10 April 2014

Political consensus on foreign policy This is despite passions being inflamed in Tamil Nadu

G Parthasarathy


A placard carrying a picture of Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa. An AFP file photo

IN April 1977, just after the Janata Party government assumed office, the eminent Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, arrived in Delhi, looking visibly nervous. Having backed Mrs. Gandhi’s Emergency rule, Gromyko expected a cold reception in South Block. His counterpart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, smilingly put him at ease, saying that he had no hard feelings, asserting that “Indo-Soviet relations are strong and do not depend on the political fortunes of any individual or political party”. Happily, that type of statesmanship was retained amidst the heated rhetoric of the current election campaign. Both major national parties have not bickered about the approach to two major foreign policy issues.

As tensions escalated in Ukraine, the UPA government took the position that while we would like issues to be resolved peacefully between the parties concerned, the legitimate interests of Russia cannot be overlooked. This was followed by the courageous decision for India to abstain in a US-sponsored resolution in the UN Human Rights Council, seeking an international inquiry into the civilian casualties in the last days of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. This was a sensitive issue in which passions were competitively inflamed by political parties in Tamil Nadu, some of whom are allied to the NDA. Despite the surcharged atmosphere in Tamil Nadu, the BJP did not oppose the government action and, in fact, let it be known what it felt about India's larger national interests.

The UNHRC resolution passed this year, unlike in the past, included the constitution of an open-ended international investigation into developments in a sovereign member State. This goes well beyond the current understanding and basic operative principles of the UNHRC. Moreover, unlike resolutions of the UN Security Council, resolutions of the Human Rights Council are not enforceable by international sanctions. Not surprisingly, this resolution did not secure the support of the majority of members on the Council. Only 23 of the Council's 47 members supported the resolution, with the majority either abstaining or voting against. Apart from South Korea, other members in India's Asian and Indian Ocean neighbourhood either abstained or voted against the resolution. These included China, Indonesia, Japan, Kuwait, the Maldives, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates. Despite their reputed global influence, the US and its allies could pick up support only from a few Latin American and African countries,

The approach to the vote of the UNHRC revealed that both national parties felt that while India was committed to the safety, welfare and human dignity of members of the Tamil community in northern Sri Lanka, it should not allow itself to be totally isolated in Asia on an issue concerning its immediate neighbourhood. Based on the support that it received from two Permanent Members of the Security Council (China and Russia) and the overwhelming majority of Asian and Indian Ocean littoral States, Sri Lanka will ignore the more intrusive aspects of recommendations of the UNHRC. Moreover, we would only open strategic space for China and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean by totally alienating Sri Lanka. More importantly, it would become increasingly difficult for India to implement projects for the economic benefit of the northern Tamils without the cooperation of the Sri Lankan government.

New Delhi's strategy has to be two-pronged. Politically, it has to work with world and regional powers to ensure that Sri Lanka fulfils its comment to credibly inquire into the entire range of human rights violations in the last stages of the conflict, alluded to by its Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. This has to be accompanied by a phased and early reduction in the presence of the army in its north and an end to interference by its army in civilian affairs. Joint patrolling of the maritime boundary has to be enhanced to ensure there is no inflow of weapons to the North. The powers required to be devolved to the Provincial Chief Minister, Justice Vigneswaran, have not been devolved, particularly on lands. Bureaucrats posted by Colombo have to be warned that they will face action if they continue to flout directives of the Chief Minister. Economically, India's already substantial aid programme will have to be continued vigorously.

India has allocated an estimated at $ 1.3 billion (Rs 8,000 crores) — its largest ever development assistance programme — for the Tamils in northern Sri Lanka. As many as 2,50,000 family packs comprising clothing, utensils and essential food packets have been distributed. Moreover, 95,000 packs of seeds and agricultural implements provided to those tilling the land. The projects being undertaken include the construction of 50,000 homes and supply of materials for around 43,000 war-damaged houses. There have also been major projects for the development of rail transportation, port infrastructure in Kankesanthurai, a 500 MW Thermal Power Station in Sampur and upgrade of Palaly airport. Development of human resources has been facilitated by upgrading schools and vocational training centres, the construction of hospitals and involvement in employment generation projects in agriculture, fisheries, small industries and handicrafts.

Despite the stormy rhetoric, there has been virtually no major effort from the government, civil society organisations, political parties or business houses in Tamil Nadu to see how the state's human and developmental resources could be put to use for economically empowering people in northern Sri Lanka. Given its vast resources in fields like information technology and technical education, the State could make an immense contribution through collaborative interaction with people in Jaffna and elsewhere to ensure that the North emerges as a technical and industrial hub of Sri Lanka. This would necessarily require a cooperative effort involving the governments of India and Sri Lanka, together with the state government in Chennai and the provincial government in Jaffna. This would be a far better approach than joining the US and its European partners, who have contributed precious little to the welfare of Sri Lankan Tamils and merely resorted to sterile posturing and sermonising.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140410/edit.htm#3

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