18 April 2014

Arming ‘After’ Aiming: Agenda for the New Government

IssueNet Edition| Date : 15 Apr , 2014

We blaze our own tracks

“The inability to think beyond rigid assumptions and perceptions in matters strategic have often led to surprise, failure and disaster”

Mr Stephen Cohen needs to be complemented for flagging the attention of India’s leadership and her strategic community to the direction modern India needs to take towards meeting her strategic destiny. His (timely) book “Arming ‘without’ Aiming needs to be considered seriously, not merely because of the ways and means that have been recommended, but because of the urgency. Security issues and matters of strategic import can no longer be remain on the political backburner as the rapid pace at which the world is altering well-established security equations, both in the immediate region and across the globe and the role India can play in balancing relations mandate serious consideration and effort. This is an important task for the new leadership in New Delhi as they would have the opportunity and the support of the major players.

India remains a soft target because she has invariably taken a re-active approach, and the effect gets compounded since the articulation of her strategic outlook is not only defensive, but pacifist by nature.

Without delving into the merits and demerits of what Mr Cohen has prescribed for India’s security, issues that merit a re-visit are flagged for re-setting the mental mould of the new leadership as also of the well-entrenched Praetorian Guards in South Block for taking matters of security head on. In view of the major changes sweeping the globe, these have become essential for what portends to be an uncertain strategic future, a future with which the new leadership has to contend with squarely as the time for making political statements in the din and dust during electoral campaigning is now over. It also needs to be highlighted that beyond the rhetoric of ensuring the safety and security of the nation, no party attempted to make clear-cut policy statements relating to matters of security.

Modern India is restless to achieve her strategic future and for doing so, she has to arm herself, and do so with a sense of urgency. For that she not only needs to be pragmatic in her approach and ensure more than just a bang from her high end purchases and therefore need to pay heed to Mr Cohen and aim deliberately before arming.

The Issue of Defence versus Security

Defence and Security are words that are often used interchangeably, whereas, the differences between them are basic. ‘Defence’ means taking defensive action(s) against any action or actor. While, the dictionary does not amplify if the action taken is reactive or pro-active, by implication, it is merely a reaction or a counter-action. This opens up the larger point that is being made. While professing a defensive strategy makes for good diplomacy, it puts the defender on the back foot as the initiative is allowed to be with the opponent. At the same time, by professing a strategy of ‘Active Defence’ (China), ‘Offensive Defence (Pakistan) and ‘Retaining the right of Pre-emption’ (USA), nations seek to take the initiative, which as any strategist (military or otherwise) would tell is invaluable in war. India remains a soft target because she has invariably taken a re-active approach, and the effect gets compounded since the (official) articulation of her strategic outlook is not only defensive, but pacifist by nature. While many examples of this mindset can be recounted to exemplify the point, the fact that her army is disproportionately organised as Holding (now called Pivot) and Strike Forces, and the bulk of her forces remain tied down for (static) defensive tasks, instead of being organised to take the battle to the enemy is testimony of this mindset.

…the leadership of modern India needs to get out of the defensive mindset and think beyond ‘reacting’ as no victory has ever come from merely being defensive.

On the other hand, nations organise, structure and prepare their militaries for undertaking offensive tasks, while static tasks like defence of frontiers are left to Border Guards (Mujahids and Frontier Corps in the case of Pakistan and Border Guard in the case of China). In the light of the above, not only is there a requirement to free the potential of the army for undertaking offensive actions by defining a more definitive role for the Para Military Forces (PMF), even more important is the requirement for the leadership of modern India needs to get out of the defensive mindset and think beyond ‘reacting’ as no victory has ever come from merely being defensive.

Security is another issue that is often obfuscated in debates and discourses. Security simply means the sense of being secure and by extension, being ‘free of danger.’ Thus, while defence adds to the sense of security of the nation at large, security perse is beyond what defence can provide on its own. While there are many dimensions that contribute to a nation’s security, in military terms, it boils down to external security, which is essentially a matter for the military, and internal security, which is an issue of governance. In the ultimate analysis, the nation requires to ensure both external and internal security as the sense of being secure can never be complete without both. Given the well-entrenched defensive mindset and years of neglect, this is a task of herculean proportions, but can still be managed if addressed with the seriousness and earnestness the issue deserves.

