Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

17 August 2017

Pak GHQ using PLA ‘neocons’ to damage India-China ties


PLA has warned Beijing that diluting stance on Doklam would embolden other countries.

Analysts tracking developments within the China-Pakistan alliance of the two militaries warn that the Pakistan side is seeking to move the relationship “from the strategic to the tactical”. GHQ Rawalpindi’s expectation is that in future, field operations will take place in a coordinated manner, and both sides will participate in actions undertaken on the initiative of any of the partners. The analysts say that the intention of GHQ Rawalpindi is to make the China-Pakistan military alliance “acquire the core characteristic of NATO, which is that a conflict involving one of the parties will inevitably bring in the other”. There has been a deepening rift with the United States—caused by the unwillingness of Washington to sign off on GHQ-ISI plans for destabilisation of Afghanistan and India—that has brought the Pakistan army closer to the PLA, which has adopted a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy towards the several subversive activities of the Pakistan army in its neighbouring states, including Iran, Afghanistan and India. Especially during the final two years of the Barack Obama administration, the Pentagon has repeatedly cautioned GHQ Rawalpindi not to continue with its proxy wars against India and Afghanistan, even while adopting a policy of “wilful blindness” towards activities targeting Iran. Very quietly and without any direct public acknowledgement of the fact, the generals in Islamabad have moved Pakistan into the anti-Shia military alliance led (and funded) by King Salman of Saudi Arabia. While the alliance speaks of countering Iran, in actual fact, it is directed against any effort by the Shias to acquire parity with the Sunnis (including the Wahhabi layer). The judicial coup against Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was caused by the former Premier’s aversion to some of the “special operations” being conducted in Iran, Afghanistan and India by GHQ-ISI. It is expected that his successors will once again adopt the policy urged on the civilian leadership by the military, which is to “see, speak and hear no evil”, i.e., the new leaders should not seek to know about—much less block—ISI special operations cleared by GHQ.

Seeking Greater Global Power, China Looks to Robots and Microchips


BEIJING — In Chinese schools, students learn that the United States became a great nation partly by stealing technology from Britain. In the halls of government, officials speak of the need to inspire innovation by protecting inventions. In boardrooms, executives strategize about using infringement laws to fell foreign rivals.

China is often portrayed as a land of fake gadgets and pirated software, where intellectual property like patents, trademarks and copyrights are routinely ignored. The reality is more complex.

China takes conflicting positions on intellectual property, ignoring it in some cases while upholding it in others. Underlying those contradictions is a long-held view of intellectual property not as a rigid legal principle but as a tool to meet the country’s goals.

Those goals are getting more ambitious. China is now gathering know-how in industries of the future like microchips and electric cars, often by pushing foreign companies attracted by the country’s vast market into sharing their technology. It is also toughening enforcement of patents and trademarks for a day when it can become a leader in those technologies — and use intellectual property protections to defend its position against rival economies.

China faces split into seven parts

By Yatish Yadav

NEW DELHI: Balkanisation of China seems to be imminent. The so-called unity within the Chinese Communist Party is in tatters as all three factions are involved in a bitter feud. This is likely to intensify in the coming months, triggering the beginning of a revolution and then disintegration of the country into seven independent territories.

The Shanghai faction, led by Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao-led Beijing faction are caught in a covert war with Zhenjiang faction, led by President Xi Jinping, and each one is trying to eliminate the influence of the other in the dirty political game. And, behind the scene is a massive labour unrest, pro-democracy protests against the present regime that hardly find mention in the highly-censored national and international media.

Spies and analysts closely monitoring the growing turbulence in China believe that the collapse is likely to be expedited as unprecedented crackdown against opposition and disappearance of lawyers and human right activists is causing massive chaos in the Chinese hinterland.

Unprecedented crackdown on opposition and disappearance of lawyers and human rights activists is causing massive chaos in the Chinese hinterland. “Thanks to brutal control over media, China has managed to mute news reports about hundreds of protests in provinces. But some underground activists have provided details on what we now know as a major uprising against the Xi Jinping regime ahead of 19th National Congress of the Communist Party,” sources said.

