29 July 2015

Blame higher education for America’s potentially weaker military

As more Americans pursue college degrees, it has become less of an obstacle to becoming a leader in the military, hurting their relative quality.

The law of unintended consequences is alive and well in a strange place: more Americans are going to college, which is a good thing, but it has reduced the quality of officers joining the military.

I saw the importance of having a high-quality officer corps firsthand when I was deployed with an infantry company to Sangin, Afghanistan in 2011. For seven frustrating months, our battalion was stuck in a Groundhog’s day of either finding Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or having the IEDs find us. The only variation was imposed on us by the actions of the other side.
Waiting for the plane home, I joked to another officer, “That was nothing like what the counterinsurgency manual described.”

“I wouldn’t know – I haven’t read it,” he replied. “I don’t need a book to tell me what to do.”
This anecdote of one lieutenant’s antipathy to “book learning” reflects a deeper problem: the decline in the intelligence of military officers, which our recent studyfound has become significant. This is not just a result of continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but has been a trend for at least 35 years.

India, Myanmar Eye Future Defense Cooperation

This week, Myanmar’s military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing began his much-anticipated four-day visit to India.

On his trip, he and the rest of his high-level military delegation were expected to meet top political and military leaders including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar and Army Chief Dalbir Singh. India-Myanmar border cooperation is expected to dominate discussions during the week, since the visit comes over a month after New Delhi conducted a controversial cross-border raid on insurgent camps.

But ahead of those talks, the delegation visited Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL). According to sources, they visited the Indian Navy’s local bases and the two sides held wide-ranging discussions on maritime strategy, ship-building and maritime deployment.

Beyond these conversations, media reports indicate that there may be some movement towards future defense cooperation. According to Times of India, Shekhar Mital, chairman and managing director of GSL, said the visiting military delegation was “very keen” on India’s offshore patrol vessels (OPV) in particular. While project approval was stuck for now due to sanctions, Mital said “it is only a matter of time before the approval is given.” Mital personally briefed Min Aung Hlaing on the ongoing construction of OPVs in India for its own capabilities as well as for export. The delegation was also shown efforts being undertaken in the mine countermeasures vessels (MCMV) project.

We’re Developing the Wrong Leaders

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen speaks to the assembled students of the Army’s Command and General Staff Officer Course

The following guest post was provided by Major Jon Mohundro, a Logistics officer currently teaching at West Point. His previous experience includes junior officer positions within Armor battalions and the TRADOC Commander’s Planning Group. The views expressed in his post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, or the Army University.
Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno has repeatedly said that leader development is the Army’s top priority for developing the future force(1). As the defense budget continues to be constrained by sequestration, developing the right leaders who can operate and win in a complex world will become increasingly more important. Unfortunately, the Army’s officer education system is designed to develop the wrong leaders.


Most research has shown that cognitive ability, commonly called “intelligence” or simply “brightness”, is only slightly malleable in adults, but is highly portable. This means, in essence, that once a person reaches adulthood, their cognitive ability is more-or-less set, but that cognitive ability can easily be applied to different challenges and environments. Officers with the highest cognitive ability will continue to have the highest cognitive ability regardless of their relative development.

While raw intelligence is not fluid in adults, the ability to learn new conceptual frameworks to apply to new situations is definitely possible. Developing this ability, known as “crystallized intelligence in research and “wisdom” in regular expression, is the goal of most long-term intellectual development and performance psychology programs(2). Academic research has shown that job experiences and workforce development programs can have great impacts on this type of intellectual development(3).

28 July 2015

1971 War: The Sinking of the Ghazi

By Vice Adm (Retd) GM Hiranandani
27 Jul , 2015

The Pakistan Navy’s Deployment of Ghazi in the 1971 Indo Pakistan War

In his book, “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership”, written in 1972 soon after the war, Maj General Fazal Muqeem Khan states: (Page 153)

“The submarine GHAZI was despatched to the Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal. The GHAZI’s task was to carry out offensive mine laying against Visakhapatnam.