Traditionally, nations has kept the charter of Internal Security under the Interior Ministry while External Security is the purview of the Defence Ministry. Though there is nothing wrong in continuing with this approach, there is a need for greater integration of their efforts and for generating the required synergy between the two ministries. In view of the increasing spectre of Non Traditional Threats and from Non-State Actors, there is an urgent need of re-evaluating, re-defining and re-engineering the roles of the Civil Police, PMF and also of the Intelligence Agencies for energising their latent potential and for synergising their application with the military. This requires serious consideration along with the appropriate legislation; more importantly, it requires the will and the determination to transcend turfs.

If India’s deterrence is to appear robust and visible, it would add to her sense of security and provide her the space to concentrate on development exponentially.

In view of the synergy required and the potential that could be unleashed internally by these reforms, there is the requirement for the new government to consider the appointment of a suitable minister to oversee the functioning of both ministries concurrently. Admittedly, the Prime Minister has been the person who traditionally has generated the required synergy between the ministries. However, if past experience is to be relied upon, this is a fulltime job and a Senior Minister with the exclusive charter of Security – both external and internal is the need of the hour. Having said that, whatever, be the form or working arrangement, there is a distinct requirement to think beyond turfs and be able to synergise application of the nation’s forces – both military and the PMF in an optimal manner. At the same time, the functioning and effectiveness of the Intelligence agencies also require to be reviewed and perhaps the time for the complete implementation of the recommendations of the Kargil Report need to be ensured.

Integrated Planning, Force Structuring and Synergy for Combat Application

Planning for meeting future challenges is invariably complex as various requirements have to be concurrently met; since resources are and will invariably remain finite, prioritisation is always required. In the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to oversee the requirements of all three services, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, headed by a Chairman (by virtue of seniority) is the one who is required to meditate. Since, the appointment lacks both authority and permanency, in practical terms; bureaucrats often decide on the priorities, which more often than not, may not be in tune with the operational or functional requirement.

Despite the many recommendations made in this regard, since the government has shown its reluctance to bite the bullet on the appointment of the CDS, perhaps the interim recommendations of appointing a ‘permanent’ Chairman need to be implemented. Having said that, there is also the requirement for including Strategic Forces on the High Table of the Committee for ensuring their requirements are also met. More than anything else, there is an urgent need for the chairman to formulate an ‘Integrated’ Perspective Plan, duly approved by the ministry, which would then serve as the blue-print for force structuring of the services, thereby, injecting the much needed factor of permanency of aims, plans and meeting delivery deadlines.

In view of the fast pace of operations and the operational needs of the future, there is an urgent need to not only strengthen the Air Force and the Navy, but also widen the role of the Strategic Forces – both missile based and Special Forces. This is not to say that the role of the army has in any way diminished, and the force does not require modernisation, it does, but under the circumstances, when there is a need for others to augment their (neglected) capabilities, the army needs to work toward optimising its combat potential through modernisation and restructuring.

China realises that not only does she have to develop the capabilities to be able to fight a highly networked US military, but this would empower her forces and provide them a cutting edge against her neighbours…

The argument being put forward is that future challenges mandate a significant enhancement in the aero-space and maritime domains as also in enhancing the capabilities of undertaking long range strategic tasks – this translates to air, amphibious and for the conduct of ground operations – both covert and overt. If India’s deterrence is to appear robust and visible, it would add to her sense of security and provide her the space to concentrate on development exponentially.

In view of the emerging challenges from China’s forays in the Indian Ocean region and nibbling on the Eastern and Northern frontiers, there a pressing requirement for enhancing the capabilities for undertaking long-range mobile operations, both in the sub-continent and in and around the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). These can only be undertaken by having long endurance transportation assets and ensuring a denser footprint on the ground. In view of these requirements, there is a need to enhance the capabilities of not only the Air Force and the Navy, but also of the Strategic Forces as also of the Intelligence and Surveillance assets.

Networked Centric Warfare

Modern warfare is not only fast paced, but also dynamic, making situational awareness and decision making more important than actions taken on the ground. For success, the side capable of acting and/or reacting faster will definitely have the edge. It is therefore axiomatic that not only must a side have these capabilities, but also the capability to protect its sensors and force multipliers from enemy interference and be in a position to be able to use them despite enemy action. The greatest transformation that is underway in the rapidly modernising Peoples Liberation Army in China is on what they call ‘informationisation.’ China realises that not only does she have to develop the capabilities to be able to fight a highly networked US military, but this would empower her forces and provide them a cutting edge against her neighbours, including Russia and Japan – both fairly advanced in terms of their militaries, and in many ways ahead of India.