16 August 2017

Waiting for China’s Data Protection Law

Source Link
By George G. Chen and Tiffany G. Wong

Fourteen years ago, the Chinese government started to draft a bill to protect citizens’ information across the country. Earlier this year, China’s legislators were still striving to get China’s legislature to review this bill. In the wake of growing social concerns over large-scale misuse of citizens’ data, Yang Zhen, a delegate to the National People’s Congress (NPC), has continued to advocate the adoption of a specific bill on data protection over the past three years. Although some delegates espoused this proposal, it might take another “three to five years” to pass the law, said Yang.

Concomitant with their struggle was the “General Provisions of the Civil Law” passed on the final day of this year’s NPC in March. As the opening chapter of China’s first Civil Code, this law bans “illegal” sales or publication of personal information. Yet any clear liability for government bodies is missing, as is the case with the Cybersecurity Law enacted this June. Without further legal restraints on the inordinate power of the government to manage data, effective data protection will prove to be very difficult.

The protection of personal data is a core issue of China’s digital transformation. As life gets increasingly tied to computers and mobile devices, personal information is becoming more and more vulnerable to hackers and other third parties with malicious intent. Foreign companies, researchers, and also the Chinese government have suggested that Chinese citizens do not care about the protection of their personal data. The mobile habits of tech-savvy Chinese youths suggest as much. Online payment apps allow them to hook their bank and credit card information to their mobile phones, while cab-hailing apps such as Didi Chuxing require constant disclosure of their GPS locations. Convenience seems to trump privacy concerns.

15 August 2017

Chinese dream, Indian slumber

by Deepender Hooda

The increasingly aggressive Chinese foreign policy is primarily driven by two factors: A build-up of nationalistic fervour in domestic politics and the Chinese economy’s hunger for new markets.

The stand-off with China in Doklam is not about who blinks first, it is about a much broader game India has always been a part of. We need to understand what is motivating China in initiating these flare-ups and how we can protect Indian interest. The increasingly aggressive Chinese foreign policy is primarily driven by two factors: A build-up of nationalistic fervour in domestic politics and the Chinese economy’s hunger for new markets. Soon after taking over as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in 2012, Xi Jinping spoke of the “Chinese dream,” a term that, among other things, referred to national glory. Soon after he took over as the Chinese president in 2013, Xi undertook efforts to expand the Chinese footprint worldwide.

These “nationalistic” efforts have also resulted in sparking conflicts with inconvenient neighbours. Since 2014, we have seen a pattern: From the PRC’s escalating tensions with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea to increasing conflict with Japan over Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, from the downturn in relations with South Korea over Seoul’s deployment of US THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) to the tensions over Doklam. Interestingly, each time a conflict arises, the state-run Chinese media drums up patriotic war-rhetoric. A strong nationalist sentiment helps Xi consolidate and look beyond just the next term, which looks certain now. With five of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee set to retire at this year’s Congress, President Xi is looking to consolidate his hold by getting loyalists like Wang Huning into the PB.

How China Would Win a War Against America: Kill Washington's Satellites

Zachary Keck

While much attention has been paid to China’s development of traditional ground-based antisatellite weapons, a more nefarious threat to America’s space assets continues to receive far less attention.

In a new article, “Stalkers in Space: Defeating the Threat,” in Strategic Studies Quarterly, Brian Chow, formerly senior physical scientist at the RAND Corporation, discusses China’s “space stalkers,” which he calls a “game-changing threat” to America’s satellites.

“Since 2008, China has been developing a new co-orbital antisatellite weapon (ASAT),” Chow writes. “These ‘space stalkers’ could be placed on orbit in peacetime and maneuvered to tailgate US satellites during a crisis. At a moment’s notice, they could simultaneously attack multiple critical satellites from such close proximity that the United States would not have time to prevent damage.” These co-orbital ASATs are often indistinguishable from benign satellites, yet they are able to knock out satellites in close proximity through various weapons, such as kinetic-energy weapons, explosive charges, fragmentation devices and robotic arms.

New China of 21st century is ‘Goebbelsian’

Abhijit Bhattacharyya

The writer is an advocate practising in the Supreme Court. The views expressed here are personal.

Why has China brazenly and defiantly violated India’s sovereignty and territory in connivance with military rulers of Pakistan?

If China refers to Kalapani, India too can talk of Taklakote (old Hindu mythological name of Purang), which is 20 km downhill of watershed Lipulek Pass of Sino-Indian border.

One is amazed at the lack of basic knowledge shown by no less a person than Wang Wenli, deputy director general of boundary and ocean affairs at the Chinese foreign ministry, who flaunted her new-found official knowledge on August 8. She said (perhaps camouflaging ignorance) at the “visiting Indian media delegation in Beijing”: “What if we enter Kashmir or Kalapani in Uttarakhand?”

Indeed! Why Kashmir, Kalapani or Uttarakhand, Ms Wenli? Why not enter anywhere, anytime, any day, any place of the world, with or without passport or visa? Without batting an eyelid, trample the sovereignty of any or all contiguous.

Did China not enter Kashmir, which is Indian territory, in the 1950s during the time of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai whose “memorable stabbing” of Jawaharlal Nehru today constitutes the folklore of India’s momentously misplaced and misjudged foreign policy of “trust China”? Did not China ravage Tibet in 1950 without any sovereign rights thereon? 


Vinayshil Gautam 

Between 1945 and 1960, world order changed dramatically. Not only did empires crumble, following the conclusion of World War II, but unprecedented forces were released, realigning, not only empires but also conglomerate of states, which included the Chinese land mass.

During this period, Chinese military and political leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, sought refuge in the island of Taiwan and the People's Liberation Army got China on a trajectory of moving from strength to strength. In less than three years of the communist take over (1949) of mainland China, the statesmen of that country started looking at the boundaries which were open to question because of various legacies. From Japan to Tibet, even in the face of unsettled domestic situation, the Chinese leaders were pushing beyond the conventional existing maps.

A classic case was that of incorporation of Tibet as a part of China with an obliging leadership in the neighbourhood. Because of a self-styled iconoclast as the Indian Prime Minister, the agreement on Tibet was easy. Further, the permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, which could have gone India's way, was gifted to China.

The issue, however, was of crumbling empires, redefining boundaries and contentious posturing. There is a common thread weaving through all this disintegration, reintegration, redrawing of boundaries which provide a thematic unity to the times. Indeed, it was not always armorial power which defined the day. In some cases it was just the clarity of purpose or statesmanlike, proactive, moves clinching the issue.

China Accuses Its Top 3 Internet Giants of Potentially Violating Cybersecurity Law

By Charlotte Gao

Tencent, Baidu, and Sina are being investigated by the Chinese Cyberspace Administration. 

On August 11, while the Chinese public attention is focusing on the powerful earthquake that struck Sichuan and Xinjiang, China’s internet regulator — the Cyberspace Administration of China — announced that it’s investigating China’s top three internet giants for potentially violating the Cybersecurity Law.

The Cyberspace Administration specified that it is the three giants’ social media platforms — Tencent’s WeChat (China’s biggest messaging app), Sina’s Weibo (China’s leading online news and social networking service), and Baidu’s Tieba ( China’s largest BBS-like communication platform) — that are under investigation.

According to the announcement, Weibo, WeChat, and Tieba have users who “spread information of violence and terror, false rumors, pornography, and other information that jeopardizes national security, public safety, and social order.” The three companies are suspected of violating China’s Cybersecurity Law, because they fail to “fulfill duties to manage those illegal information uploaded by their users.”

To show its resolution, the Cyberspace Administration also vowed to “further increase the intensity of internet content supervision and law enforcement” toward illegal acts online. In addition, the Cyberspace Administration welcomed netizens to report any “harmful” online information and published its 24-hour hotline number, website, and email.

Not at the Cost of China: India and the United Nations Security Council, 1950

By Anton Harder

In CWIHP Working Paper #76, "Not at the Cost of China: New Evidence Regarding US Proposals to Nehru for Joining the United Nations Security Council," author Anton Harder examines the controversy surrounding India's role in the United Nations Security Council in the 1950s. Using Indian archival material from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, this paper shows that America's interest in seeing India join the Security Council was motivated by the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a regional power, and that this episode was an early example of the United States attempting to use the United Nations to further its own Cold War interests.

Anton Harder is a PhD candidate in the International History Department of the London School of Economics. His dissertation is on Sino-Indian relations from 1949-1962.

Not at the Cost of China: New Evidence Regarding US Proposals to Nehru for Joining the United Nations Security Council


The issue of India’s right to a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a controversial one in India today, but it is not new. The historical controversy has centered on the culpability of independent India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in not seizing several alleged opportunities for India to join the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member in the 1950s. Nehru’s critics, then and now, accuse him of sacrificing India’s national interest on dubious grounds of international morality. The question, however, goes beyond Nehru’s reputation, as it provides rare insights into India’s relations with the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the beginning of the Cold War.

By needling 3 great powers simultaneously, China probably just punctured its own future

By Abhijit Iyer-Mitra

For some strange reason people in India seem to think that India is somehow on the backfoot in its latest showdown with Chinaover the Dokalam trijunction. Some feel that should the situation continue or deteriorate, ‘strategic defiance’ may be the only option. This, however, is not the impression in Beijing. In private, the Chinese feel that they, rather than India, are caught in a bind, unable to resort to the use of force for fear of destroying the myth of nuclear deterrence, but still supremely confident that strategic defiance by India, on the other hand, will be economically and diplomatically disastrous for India.

As a dear friend in Beijing summed it up rather rudely, “India is a dog. Whatever we do to you, you will first bark and snarl, but then accept and come back wagging your tail. The problem now is what we can do to you is also very limited.” This raises the question as to why India feels it is losing control of the situation. And second, if this idea that India will somehow finally turn on China is based on reality or plain wishful thinking.

Let us be clear about one thing — far from losing control, this has, in fact, been one of the best managed crises by India’s ministry of external affairs. India’s tone has been persistently calm, not threatening action, but sticking to its guns. And for the first time in decades, it is standing up to Chinese bullying and staring it down. The ‘losing control’ and ‘escalating crisis’ narratives seem to be emerging only from a set of strategic commentators whose window seems to be limited to Xinhua and Global Times, and completely devoid of primary research.

14 August 2017

After 50-Day Doklam Standoff, China’s Defense Ministry Invites Indian Media Over

By Charlotte Gao

China’s Defense Ministry tries to send a goodwill signal directly to India. 

China and India have been locked in a standoff in the Doklam area for 50 days after Indian troops stopped the Chinese Army from building a road in the area in mid-June. To break the ice, China’s Defense Ministry invited a delegation of Indian media over to the ministry for a direct dialogue on August 7. However, the meeting was not made public by the ministry on its website nor reported by Chinese local media until now.

According to multiple Indian media outlets, a few Indian journalists have been visiting China’s Defense Ministry in Beijing and having face-to-face dialogues with high-level officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The dialogue was organized by the All China Journalist Association, a semi-governmental organization led by the Communist Party of China.

In the meeting, China’s Defense Ministry expressed some exclusive opinions that were rarely reported before. And one of the most important signals the ministry sent was that the hawkish rhetoric some Chinese state media had published does not represent China’s official position.

Based on the reports of Indian daily newspapers The Economic Times and The Times of India, China’s Defense Ministry’s spokesman, Sr. Col. Ren Guoqiang, told the Indian journalists that some views — such as “China is considering small-scale military operation to remove Indian troops” — reported by China’s hawkish government-run media (Global Times in particular) cannot represent the position of the Defense Ministry.

13 August 2017

*** China May Finally Be Ready to Work With the United States on North Korea

The United States and China appear to have reached accord over a draft U.N. resolution on fresh sanctions against North Korea. Anonymous diplomatic sources say that the United States aims to hold a vote Aug. 5. This has been the U.S. and Chinese approach for some time — to first engage in bilateral dialogue before formally proposing sanctions measures to the broader U.N. Security Council.

Washington handed over a new draft sanctions resolution to China shortly after an emergency July 5 U.N. Security Council meeting in reaction to North Korea's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test. The United States insisted that it wanted to avoid the watered-down sanctions leveled in the past, a specific allusion to China's pattern of playing defense in the United Nations to ensure that sanctions do not go too far in destabilizing North Korea.

Shortly after the July 5 meeting, China's U.N. Ambassador Liu Jiey cautioned against rushing the measures and said an improvement of the situation might reduce the urgency, specifically noting his desire for further North Korean tests to be prevented by diplomatic means. On July 28, however, North Korea tested its second ICBM, ratcheting up pressure on China to act. The following week, the U.S. announced it would launch new investigations into Chinese trade practices — a sign that it will no longer allow hoped-for cooperation to limit it from firm action. The investigation could allow the U.S. administration to eventually unleash a slate of retaliatory trade measures against China — a prospect very much on Beijing's mind as it decides how to proceed regarding North Korea. 