“GHAZI which had sailed towards Visakhapatnam with special instructions, had to reach its destination on 26 Nov 71. She was to report on arrival but no word was heard from her. Efforts were made to contact her but to no avail. The fate of the GHAZI was in jeopardy before 3 Dec. The Indians made preposterous claims about the sinking of the GHAZI. However, being loaded with mines, it seems to have met an accident on her passage and exploded. A few foreign papers at that time also reported that some flotsam had been picked up by Indian fishermen and handed over to the Indian Navy, which made up stories about its sinking”.

The Story of the Pakistan Navy’ published twenty years later in 1991, gives a slightly different account:

GHAZI’s deployment to the Bay of Bengal must be regarded as a measure taken to rectify a strategic posture that was getting increasingly out of step with military realities.

“The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India, while GHAZI was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS VIKRANT, which was reported to be operating in the area.

India’s Foreign Policy 2004-2014 Dismally Failed: Challenges Ahead

By Dr Subhash Kapila
Paper No. 5973 Dated 22-Jul-2015

India’s foreign policy 2004-2014 dismally failed under the stewardship of Congress Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh and his selected National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon , (earlier his Foreign Secretary), with its signature note of appeasement of the China-Pakistan strategic duo grossly adversarial against India.

India’s foreign policy 2004-2014 was also a dismal failure when it came to India’s strategic partnership with the United States and Russia, two nations which greatly mattered to India’s security needs in terms of enlisting some semblance of countervailing power against the India-destabilisation strategies of the China-Pakistan Axis, reminiscent of the Germany-Italy Axis of the Second World War.

India’s ‘Neighbourhood Policy’ during 2004-2014 was more than disastrous as India served Nepal and Sri Lanka on a platter to Chinese influence and sway. India was insensitive to Bangladesh’s strategic significance for India. In fact all these three countries matter significantly for Indian security along with Bhutan.

Looking back at this period of complete divorce of India’s national security imperatives as determinants of India’s foreign policy, one wonders what factors or foreign policy ends played on the minds of India’s Congress Prime Minister and his chosen National Security Adviser, otherwise reputed to be an ace diplomat.

Sorry, the United Kingdom Does Not Owe India Reparations

Indian diplomat and politician Shashi Tharoor (from the opposition Congress Party) has recently called for Great Britain to pay reparations to India and its former colonies in a debate at the Oxford Union (that went viral online). This argument has been met with widespread praise in India where nationalism – for both the left and right – is often cast in anti-British and anti-colonial terms, influenced by the the narratives of the anti-imperialist 20th century in vogue throughout the world. These ideas have had elements of truth and exaggeration in them. Despite the appeal of these ideas, it does not make sense for Britain to pay reparations to India for reasons I outline below.

First, I disagree with the characterization of colonialism that lends itself to such calls in the first place. History, is among other things, the story of the rise and fall of states and empires. And by their nature, politics and state-building always help and hurt certain groups. In an empire or after conquest by an empire, there are always privileged elites, collaborators, people whose lives don’t change at all, and groups that have the worst of it.

Taliban Overrun Afghan Military Base in Northern Afghanistan, Capture 100 Personnel

Bill Roggio
July 26, 2015

Taliban overrun base, capture and release 100 Afghan security personnel

The Taliban overran a military base in the remote northern Afghan province of Badakhshan this weekend, capturing more than 100 police and tribal fighters before disarming and freeing them.

Taliban fighters began their assault on the Qala base in the embattled district of Warduj beginning on July 24, according to the jihadist group and Afghan press reports. The base was overrun by July 25, but the Afghan government and the Taliban differ on the reasons why.

Afghan officials claimed that a police commander known as Amanullah and his officers defected to the Taliban, TOLONews reported.

“Amanullah head of the border police in the military base made a deal with the Taliban insurgents because the military base did not have any problems and they had all the equipment,” a spokesman for the provincial chief of police said.

The Taliban claimed credit for the assault in a statement that was released on its official website, Voice of Jihad, but did not give any indication that the police defected. Instead the Taliban said the assault force detained “110 hireling ANA [Afghan soldiers], police and Arbaki militiamen.” Additionally the Taliban said it seized “10 PKM machine guns, 10 RPG launchers, 90 rifles, 3 Dshk heavy machine guns, 2 mortar tubes, an artillery piece as well as a large amount of ammunition and other military gear.”

The Enduring Power of Bad Ideas: ‘Cold Start’ and Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

In April 2011, Pakistan declared that it had tested a short-range battlefield nuclear missile, the Nasr.1 Since then, prominent purveyors of Pakistani nuclear doctrine, including Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai and former diplomat Maleeha Lodhi, have portrayed the Nasr missile as a counter to India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine.2 

That doctrine supposedly aims at rapid but limited retaliatory incursions into Pakistan by the Indian army to seize and hold narrow slices of territory in response to a terrorism event in India involving Pakistanis. The rationale is that the seized territory would be returned in exchange for Pakistani extradition of extremists inflicting terrorism onto India. The doctrine is based on the assumption that Pakistan would not resort to the use of nuclear weapons in response to a limited Indian incursion, thereby offering space for conventional conflict even in a nuclearized environment.

Pointing to this Indian war doctrine, Pakistani decision-makers now argue that the deterrent value of their current arsenal operates only at the strategic level. According to this line of reasoning, the gap at the tactical level gives India the freedom to successfully engage in limited Cold Start-style military operations without fear of nuclear escalation. Development of the low-yield, tactical battlefield nuclear weapon, the Nasr missile, is seen as the solution providing “flexible deterrence options”3 for an appropriate response to Cold Start, rather than massive nuclear retaliation against India. Nasr proponents argue that by maintaining “a credible linkage between limited conventional war and nuclear escalation,” the missile will deter India from carrying out its plan.4

How Hamid Karzai Continues to Rule Afghanistan From Beyond the (Political) Grave

By Kambaiz Rafi
July 25, 2015
The former Afghan president is leveraging a personal network to exercise influence beyond his term.
Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan since the 2001 Bonn agreement up until a year ago, never truly had his heart in building state institutions, at least not in the same way his Western partners had in mind. Coming from a tribal background, he was ideologically opposed to a strong state bureaucracy and rekindled tribal patronage at the highest levels of government, a trend that had hardly been seen in Afghanistan for at least a century before him, barring the 1990s Civil Warand the ensuing Taliban regime. Turning into a vocal critic of the current president, he continues to wieldinfluence among the tribal communities to challenge the government’s authority.

It was in late 19th century, under the reign of Amir Abur Rahman, that Afghanistan showed signs of statehood with a centralized bureaucracy and emphasis on rule of law. In his memoir, Amir, who had previously lived in exile for a decade in Central Asia, constantly derides the old ways of tribal loyalties and the prevalent backwardness among his subjects, cracking down on a number of tribal rebellions during his reign.

Revealed: How China and Russia Could Destroy America's F-35 in Battle

July 26, 2015

After the leaking of a report about the recent failure of an F-35 to win in a dogfight against an F-16D, debate has intensified about the future nature of air to air combat. In a recent Strategist post, Andrew Davies identifies the importance of combining long-range air-to-air engagement using ‘Beyond-Visual Range Air to Air Missiles’ (BVRAAMs), with the advantage bestowed by stealth technology to reduce detectability of the aircraft, as well as exploiting superior sensors, information processing and electronic warfare capability.

Davies also notes that it is yet to be demonstrated how effective these capabilities will be in a future operational environment, stating “…there are reasons to wonder how effective the F-35’s bag of tricks will be into the future, especially as counter-stealth systems evolve, and I’d like to see it carry more and longer-ranged weapons…” Clearly the F-35 was designed to undertake a particular approach to air-to-air combat in mind (long-range attacks) rather than close-in dogfighting. This highlights a key question that is now generating significant debate: “Are our current assumptions about future air combat—that BVR engagement will dominate and ‘dogfights’ have had their day

Chinese Outward Investment and Host Country Corruption

By Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Juliette Devillard
July 26, 2015
The effect of Chinese outward investment (COI) on host country corruption levels, government accountability, and transparency has been a topic of considerable interest among activists and scholars as well as businesspeople and policymakers who fret Chinese malfeasance is putting their firms at a competitive disadvantage. This makes sense given billions of dollars of Chinese investment in countries such as Angola, Sudan, and Venezuela, which fare quite poorly in the pertinent international rankings. Moreover, there are numerous reports of Chinese companies paying bribes to secure a major port deal in Sri Lanka, to try to obtain a major broadband telecommunications deal in the Philippines, and to secure lucrative oil and gas opportunities in Kazakhstan. Beyond this, Transparency International’s 2011 Bribe Payer Index ranks Chinese companies second out of a list of 28 countries in terms of their willingness to pay bribes. Indeed, one set of writers from Pacific Forum CSIS has accused China of hypocrisy, waging a vigorous fight against corruption at home, but “turning a blind eye to the dangers that could result from massive infusions of Chinese money.” Simply put, China is ignoring how its investment and associated financial aid and loans can “nurture corruption and distort good governance.”

'This Will Make the Country a Chinese Colony'

A constitutional amendment in the Maldives has India worried about Chinese influence.

The Maldives’ recent constitutional amendment was perhaps the fastest to clear the parliament in recent history. With no debate, no consultation, and no time for legislators to study the draft, the Majlis, the Maldivian parliament, passed a landmark amendment authorizing foreign ownership of land thereby raising questions regarding the intents of the ruling Progressive Party of the Maldives (PPM). It took the parliament under 24 hours to effect a major change in the constitution, allowing foreigners to acquire land on a freehold basis on any of the 1,200 islands that comprise the Maldives.

“There has been no public debate, no consultation and the amendment passed so quickly that everyone is still in shock. It was an unprecedented move and people are still confused,” says Zaheena Rasheed, editor of Minivan News, a prominent news portal in the Maldives.

The amendment, in a radical departure from the past, allows foreign nationals to buy land on a freehold basis. Many legislators critical of the amendment says that it is aimed at giving China a foothold in the Indian ocean, disturbing the balance of power between New Delhi and Beijing in the region.

ISIS Is a a “Fast-Moving and Confounding Enemy,“ U.S. Officials

Damian Paletta, Wall Street Journal
July 26, 2015
ASPEN, Colo.—Top U.S. national security officials at a multiday mountain summit described Islamic State militants as a fast-moving and confounding enemy, immune to some of the counterterrorism methods that appeared to work more effectively against al Qaeda.

Some suggested that efforts to counter Islamic State advances were yielding success, but others painted a picture of a militant group that—particularly on social media—operates with stealth and speed that the U.S. government wasn’t prepared to match.
“We didn’t perfect the process of sharing information and sharing intelligence until this emergency really exploded in our faces,” said retired Marine Gen. John Allen, now a top State Department official who leads the government’s effort to combat Islamic State.

The three days of panels at the Aspen Security Forum demonstrated the extent of the challenge facing Gen. Allen and other law enforcement, security, intelligence, military, and foreign policy leaders as they continue to re-evaluate their approach to the militant group.
U.S. officials described two glaring challenges. First, the places where Islamic State thrives-northern Iraq, Syria, and Libya—are major U.S. intelligence blind spots. The U.S. government has no military or diplomatic presence in these areas and it is difficult to monitor activity.

Second is the challenge posed by Islamic State’s use of social media to recruit supporters and inspire followers to carry out attacks in the U.S. Against al Qaeda, U.S. officials had successfully tracked and disrupted networks often made up of trusted allies with long-standing relationships. Islamic State militants, however, often have much looser bonds, and have motivated attacks with people who militants never meet in person.
Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey said these militants connect with possible sympathizers by using the social media network Twitter, then they hold conversations by using encrypted technology that the U.S. government has a hard time monitoring.

The Lost Pilgrims of the Islamic State


Like past pilgrimages to China and the Soviet Union, the migration of Westerners to the Islamic State group points to the tragic intersection of estrangement and utopian hope. 

In Political Pilgrims, the sociologist Paul Hollander exposes and excoriates the mentality of a certain kind of Western intellectual, who, such is the depth of his estrangement or alienation from his own society, is predisposed to extend sympathy to virtually any opposing political system.
Simon Cottee is a senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Kent. He is the author of the forthcoming book The Apostates: When Muslims Leave Islam.Full Bio

The book is about the travels of 20th-century Western intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, and how these political travelers were able to find in such repressive countries a model of “the good society” in which they could invest their brightest hopes. Hollander documents in relentless and mortifying detail how this utopian impulse, driven by a deep discontent with their own societies, led them to deny or excuse the myriad moral defects of the places they visited.

But the significance of Political Pilgrims extends far beyond its immediate subject matter, and its insights may help to illuminate the mentality of that most recent and disconcerting set of pilgrims: namely, the Western migrants to the Islamic State, whose estrangement from their own societies can prime them to idealize the so-called Islamic State and overlook or justify its terrible human-rights abuses.

The ISIS flag on a hilltop after a battle in Kobani, Syria

JUL 24, 2015

In Political Pilgrims, the sociologist Paul Hollander exposes and excoriates the mentality of a certain kind of Western intellectual, who, such is the depth of his estrangement or alienation from his own society, is predisposed to extend sympathy to virtually any opposing political system.

The book is about the travels of 20th-century Western intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, and how these political travelers were able to find in such repressive countries a model of “the good society” in which they could invest their brightest hopes. Hollander documents in relentless and mortifying detail how this utopian impulse, driven by a deep discontent with their own societies, led them to deny or excuse the myriad moral defects of the places they visited.

But the significance of Political Pilgrims extends far beyond its immediate subject matter, and its insights may help to illuminate the mentality of that most recent and disconcerting set of pilgrims: namely, the Western migrants to the Islamic State, whose estrangement from their own societies can prime them to idealize the so-called Islamic State and overlook or justify its terrible human-rights abuses.

Shelling reported in southern Yemen despite truce called by Saudi coalition

Houthi rebels refuse to adopt position on ceasefire
Shelling was reported in southern Yemen on Sunday despite a truce being called by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition conducting airstrikes against the Shia Houthi rebels in the country. Witnesses said that the rebels had shelled residential areas near the city of Taiz. Clashes between the rebels and Yemeni government forces at an air base near the city of Aden were also reported hours before the ceasefire was supposed to take effect. A spokesperson for the Houthis said that they would not adopt a position on the ceasefire until they were officially informed about it. Other reports suggested that rebel leader Abdel-Malek al-Houthi had pledged to continue fighting government forces. While the coalition on Saturday said that it would suspend bombarding Houthi positions for five days, it also reserved its right to respond to any provocation by the rebels.

Turkey calls for NATO talks on Islamic State, PKK

Turkey has called for a special meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to discuss military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Kurdish separatist outfit the Kurdistan Workers Party. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that Turkey’s request was based on Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which allows member-nations to request a special meeting if their territorial security is being threatened. “I think it’s very right and timely to have a meeting where we address the turmoil and the instability,” Stoltenberg said. He also commended Turkey over their increased operations against the Islamic State and their efforts to “increase control over their borders and to stem the flow of foreign fighters”. Turkey’s call for a special session came a day after it bombed Islamic State positions in Syria and PKK camps in northern Iraq.

All Roads Lead to Syria

July 24, 2015

So far, the “historic” Iran deal hasn’t shifted much. If it’s going to stick, the Obama Administration has to think bigger.

The United States got down on its knees last week to kiss the frog on the lips and sign the nuclear deal with Iran; the frog, however, does not show much sign of turning into a prince. It is early days, but the Iranian nuclear dealseems not to have changed very much on the ground. Instead of a handsome prince professing undying love, we have the same old ayatollah croaking dismally that U.S. policies were diametrically opposed to those of Iran, in a speech punctuated by chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” The top Revolutionary Guards commander came out in opposition to the heavily caveated provisions which grant access to Iran’s secret military sites, saying that the deal crossed “red lines.” “We will never accept it.”This doesn’t seem to be what our diplomats expected. “I don’t know how to interpret it at this point in time, except to take it at face value, that that’s his policy,” said U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in an interview on Al-Arabiya. “But I do know that often comments are made publicly and things can evolve that are different. If it is the policy, it’s very disturbing, it’s very troubling.” The Princification Process still has a ways to run.

Assuming that the Iran deal is here to stay, and that one or both houses of Congress don’t get the two-thirds majorities needed to override a presidential veto, the question now is what next. What does the deal with Iran really mean? Did we take the nuclear issue off the table, sort of, in order to clear the decks for a tougher regional strategy to counter Iran’s rush for hegemony across the Middle East? Or is the nuclear deal just the first act in a longer drama of retreat, retrenchment, and accommodation as the U.S. hands the keys of the Persian Gulf to our new Shi’a friends?

Turkey’s double trouble: ISIS and the PKK

26 July 2015

The past several days in southeastern Turkey have seen significant bloodshed followed by high tensions and widespread unrest that has spilled over into Istanbul and Ankara. On 20 July, a 20 year old Turkish national, identified as Abdurrahman Alagözand suspected of having ties to ISIS, detonated his explosives-laden body at a cultural center in southeastern Turkey’s Suruc province. The explosion ripped through a gathering of Socialist Youth Association (SGDF) members, who were discussing how to rebuild the war-torn Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane. The blast killed at least 32 people and injured another 104.

Following the deadly attack, demonstrations and unrest broke out across the southeast as well as Ankara and Istanbul. As protesters condemned the perceived failure of the Turkish government to prevent the attack, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) began plotting. 

During evening hours local time on 21 July, PKK cadres killed at least one man they alleged was an ISIS fighter in Istanbulwhile another man accused of supporting the militant group was shot dead in his house in Adana province the following day. 

Later on 22 July, two days days after the suspected ISIS bombing, PKK cadres fatally shot two Turkish police officers inside the men’s shared private residence in Şanlıurfa province. The militant group quickly claimed responsibility for the revenge attack, noting that, "A punitive action was carried out... in revenge for the massacre in Suruç.” Deadly PKK ambushes continued on 23 July with two masked gunmen shooting one policeman dead and injuring another inDiyarbakır province.

Post deal, can Rouhani deliver on promises of reform?

Author Alireza Nader
July 24, 2015

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani leaves after delivering a speech at the plenary session of the Asian African Conference in Jakarta, April 22, 2015.

The next few months will see President Hassan Rouhani enjoy a peak in popularity. The nuclear agreement reached between Iran and the P5+1 (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France and Germany) boosts Rouhani among the public and even the political elite. The mild-mannered president will have much more political capital in his hand. But what will he spend it on? The economy will no doubt be a big focus. Rouhani’s government has already indicated a desire to liberalize and privatize Iran’s moribund economy and possibly loosen the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) chokehold on business. But Rouhani has been relatively reticent on political and social reforms, both of which matter a great deal to Iranians; after all, what is economic prosperity if there is no accompanying personal freedom?
Summary⎙ Print Iranian President Hassan Rouhani must tread lightly to ensure economic prosperity after sanctions relief.

Iran can buy a lot of terror with $100 billion

 JULY 26, 2015

AS A CANDIDATE for president in 2004, John Kerry couldn’t bring himself to worry overmuch about Islamic terrorism. Today, as a secretary of state trying to sell a nuclear accord that would lift economic sanctions from the world’s leading state sponsor of Islamic terrorism, he still can’t.

During his run for the White House, Kerry insisted the danger from global jihadists should be viewed as primarily an “intelligence gathering, law enforcement, public diplomacy effort,” not a military conflict. “We have to get back to the place we were,” he told an interviewer — back to regarding suicide bombings and planes flying into skyscrapers as a manageable annoyance, not an existential threat. He likened terror attacks to prostitution and illegal gambling: “a nuisance” that “we’re never going to end . . . but we’re going to reduce.”

Ten years later, jihadist violence remains a deadly global reality, much of it fueled and financed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. That is why one of the gravest concerns about the proposed Iran deal is the massive financial windfall Tehran will reap as international sanctions come off. With well over $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets poised to be released, plus some $20 billion a year in new oil revenues, the Iranian regime will be awash with cash — cash it will be free to invest in its lethal proxies.