9 April 2019

Taking the Long View on the Arab Spring, After Bouteflika’s Resignation in Algeria

Ellen Laipson 

The unexpected outburst of popular opposition to the regime long in power in Algeria has stimulated a renewed conversation about the dramatic tidal wave of change in the Middle East in 2011 known as the Arab Spring. The conventional view has been that cascading protests toppled autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, but then fizzled out. Egypt returned to its previous strongman system, only one that was even worse than before. Libya, along with Yemen, got stuck in incomplete transitions that led to state failures and armed conflict, exacerbated by outside interference. And Syria is only now, eight years later, slowly wrapping up its brutal civil war, with the wrong side—the entrenched regime of President Bashar al-Assad—coming out on top. 

But the surprise developments in Algeria in recent weeks have inspired many regional experts to take a fresh look. Is Algeria new evidence that the march continues for opening up political affairs in the Arab world? Or will angry crowds in the streets of Algiers meet the same fate of their Egyptian and Syrian counterparts—with the breakthroughs they facilitate only strengthening the hands of strongmen and their cliques? Already the momentum is stalling, with a clear impasse between demands for change by the public and offers of compromise by “le pouvoir,” what Algerians call the shadowy cabal of military and security leaders who have held power in their country for decades. 

Algeria’s deep state initially offered the crowds only partial relief, delaying elections but avoiding bigger concessions. By April 2, however, the tide had turned, and Bouteflika submitted his resignation to the Constitutional Council. There is still uncertainty about the next steps, even though the succession process set out by the constitution is being observed, with the head of the Senate, Abdelkader Bensalah, taking over as interim president for 90 days until new elections can be organized. 

The anger of the crowds, though, is only one indicator of a desire for change in nondemocratic countries, and its articulation is often way off the mark of what is achievable. Algerians may be justified in rejecting what looks like a cosmetic fix offered by those in power, but few would benefit from an abrupt collapse of the system in a revolution, as some of the placards in the streets have called for. The protests appear to be spontaneous and without any formal leadership, similar to what unfolded in Tunisia and Egypt more than eight years ago. 

The transition to a more representative system, and the process of opening up ossified institutions to more public scrutiny and oversight, is a long, slow slog. Tunisians are still doing the tedious work of making their institutions more accountable, building a political culture where transfers of power and compromise across party lines are normal. Some observers worry that Tunisians may tire of this process before their elected officials produce the long-needed economic reforms that would help redistribute wealth and bring greater material and moral satisfaction to citizens who have demonstrated such commitment to democratic change. 

It would be naive and misleading to interpret recent developments as evidence of a new wave of peaceful change in the Middle East.

Nearly a year ago, I argued that it’s important to look for small successes, the modest incremental changes that are still happening in several countries in the region, from Tunisia to Iraq. 

Iraq, while not swept up in the Arab Spring, since Saddam Hussein was toppled years earlier by the U.S. invasion, is nevertheless making progress on the path to a more stable system of politics. Elections last year produced a government led by moderates as president and prime minister. Much work needs to be done to win back the trust and support of Sunni areas of the country that were brutalized by the now-defeated Islamic State. Shiite militias still need to be reined in, given their track record of using excessive force against Sunnis and other political adversaries. And relations between Baghdad and the Kurdish region in the north can revert to tension at any time. But the balance sheet is still on the positive side. 

In Egypt, where the high hopes of Tahrir Square have faded, some still believe that President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi’s heightened repression has raised the temperature again. A new explosion of popular rage and resentment against this authoritarian government isn’t out of the question. 

But it would be naive and misleading to interpret these recent developments as evidence of a new wave of peaceful change in the Middle East. The region’s autocrats can take some encouragement from anti-democracy trends around the world, from the poor performance of democratic institutions and practices in established democracies, to the success of the likes of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan closer to home. Russian President Vladimir Putin and even U.S. President Donald Trump, who will host Sisi at the White House next week, provide political and material support to Arab leaders most committed to pushing back against popular demands for reform. 

Economic issues also make it exceedingly hard for more democratically inclined forces to demonstrate that their approach will produce much-needed peace and prosperity. Structural and historical realities are working against any easy return to the more egalitarian environment that Arab states enjoyed in the early years of their post-colonial independence. With smaller populations in the 1960s and 1970s, states like Egypt and Syria provided many public services, including free health care and education, which are no longer possible. When regimes opened up their economies to the private sector, as Western donors and agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund advised, it created corrupt networks of crony capitalism that will take time and major political courage to dismantle. The region now suffers from severe income inequality that makes politics all the more bitter and polarized. 

But the long view can provide a more calibrated assessment. More than any other factor, this view is based on the enduring demand by a young, educated and increasingly informed citizenry across the Arab world for greater openness and accountability from their governments. From Algeria to Yemen, the world sees the many injustices and cruelties committed by draconian regimes and radical extremists alike. Yet there are also signs of citizens and civil society organizations willing and able to assert themselves in the public square. Their stories need to be told.

Ellen Laipson directs the International Security Program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. She led the Stimson Center from 2002 to 2015, and served in government for 25 years.

No comments: