4 June 2017

Concerted initiatives vital

Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia (rtd) 

In a departure from the past, the Indian Army hurriedly called a media interaction on May 23 and released a video of the army destroying a Pakistani army post along the Line of Control (LoC) in the Naushera sector of Jammu and Kashmir. As expected, the TV channels continuously showed the visuals and conducted panel discussions for the next 48 hours. 

However, in this competition to attract eyeballs and raise TRPs, one particular aspect went mostly unreported. Additional Director General, Public Information, Maj Gen Narula while releasing the video, said “As part of our counter terrorism strategy, punitive fire assaults are being undertaken across the LoC.” Repeating the phrase “counter terrorism strategy”, he went on to say that infiltration attempts from across the LoC will be countered by a proactive strategy. 

The statement spells out a paradigm shift in the counter terrorism strategy, sending a clear signal to the Pakistan army — “play and pay at your own peril.” Apparently, the instructions to the Indian Army are to punish the posts abetting and facilitating infiltration by pre-emptive fire assaults to destroy terrorist launch pads along the LoC. Releasing the video in the public domain was also an exercise to assuage public sentiment in India.

The army’s sub conventional doctrine has shied away from including ‘punitive’ and ‘pre-emptive’ operations. This shift in strategy signals a positive move to raise the costs for Pakistan as it continues to wage a proxy war and calibrate the violence levels in Kashmir. The surgical strikes in Myanmar and thereafter across the LoC were indicative of a strategic resolve to carry out punitive strikes.

The increase in violence levels in J&K, a spike in ceasefire violations and infiltration bids coupled with the beheading of Indian soldiers, dictated a shift in policy options at the military level. The new strategy to execute punitive and pre-emptive strikes, hence, is an operational imperative.

It is a well-known fact that the Pakistan army drives the state policy with regard to India, and has successfully waged the ‘low-cost, high-effect’ proxy war, bleeding India with a thousand cuts. The key question for India has always been ‘how to raise the costs for Pakistan?’ Efforts at normalising relations with Pakistan at the politico-diplomatic level were always stymied by the Pakistan army by carrying out high-visibility or high-profile terrorist attacks forcing the Indian government to cancel the talks.

These initiatives were either preceded or proceeded by a high-visibility terrorist attack planned and perpetrated by Pakistan. This has been an established pattern. The meeting between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif on July 10, 2015 at Ufa was followed by a terrorist attack in Gurdaspur (Punjab) on July 27. Similarly, Modi’s much publicised surprise visit to Lahore on December 25, 2015 was paid back by the terrorist strike on the Pathankot Air Force Base within a week. 

India faces a strategic dilemma, as by cancelling the political-diplomatic dialogue, the government furthers the aims of the Pakistan army and if it proceeds with the political initiatives, it will result in more terror attacks and also be unacceptable to the Indian public. This dilemma has resulted in a win-win situation for the Pakistan army.

Surgical strikes eroded the prestige and the authority of the Pakistan army, even resulting in Sharif blaming the army chief for having isolated Pakistan. Pakistan army had to strike back to ensure their continued relevance and unquestioned power. This they did by executing terror strikes and upping the ante in the Kashmir Valley by a well crafted strategy of ‘agitational terrorism’ involving students and fence-sitters in stone-pelting.

Surgical strikes

It is another matter that the Indian public was made to believe or perceive that the ‘surgical strikes’ will deter Pakistan from carrying out terrorist attack. It needs to be understood that the ‘surgical strikes’ are only a means and not an end in itself. India has been struggling with a policy to ‘talk to Pakistan in the language it understands.’ The critical issue is to defeat the ‘low-cost, high-effect’ war being waged by Pakistan by ensuring it becomes a ‘high-cost, low-effect’ war. 

To this end, the new strategy of execu­ting ‘punitive’ and ‘pre-emptive’ operati­ons is bold and timely. Again, to assume that a few punitive operations will force Pakistan to stop the proxy war in the near or immediate term will be far-fetched. These will have to be sustained, and the army and the public should be prepared for counter strikes. The prevalent ceasefire on the LoC, in fact, is not a ceasefire agreement but an agreed upon ceasefire at the behest of the Pakistan army.

Pakistan army declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 26, 2003, a gesture reciprocated by India. This ceasefire was the result of sustained and effective fire assaults on Pakistan army along the LoC post-1999 Kargil war. The ceasefire is good for both nations but Pakistan stands to lose more in case the LoC becomes live again.

The possibility of conflict escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbours is minimal as Pakistan cannot and will not escalate. The Pakistan army is fully aware of the consequences of escalation, and cannot risk being defeated yet again and lose the power and econo­mic benefits and privileges it enjoys. Pakistan as a nation, too, cannot afford a war given the economic and internal security situation. The escalation, if any, will continue to be confined mostly to J&K and the LoC.

The shift in the counter terrorism strategy has to be complemented by concerted and focussed political, diplomatic, economic and informational initiatives. Pakistan has waged the proxy war for over 27 years with near impunity, comfortable in the belief that India will not hit back for fear of escalation. India cannot afford to suffer terrorism in perpetuity. The new counter terrorism strategy will raise the costs for Pakistan in the mid to long-term ensuring relative peace.

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