26 December 2018

Can the United States Still Promote Democracy in Asia?

Joshua Kurlantzick

During the first two years of the Trump administration, Washington has dramatically reduced its rhetorical focus on democracy promotion in Asia. For instance, President Donald Trump has mostly ignored issues of human rights and democracy when meeting with leaders of abusive regimes, like the Thai prime minister and junta leader, Prayuth Chan-ocha. This approach is consistent with Trump’s overall realpolitik; he usually does not raise rights issues in meetings with other authoritarian leaders, and he often seems to have more contempt for democratically elected leaders around the globe than for autocrats. 

More recently, despite extensive evidence suggesting that the armed forces of Myanmar oversaw crimes against humanity and genocide against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state, in the west of the country, the State Department did not label the atrocities as genocide, as did the United Nations in a report released in August. The State Department’s own investigation into the Rakhine crisis instead accused Myanmar only of “planned and coordinated attacks” on the Rohingya minority.

At the same time, however, despite my own previous pessimism about the White House’s approach to democracy promotion, there are some signs that the Trump administration recognizes that focusing on human rights should remain a U.S. priority. Indeed, doing so would help differentiate the U.S. vision for Asia from China’s approach to the region, and also might bolster American links with populations in Asian countries, including Malaysia, Cambodia and Indonesia, where democracy still has significant appeal. 

As Alyssa Ayres of the Council on Foreign Relations has written, the White House’s signature policy framework for Asia—the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”—does elevate freedom “in terms of values and belief systems” as one component central to Washington’s view of the Pacific Rim, a key difference between Washington’s and Beijing’s regional views. The concept has multiple strands, as the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip Davidson, has noted. Other core components include free maritime and air access, free and reciprocal trade, protection from economic coercion, and respect for neighboring states’ sovereignty. Yet advocating for liberal values and beliefs is certainly an important part of the concept.

Many U.S. officials do seem to realize that, for the strategy to resonate across Asia and win support from Asian publics, Washington cannot ignore issues of democracy and rights. The aim of a free and open Indo-Pacific is meant to draw a visible line between U.S. and Chinese policy. But if Washington fails to stand up for rights, Beijing actually has more leverage to promote its own models in Asia.

Vice President Mike Pence, by far the most high-profile administration official to directly address rights issues, has touted the strategy and used visits to Asia to press regional leaders on rights and freedoms. During his most-recent trip to the region in November, Pence called upon Myanmar’s civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, to pardon two Reuters journalists imprisoned in the country, and also to address the crisis in Rakhine state. Pence has also condemned China’s brutal treatment of Uighurs and other minorities, as Beijing has launched a massive crackdown on rights in Xinjiang province. These are but two examples of Pence’s often-expansive comments on issues of human rights.

It remains unclear how Secretary of State Mike Pompeo views them, though. He presided over the report on Rakhine state, which documented severe abuses against the Rohingya yet did not issue a genocide finding. But Pompeo also has pushed Myanmar to release the Reuters journalists and has issued strong statements on rights in some other regions of the world, including Latin America.

Trump’s fulsome praise for some autocrats and his rhetoric about the American press and judiciary resonate among authoritarian regimes in Asia.

At lower levels in the U.S. government, diplomats and officials based in Washington continue to push Asian leaders on human rights. As Thomas Carothers and Frances Z. Brown, two leading experts on democracy promotion, note, although the U.S. has downgraded its pro-democratic advocacy at the highest levels of government under Trump, “quiet but serious engagement by U.S. diplomats to counter democratic backsliding and support democratic advances overseas, and the extensive but generally low-profile domain of U.S. democracy assistance programs … largely carried on” during Trump’s first year in office.

They cite the example of Cambodia, where not only American diplomats but also officials from Trump’s National Security Council have pressured the Hun Sen government, in meetings and statements, to pull back from its most abusive behaviors. U.S. officials have in similar settings warned leaders from Malaysia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and other Asian states about their own rights abuses.

But much of this pressure is being applied on some of the weakest regimes in Asia, and ones with long and hostile relations with the United States, like Myanmar and Cambodia. Trump has said little or nothing about abuses in countries like Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines or even North Korea, which the White House continues to court.

The president’s fulsome praise for some autocrats and his rhetoric about the American press and judiciary, meanwhile, resonate among authoritarian regimes in Asia, as they do with autocrats in other parts of the world. In countries like Cambodia and Malaysia, among others, leaders have echoed Trump’s attacks on “fake news” and pushed legislation that ostensibly targets it, but in reality is designed to limit press freedoms. To its credit, the new Malaysian government under Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has attempted to junk the country’s fake news law since coming to power in May, although it has been blocked by the Malaysian opposition.

In the coming year, there will be several indicators signaling whether Washington will move back to more emphasis on democracy and rights promotion in Asia. The new Congress, with a House of Representatives led by Democrats who want to raise the profile of human rights issues, likely will pressure the administration to take tougher measures against abuses by the Philippines, Thailand and other countries. How forcefully they push for this shift will make a difference. Already, congressional leaders, including top Republicans, have called on Pompeo to declare the abuse of the Rohingya a genocide and bolster sanctions on Myanmar’s leaders.

So far, however, Pompeo seems to be standing firm in not issuing a genocide determination. But moving forward, his actions, as well as those of Pence and National Security Adviser John Bolton, will show how, if at all, the White House is going to respond, since Trump himself seems wholly unlikely to adopt the language of rights and freedoms. Pompeo, for instance, will be faced with the choice of publicly introducing next year’s State Department country reports on human rights, which his predecessor, Rex Tillerson, seemed to downplay. He also retains the option of publicly declaring the Rakhine crisis a genocide, which might be reflective of his rights posture more generally. 

How Trump administration officials frame the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific, as it moves from a concept into real action, also will show whether democracy promotion can be part of higher-level policy. Diplomats in Asia and lower-ranking officials will almost surely carry on with the types of lower-level and ongoing advocacy for rights and freedoms that Carothers and Brown discuss. If senior U.S. officials emphasize not only the aspects related to sovereignty and freedom from economic coercion, but also the rights and democracy aspects of bolstering freedom in Asia, it would show that the White House is not going to completely abandon democracy promotion in the region. 

There is still plenty of cause for concern about the Trump administration’s commitment to promoting democracy and liberal values in Asia. But that should be tempered by some of the reasons for mild optimism.

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