India-China stand-off: The truth from the Dragon's mouth

A new book reproduces original Chinese maps that contradict Chinese propaganda.

The book reveals Chinese intelligence admissions that Beijing never maintained any army base, customs office or other government function in the disputed area until 1983.

Claude Arpi digs deeper.

On August 1, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China, chairman of the Central Military Commission and president of the People's Republic of China, presided over a grand function to celebrate the 90th founding anniversary of the People's Liberation Army, PLA.

From the rostrum of the Great Hall of People, he solemnly affirmed: 'The Chinese people love peace. We will never seek aggression or expansion, but we have the confidence to defeat all invasions. We will never allow any people, organization or political party to split any part of Chinese territory from the country at any time, in any form.'

The message was probably for India.

He urged the PLA to focus on war preparedness and forge an elite and powerful force that 'is always ready for the fight, capable of combat and sure to win.'

'All thoughts must be put on combat, and all work should focus on combat so the military can assemble, charge forward and win any time,' he said.

Meanwhile, the standoff continues on the ridge near the tri-junction of Tibet-Bhutan and Sikkim; for nearly two months, Indian and Chinese soldiers have faced-off here.

Amid the Doklam Standoff, China’s Vice Premier Will Visit Nepal

By Charlotte Gao

More evidence has shown that China is trying hard to solve the Doklam standoff with India via some indirect channels, although China refuses to let the domestic Chinese audience know about its efforts.

On August 8, citing Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Nepal’s deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs, Nepal’s English-language newspaper The Kathmandu Post reported that China’s Vice Premier Wang Yang will visit Nepal on August 14.

Although Mahara denied that Wang Yang’s upcoming visit has anything to do with the standoff between China and India, the sensitive timing together with Wang’s high-level official title indicate otherwise.

The other equally important information Mahara revealed during his press briefing was that Nepal vows to remain neutral in the dispute between China and India. Mahara said that Nepal will not be “influenced” either by India or China and will not “get dragged” into their border dispute. “Our policy on boundary dispute between India and China is clear,” he emphasized. As The Kathmandu Post noted, this is also the first time that Nepal made its position clear since the standoff between India and China broke out nearly two months ago.

It is obvious that Nepal’s geographic position puts it in an awkward situation in this dispute: it borders China in the north and India in the south, east, and west. Although Nepal does not border Bhutan, the disputed Sikkim area is located between Nepal and Bhutan. Thus, if any real conflict happened in the disputed area, Nepal wouldn’t be able to avoid the impact.

Has China's Rise Topped Out?

Michael Schuman 

The fall from grace of China’s Anbang Insurance Group Co. Ltd. continues to get steeper. Not long ago, the mysterious firm was chasing one foreign deal after another, becoming a symbol of China’s global economic ambitions. Now it appears the government may be pressuring Anbang to divest those prized foreign assets. If that proves to be the case, China will have given foreign businessmen yet another reason to be wary of working with Chinese companies: the uncertainty of an erratic, intrusive state meddling in private financial affairs.

But the Anbang case is also part of something bigger, and for China’s economic future, scarier. In just about every category, China’s rise into a global economic superpower has stalled. And the Chinese government sits at the heart of the problem.

Most people around the world still seem to believe China’s ascent is relentless and inevitable. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center showed that while more of those polled still see the U.S. as the world’s leading economy, China is quickly narrowing the gap. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been feeding that positive image by presenting his country as a champion of globalization, trade and economic progress.

Statistics tell a different story. The common perception is that China is swamping the world with exports of everything from mobile phones to steel to sneakers. In fact, the entire Chinese export machine is sputtering. Between 2006 and 2011, China’s total merchandise exports nearly doubled, powering the country through the Great Recession. Since then, they’ve increased less than 11 percent, according to World Trade Organization data.

China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales

By Siemon Wezeman

Following the end of the cold war and the break-up of the Soviet Union, there were rapid decreases in Russian military budgets. Soviet military expenditure had stood at almost USD $350 billion in 1988. However, by 1992 it had fallen to USD $60 billion and in 1998 was only USD $19 billion. The more flexible parts of the budget suffered the most, such as those for procurement and operations. At the same time, the Russian arms industry saw several major clients for its weapons disappear, chief among them the former Warsaw Pact members and Iraq. By 1992, the arms industry Russia had inherited from the Soviet Union was in serious trouble. Most of its internal market and part of its export market was gone.

In parallel with this development, China was embarking on a serious military modernization. Boosted by its rapidly growing economy, it began to implement a long-planned reorganization of its armed forces and the acquisition of advanced weaponry. (This modernization had been planned since the 1970s and was given extra impetus by the poor performance of China’s armed forces against Viet Nam in 1979.) Chinese military spending has increased almost every year since 1989, the first year of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data for China, from USD $21 billion in 1988 to USD $215 billion in 2015. With this surge, China overtook Russia’s spending in 1998 and within five years had become the second largest spender globally behind the United States.

12 August 2017

Doklam may bring Bhutan closer to India

Sandeep Bhardwaj

If India remains firm in its commitment to Bhutan, the Doklam standoff against China will only serve to deepen the India-Bhutan ties even further

The Doklam standoff on the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan is well into its second month and Beijing continues with its hardline position and refuses to negotiate on equitable terms. What it aims to gain out of this crisis has been subject to much speculation in New Delhi. Most likely, it hopes to peel Bhutan away from India’s orbit. However, perhaps it should recall the last Doklam crisis between India, China and Bhutan in 1966. That imbroglio only ended up strengthening the India-Bhutan alliance.

Sino-Bhutanese relations first took a nosedive in the late 1950s, mirroring the growing tensions between India and China over their boundary dispute. From 1958, Chinese maps began showing large swathes of Bhutanese territory as part of China. In 1959, as it suppressed the Tibetan rebellion, China also took over certain Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet. At the same time, around 4,000 Tibetan refugees entered Bhutan, straining the country’s limited economy.

Thimphu viewed these developments with alarm and responded by closing its northern border. It also moved closer to India and embarked on an ambitious project to modernize the country’s military and economy. While it had a special treaty relationship with New Delhi since 1949, the two countries did not share any formal defence arrangement until then. Fear of China changed the situation. The Indian Army began training Bhutanese forces. India also began pouring in economic aid into the country (increasing it by 1,000%), most of which went into building roads and airfields of strategic value.

The 3 Known Unknowns of Xi Jinping’s China

One of the most famous comments from the Bush era, running from 2000 to 2008, came from then-Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfield who talked acerbically about “known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns.” His convoluted language was interpreted at the time as referring to the complete mess that was starting to unfold in the newly “liberated” Iraq. Even so, many realized that there was ironically a deep logic behind what he said: some things we know, and some we don’t. It is better at least to recognize the vast expanse of our ignorance than simply trying to go around ignoring it.

There are plenty of things we know about China under Xi Jinping – from the profuse economic data spewing out from its statistics agency, to the granular reports produced by journalists, analysts, and observers of the situation on the ground across the country. Then there are a massive number of very important things that we don’t know, and have no real way of easily finding out – how, for a very topical example at the moment, elite political leaders are actually going to be chosen at the imminent 19th Party Congress later this year

But on top of these issues, there are three very clear known unknowns about China – things where we have lots of evidence and analysis, and plenty of observations, but which we have no way of decisively resolving now. These known unknowns all relate to China’s relationship with the outside world.

Be prepared for China's Electronic Warfare

'In India, China's capacities to conduct new types of warfare is critically underestimated,' says Claude Arpi.

China's People's Liberation Army is ready with extensive plans for Electronic Warfare

General Bipin Rawat, the chief of the army staff, recently mentioned the future of the defence forces in India; the general spoke of a long-awaited integrated command.

While dismissing apprehensions about shortage of funds, he asserted: 'If we are going to fight a war someday, the war is going to be fought by the three forces together. Integration has to be in a holistic manner. Can we have a joint forces mechanism? Is it better or not? We have to look at the option.'

'You also economise by integration of logistics. The integration has to be in the form of all services utilising their resources in a harmonised manner, the amy chief said.

Though often expounded upon, little has been concretely done to make the integrated command a concrete reality.

At the same time the Chinese People's Liberation Army under President Xi Jinping is taking giant steps towards the future.