31 July 2014

Employment of Helicopters in Counter Insurgency Roles

29 Jul , 2014

Experts estimate that about 80 different insurgencies are active around the world. Malaya, French Indochina, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, South Africa, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Congo, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, Xinjiang, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Chechnya have all seen the use of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in operations against insurgents in the past. Usage was limited in most cases because of the shortage of helicopters in the inventories of most military and para military forces barring perhaps the US and the Soviets, and not because their unique capabilities were not apparent.

Counter insurgency operations aim to degrade the military capabilities of insurgents and either eliminate or win over their cadres with minimum destruction of infrastructure and loss of life in areas of operation.

Insurgencies have been in existence since the beginning of history and are as old as human conflict. They are, in essence, movements organised to overthrow a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict. All available options including psychological, political and religious are used to alienate the population from the state. The degree of organisation and an established leadership cadre with a proper command hierarchy is what distinguishes insurgents from armed mobs.

At the start of all insurgencies, there has been a marked asymmetry of military power as well as resources, between the state and the insurgents. In several cases, this asymmetry continued to exist right up to the overthrow of the state with the functioning of the state being undermined from within.

Conventional Warfare and Counter Insurgency

The aim of military forces engaged in a conventional conflict is to destroy the military capabilities of the opponent or to gain control of territory, or both. Enemy forces, infrastructure, communication links, economic and industrial assets and even the leadership as well as non-combatants become targets. Maximum use of available force is done to achieve a speedy victory while minimising damage to own assets and population.

The aim of the insurgents is to dismantle the control of the state over an area and more specifically, over the population of that area. Once this is done, the insurgents become the de facto state. This is achieved by subverting the authority of the state by political and mass agitations, destroying the infrastructure and then blaming the state for the lack of it, using armed action to ‘liberate’ both the area and the population and then assume the full functions and powers of the failed state. Provoking the state to use excessive force which results in damage and casualties to non combatants, is a method effectively used by all insurgents.

The ability to operate from unprepared surfaces without being dependent on sizable infrastructure is unique to rotary wing aircraft…

Counter insurgency operations aim to degrade the military capabilities of insurgents and either eliminate or win over their cadres with minimum destruction of infrastructure and loss of life in areas of operation. Military action is extremely selective. Unfortunately the training, ethos and equipment of regular military forces as well as the thought processes of military commanders often run counter to these tenets with disastrous results. Use of weaponry has to be decided upon not with their effectiveness against opposing forces alone but after considering the far reaching ramifications of their use against what are, more often than not, one’s own people.

This difference is why counter insurgency operations differ from conventional military operations. The military aspect is possibly the least important and is limited to facilitate the other organs of the state to restore normalcy. In conventional warfare, destruction of opposing regular forces and boots on the ground in enemy territory result in military victory. Whether it will guarantee achievement of all the aims for which the war started, is another story. It is clear that weaponry alone cannot prevail. At home, our experience in the border areas of Jammu and Kashmir, in the North East and in our heartland are also pointers to this.

History of Helicopters in Counter Insurgency Operations

Experts estimate that about 80 different insurgencies are active around the world. Malaya, French Indochina, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, South Africa, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Congo, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, Xinjiang, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Chechnya have all seen the use of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in operations against insurgents in the past. Usage was limited in most cases because of the shortage of helicopters in the inventories of most military and para military forces barring perhaps the US and the Soviets, and not because their unique capabilities were not apparent.

In Malaya, Indo-China, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia South Africa and Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, reconnaissance and surveillance, troop insertion and extraction, resupply and Casualty Evacuation (Casevac) and hot pursuit of insurgents by heli-borne troops were the main roles. A few air-to-ground strike missions providing fire support to ground forces were also flown. All these were generally daytime operations due to the limited capabilities of helicopters at that time.

The attack helicopter proved to be very effective in counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan…

In Vietnam, about 12,000 helicopters were deployed in total and gave unprecedented air mobility to the US and South Vietnamese military forces. Helicopters specially modified for the air-to-ground combat role began to be used. Night operations using helicopters became feasible. Losses were also huge, amounting to over 5,000. It is another matter that despite employment of the most modern and complex weaponry, wrong strategic assessments resulted in defeat in the end, once again proving that strategy prevails over tactics all the time.

The Soviets inducted dedicated combat helicopters (Mi-24) into counter insurgency in Afghanistan in 1980 and they proved to be the most reliable form of fire support to ground forces in that difficult terrain. Operating with the Mi-8 armed troop transport helicopter, they provided vital mobility and firepower. The Afghan insurgents regarded the Mi-24 as their biggest threat, a back-handed compliment to its lethality. This led to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supplying Stinger man-portable Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) to the insurgents. Some reports indicate that after initial increase in losses to Stingers, their effectiveness against helicopters, especially gunships, had waned. However defensive measures degraded weapon delivery accuracies and increased collateral damage, further alienating the population. Overall, the attack helicopter proved to be very effective in counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Helicopter losses between 1979 and 1989 were close to 350, more than half of which were before the advent of the Stingers. One option available to insurgents is to neutralise this threat by ground attacks on the helicopter bases. This has been tried with some success in almost all insurgencies and bigger conflicts such as in Vietnam and Afghanistan. There is an assessment that ready availability of helicopters in both Vietnam and Afghanistan, led to increase in impatience and aggressiveness in their use by military commanders in the counter insurgency environment which calls for time-consuming patience and avoidance of excessive force. This is one aspect we have to be careful about when using not only helicopters but also other highly lethal weaponry in counter insurgency scenarios.