Though there has been some movement in this regard, India’s efforts are grossly inadequate and while individual services are making headway in this regard, it requires a holistic and seamless approach to be able to fight successful ‘integrated’ operations. While this again brings up the issue of centralised planning and control, this also throws up the requirement to have an empowered inter-service planning and working group, which must also incorporate civilian specialists to fill in technical voids, which in turn would spur the highly capable Indian IT industry to come up with path breaking technical solutions.

Fighting the Internal Conflict


(Photograph Courtesy: www.post.jagran.com)

A picture they say conveys more that what words bring to life. The above are action photographs of our Security Forces fighting what has been acknowledged by experts as a difficult type of war. While the spirit and dedication of our soldiers has always been commendable, the weapons and equipment being used, despite the fight going on for over two decades in J & K tell the picture of apathy on the part of the authorities. Note the J & K Police personnel – the weapons are the trusty AK and INSAS Rifles (not suitable for such like operations), their bullet proof vests are heavy and ill fitting and it is assumed that they are inured to head injuries.

Though close civil-military relations have never been encouraged in independent India, this has become a matter of weakness and the abysmal state of affairs has been allowed to degenerate to an all-time low.

Now note the army jawans of the Rastriya Rifles; their weapons again remain a mix of direct firing weapons, more suitable for conventional operations, their bullet proof vests equally heavy and ill fitting and while they may be wearing bullet proof patkas (flat faced helmets), only one who has worn them in combat know how heavy they are. Neither of them have the ware withal of firing Under barrel grenades and neither are equipped with non lethal weapons and equipment that would give them an edge for prevailing in suchlike operations. The bottom line is that despite decades of fighting the same enemy in the same terrain and operating conditions, there is little that has been done. In view of this reality check in what has been a frontline since long, it would be a revelation to see the operating conditions of the CRPF and other forces operating in the Naxal affected areas of the nation. Clearly, much has to be learnt to make the forces capable of doing what has been asked from them.

Civil-Military Relations

Though close civil-military relations have never been encouraged in independent India, this has become a matter of weakness and the abysmal state of affairs has been allowed to degenerate to an all-time low. This is an aberration for the new government to correct and revive the faith in the system – especially amongst the military services. Despite the much hyped announcement on the part of both major political parties to support the delayed ‘One Rank-one Pay’ demand, it is paradoxical that neither of them did anything during their time in power to correct what would appears as a ridiculous (bureaucratic) anomaly, exposing the political intent behind the timely endorsement. This ‘unhealthy’ state of affairs needs a mature outlook on the part of the leadership and correction from the top.

Defence Infrastructure and Indigenisation

These are other areas that require a great deal of impetus as India’s northern neighbour has made impressive progress to improve the infrastructure ‘to’ and ‘within’ Tibet. India on the other hand, lags behind in developing her frontiers and this remains a great strategic and operational disadvantage. This is not merely in terms of roads and rail construction but also in terms of communication infrastructure and in terms of stockpiling and meeting the logistical requirements of a fast-paced war.

While there would be many issues that would engage the new government, the security needs of the nation are required to be addressed with the urgency the situation demands.

On the other hand, development of terrain and role specific equipment by China is a great advantage and the fielding of wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles for conduct of operations in difficult terrain is testimony of this fact. On the other hand, due to the lack of progress and correspondingly, the lack of confidence in indigenously produced weapons highlights the requirement that India needs to pay serious attention to overcome these shortcomings. Though it is not a matter of pride that India is the largest importer of weapons in the world, this needs to be leveraged to obtain technology for producing state of the art defence equipment within the country.

Conclusion 

While there would be many issues that would engage the new government, the security needs of the nation are required to be addressed with the urgency the situation demands. While the first task would be to find the right talent to tenet the required ministerial slots, there is a requirement to assist the new ministers in their task by having empowered committees made up of specialists to go into the depth of the issues and to correct the system. This requires political sagacity and maturity – hopefully, the new leadership in New Delhi is up to the task.

About the Author

Brig Amar Cheema, author of The Crimson Chinar: The Kashmir Conflict - A Politico-Military Perspective.
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