments which could hit critical military and infrastructure targets and effective replace nuclear weapons with “weapons of mass effectiveness”. 

The need to go beyond the PAC-3 level of missile defense, and deploy theater missile defense systems like THAD or AEGIS, as well as create effective, integrated air and missile defense. 

The need to create more interoperable and integrated conventional forces, and make the GCC a real military alliance. The current divisions between and within the GCC states have sharply limited their real world military effectiveness, and require real action to produce a stronger and more unified alliance and the necessary institutions to make it work. 

The need to give far more priority to the threat posed by Iran’s growing asymmetric warfare capabilities, especially the sea, air, missile threat to maritime traffic through the Gulf and its approaches in the Indian Ocean. Efforts which require improved GCC capability for mine warfare, dealing with swarms of missile patrol craft, ASW, and anti-ship missiles. 

The need to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, as well as deal with the threat from ISIL and groups like the Al Nusra Front, and for GCC states to work with the Iraqi government to help create an basis for a future partnership between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi’ites, and show all Iraqis that Iraq can be a partner to the GCC and have its support in achieving stability and development. 

The need to bring Egypt and Jordan into partnership with the GCC and U.S., and address the threats posed by Jihad and Assad in Syria and the need to cooperate in finding a solution to Syria’s humanitarian crisis. 

The need to go beyond a focus on the Houthi military threat in Yemen, and address the broader issue of how to bring some level of stability and unity that will both limit Iran’s future role and influence, and the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula - actions where nation building will be far more critical than conducting a bombing campaign 
The need to limit Iran’s role in Lebanon and the Gaza. 

At the same time, however, the U.S. needs to reassure the leaders of the GCC that it will remain their strategic partner, and that the effort to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran does not mean the U.S. is somehow moving away from its commitments to the Arab Gulf states.

This assurance is also one that needs to be fully communicated to Gulf media, think tanks, and strategic research centers, as well as the people of the region. Concern at the Ministerial level is matched by a host of conspiracy theories and fears at the media and public level, and by fundamental lack of knowledge of U.S. strategy and strategic guidance, U.S. military efforts in the region, and the level of partnership the U.S. is building through transfers of advanced arms and technology worth well over $100 billion.

These issues –and the growing nature of the U.S. strategic partnership in the region – are addressed in detail in a new report by the burke Chair at CSIS entitled The Arab-U.S. Strategic Partnership in the Gulf: U.S. Forces in the Gulf, U.S. Power Projection Capabilities and the Critical Role of U.S. Arms Transfers. This report is available on the CSIS web site athttp://csis.org/files/publication/150507_US_Arab_Gulf_Strategic_Partnership.pdf.

It describes the nature of U.S. strategy and strategic guidance, provides key quotes from the commander of USCENTCOM’s posture statement, describes the growing role and size of U.S. forces in the Gulf, describes U.S. power projection capabilities in the region, and describes U.S. transfers of arms and military technology in detail – showing that these will give the GCC a decisive” edge” over Iran’s military capabilities. 




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