Usage Of Helicopters

Helicopters have important roles in counter insurgency operations in areas of intelligence acquisition, surveillance and reconnaissance, Casevac, logistics resupply, transportation of combatants and non combatants, troop induction and extraction and in air-to-ground strike plus psychological operations such as voice and radio broadcasts and leaflet dropping. It is safe to assume that local insurgents will not have sophisticated air defence with early warning and acquisition radars, SAMs other than a few man portable systems and air assets.

A recent development has been the use of UAVs integrated with helicopters…

Advantages

The ability to operate from unprepared surfaces without being dependent on sizable infrastructure such as runways is unique to rotary wing aircraft. This enables them to be located close to areas of interest and reduces reaction time despite having slower speeds. Helicopters have the ability to fly slow and low and to hover during surveillance, reconnaissance, psychological operations and for re-supply, troop induction and extraction, Casevac and for accurate delivery of firepower especially when using unguided munitions. Hover capabilities permit trained troops to exit by rappelling, eliminating the danger of land mines in Landing Zones being triggered by the weight of the helicopter resting on the ground.

The ability to loiter for extended periods of time over areas of interest is an advantage over fast jet fixed wing aircraft. Helicopters have the option to provide air mobility to ground forces to a degree unmatched by fixed wing aircraft. A recent development has been the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) integrated with helicopters. The former are ideally suited for reconnaissance, surveillance and for real time data collection because of their longer endurance, generally higher speeds and greater loiter times when compared to helicopters. They can even be controlled from helicopters directly or with the helicopter providing a data link to extend the range of the ground station. They can free up scarce helicopter assets by taking over the above roles. They are also lethal in air-to-ground strike roles as insurgents in a lot of countries are discovering.

Disadvantages

By their very nature, helicopters are complex and aerodynamically unstable platforms as compared to fixed wing aircraft. Their ability to tackle extreme conditions of weather is generally less than that of fixed wing aircraft. Performance degradation with altitude (especially in the high and hot conditions prevalent in the mountains) is more rapid than with fixed wing aircraft. Speeds and altitudes are lower than that of fixed wing aircraft, putting them at risk against ground fire to a greater degree. Lower speeds result in increased response times unless they are based close to areas of operations. This increases the vulnerability of bases to attack by ground forces especially in counter insurgency scenarios where forces are operating deep in areas where the control of the state is tenuous. Because of their very design, rotors and power transmission systems are exposed and extremely vulnerable to damage from light and medium automatic weapons.

An area of contention between the IAF and para military forces has been the sanitising and securing of drop zones for helicopters…

Unlike fixed wing aircraft, such damage is often catastrophic. Although their ability to land vertically and hover are assets, they are extremely vulnerable during these phases. Due to limitations in weight carrying capability, fitting heavy armour on aircraft in general and helicopters in particular is usually not a workable idea. Providing protection against small calibre automatic weapons up to 23mm for crew members, fuel tanks and some critical areas has been done in certain types, especially gunships. Simple weapons like Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) with shaped charge warheads have proved to be lethal even against armoured gunships like the Mi 25/35. These weapons are readily available to even poorly equipped insurgents. Existing armour on gunships does not provide sufficient protection. As of now evading them is the only effective defence if helicopters have to operate within their lethal envelopes. However due to short ranges, time available to evade is limited. Such a crude use-and-throw weapon operated by someone with very little training but high on motivation can neutralise a sophisticated system. Medium calibre machine guns are also a serious threat.

Vulnerabilities to ground weapons have forced helicopters to fly higher outside the kill envelopes of these weapons or to operate by night when the ground defenders have problems of target acquisition. Both these tactics degrade weapons delivery accuracy especially when using unguided weapons. This brings up the problem of collateral damage which may be acceptable to some extent in an all out war, but is totally counter-productive in counter insurgency situations.

The Indian Scenario

In the past we have used fixed wing aircraft in an offensive role in the North East briefly in the early 1960s and extensively in logistics support roles from then onwards. Indian forces used both Mi-8 transport and Mi-25 attack helicopters in counter insurgency operations in Sri Lanka and in support of UN ‘peacekeeping’ missions in Africa.

Effective command and control plus coordination are aspects that are at times deficient in our joint operations…

As of now, we have been using very limited numbers of medium transport helicopters in the support, reconnaissance, surveillance, air mobility and Casevac roles. Numbers are few, for example 12,000 ground para military forces being supported by just eight IAF helicopters in Central India. The decision to increase the numbers to 14 is touted as a great effort! These have been augmented by UAVs for surveillance and reconnaissance. The sensor packages in the UAVs are reportedly having difficulties in picking up insurgents under forest cover. Although real time data generation is possible, the complaint is that the data reaches the ground para military commander late. We have a habit of degrading our capabilities, inhouse itself because of turf wars!


IAF helicopters are armed for retaliatory fire with light automatic weapons only. Indian Air Force commanders have opposed using offensive air power against our own people. We had done that with fixed wing fighters in the mid 1960s in the North East and like almost all countries realised that except in very high intensity operations bordering on civil war or full armed conflict, such options are counter-productive. The call for use of helicopters in fire support roles is possibly born out of political desperation to try anything and without appreciating the limitations and dangers of offensive use of air power in counter insurgency operations.


Insurgents will love to destroy an IAF helicopter and capture the crew not because it significantly degrades the capabilities of one of the largest air forces in the world (which it does not), but because it acts as a morale booster for their cadres and a propaganda tool for their perceived fight against ‘an oppressive state’. It also helps in attracting recruits and garnering both national and international sympathy.


An area of contention between the IAF and para military forces has been the sanitising and securing of drop zones for helicopters. The former wants neutralisation of insurgents in the area whereas the latter contends that the need to induct ground forces into hostile areas is because the areas have insurgent activity in the first place. A ground force which finds it difficult to clear road lines of communication along a five-metre wide road for, say, ten kilometres because almost all the ambushes have been of security forces moving along roads because they lack the mobility, terrain knowledge and at times the infantry skills to move cross-country unlike the insurgents – can find it difficult to say the least to sanitise areas of around two by two kilometres surrounding a helicopter Landing Zone. Saturating the area with suppressive fire from the air as is done in war zones leads to collateral damage and further alienation.


In an ideal world, we would have state–of-the-art helicopters and Precision Guided Munitions in huge numbers…


Beset with all these constraints of low intensity insurgency operations, the best use of helicopters in our context of relatively low and medium intensity insurgencies is as follows: 
Enhancing mobility of ground forces by reducing their dependence on road links. 
Logistics re-supply. 
Reconnaissance and surveillance to monitor areas of interest on a real time basis. This is where UAV integration works. 
Provide airborne command and communication links based on helicopters. However the idea of ground forces at platoon levels being controlled from the air by the brass sitting in the relative safety of helicopters proved disastrous in Vietnam and we need not re-invent the wheel. 
Timely Casevac. This is a potent morale booster also. 


These roles require the following measures: 
A substantial increase in numbers of troop transport and cargo helicopters with simple and not sophisticated night operations capability. 
Troops need training in helicopter operations. 
Lack of heli-lift and real time surveillance availability has been a reason for troops getting trapped in insurgent ambushes. 
For Special Operations such as targeting the leadership elements, specially equipped helicopters and Special Forces from military assets could be used. 
Better helicopter or UAV mounted sensors with all weather capabilities are needed to fully exploit these sensor capabilities and these missions could be done by Air Force assets. 
Increased numbers of less sophisticated medium altitude UAVs for routine reconnaissance and surveillance. These will free up more helicopter assets for other tasks. 
Some helicopters for Communications, UAV control and command post roles. These could be standard cargo helicopters communication kits. 


The history of insurgencies shows that military domination alone cannot win this war…


We should increase helicopter assets in support roles rather than go overboard and use gunship firepower as a substitute for boots on the ground in the present state of insurgency. If insurgency is allowed to escalate into a civil war like conflict, the very survival of the state will dictate the use of all available resources without constraints. We would then have already lost the counter insurgency war.


Effective command and control plus coordination are aspects that are at times deficient in our joint operations, both military and civil. Specialised training and area familiarisation of crew and troops is required to fully exploit the potential of helicopters. Commanders with a pure law and order maintenance background and no concept of counter insurgency and ignorant of application of air power cannot be successful in conducting counter insurgency operations involving elements of air power.


Using helicopters crewed by pilots who are not trained in operating in militarily hostile environments risks lives and mission success. Involvement of the military in internal security duties itself is an admission of failure of the state apparatus but has become commonplace now. Equipment constraints with an ageing helicopter fleet and replacements mired in controversies means that the services will not willingly allocate scarce assets for counter insurgency.


Raising the numbers of helicopters from eight to 14 is at best a token gesture.


Laying down priorities is imperative in our case. The dangers posed by insurgency have to be weighed against the military threat from hostile neighbors, some of them involved in supporting the insurgencies themselves. This has to be done at the highest political levels and thereafter decisions taken on allocation of resources. Raising the numbers of helicopters from eight to 14 is at best a token gesture. In an ideal world, we would have state–of-the-art helicopters and Precision Guided Munitions in huge numbers. In such an ideal world, we would not have neglected the root causes of insurgencies and allowed them to fester for decades to start with!


Past record has proved that only ground forces operating with restraint can overcome insurgency. All other weapons systems can at best support these troops and not supplant them. The history of insurgencies shows that military domination alone cannot win this war. There is truth in the axiom that ‘those who forget history are condemned to repeat it’.

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