11 May 2016

* Indian Army: One Plains Strike Corps Too Many

Rahul Bhonsle 
May 9, 2016 

Indian Army: One Plains Strike Corps Too Many

Defence reforms generally have three triggers. Firstly these are undertaken after a defeat in war – the Indian armed forces post 1962 or the American military after Vietnam are two significant examples. Second these are forced upon by the political leadership with the main interest being economy of resources mainly budgetary savings. The United States military were forced towards jointness by the seminal Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Finally militaries undertake reforms though very rarely through own volition under a dynamic leadership. India has been fortunate enough to have such visionary leaders in the past be it Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw who prepared the Army for war in a short period of nine months though not a classic case of reorganisation, then there were General Krishna Rao and K Sundarji regarded as reformists of their time and many others.

In India very rarely has political leadership called for reforms in military organisation. However it appears that such a moment has come with the NDA government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling for right sizing or rather downsizing the Indian Army.

Clearly the Prime Minister’s address to the Combined Commanders Conference on board INS Vikramaditya at Sea, off the coast of Kochi on 15 December 2015 outlined some of the reforms that were necessary for the armed forces. These did not receive as much traction as these should have and set the minds of the armed forces thinking or possibly may have, but here are some selected Quotes from the Prime Minister’s speech with reference to military reforms and cost cutting -

Quotes –

Above all, we look to our Armed Forces to prepare for the future. And, it cannot be achieved by doing more of the same, or preparing perspective plans based on outdated doctrines and disconnected from financial realities.

In the course of the past year, I have seen progress, but I also feel that our forces and our government need to do more to reform their beliefs, doctrines, objectives and strategies. We must define our aims and our instruments for the changing world.

At a time when major powers are reducing their forces and rely more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces.

Modernisation and expansion of forces at the same time is a difficult and unnecessary goal.

We need forces that are agile, mobile and driven by technology, not just human valour.

We need capabilities to win swift wars, for we will not have the luxury of long drawn battles. We must re-examine our assumptions that keep massive funds locked up in inventories.

We have been slow to reform the structures of our Armed Forces. We should shorten the tooth-to-tail ratio.

And, we should promote jointness across every level of our Armed Forces. We wear different colours, but we serve the same cause and bear the same flag. Jointness at the top is a need that is long overdue.

Unquote

While it is not clear what the other two services [Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force] are doing, the Indian Army seems to have commenced the process of change desired which was all the more necessary given that it is clearly not a force which is “agile, mobile,” as Prime Minister Modi states.

The Indian Army is no doubt the epitome of valour, patience and perseverance admirable soldierly virtues for countering militancy, yet modern wars need smart forces which as the Prime Minister states are, “driven by technology and not just human valour”.

The axe to, “shorten the tooth to tail ratio,” is possibly intended to fall on the, “tail,” the administrative services and so called non essentials and could include as per the Hindustan Times report of 9 May 2016, “Military Engineer Services, Directorate General of Quality Assurance, Directorate General of Defence Estates and the Ordnance Factory Board.” These are likely to be further civilianised and privatised.

The Army is obviously working out a detailed road map which is likely to be comprehensive counting down the last man.

There is however a case for a reduction in the, “teeth,” as well and one area which comes to mind are the Strike Corps in the plains and desert sector. Today the Army fields three strike corps in the plains each centred around an armoured division and in turn is controlled by one of the Army Commands – Western, South Western and Southern.

Briefly speaking the Strike Corps have evolved from the experience of the 1965 War with Pakistan which was armour heavy and refined over the years through a series of exercises and war games such as Brass Tacks. These mirror image the Pakistani Strike Corps – Army Reserve North (ARN), Army Reserve Centre (ARC) and Army Reserve South (ARS) in some respects but are far more capable in terms of conduct of high tempo shock action. Thus there is safety in capability dominance as well as quantity

Yet the terrain profile on the Western borders with Pakistan has changed over the years and does not provide an opportunity for employment of more than one Strike Corps. A second strike corps is necessary for a countervailing role, thus the Indian Army could be holding one Strike Corps too many in the plains.

A look at Google satellite imagery would reveal that south of Gurdaspur in Punjab to Gharsana that is North West of Bikaner, the terrain does not permit large scale employment of mechanised forces as a strike corps due to developed areas on both sides of the International Border. The maze of canals interspersed by rural-urban conurbations are ideal to trap large armoured forces, thus the possibility of employing an armoured or a mechanised division in this area is limited if at all.

Further the Great Thar does provide areas for large scale tank manoeuvres but restricted communications would imply long trains of track material that will have to trail advancing elements restricting surprise and deception and providing soft targets to the opponent.

Realistically speaking only one Strike Corps can be employed here which does provide considerable options and advantages and could be a winner in crisis. Another Strike Corps in a countervailing role is necessary. The third appears to be just a comforting luxury.

Given the wide front shallow depth objectives in a pro-active scenario colloquially known as Cold Start, a Strike Corps as a whole per se would in any case be left gnashing at the teeth before given the Go Ahead, but that is a different tack.

While the Shakargarh Bulge is another area where Strike Corps have been employed in the past primarily to secure the axis to Jammu and Kashmir, there are better options to ensure security of this vital communication link which need to be explored.

Suffice to say it is not just the tail but the teeth too need a review as accruals there from are likely to be far more substantial than the former. In the instance case resources of one Strike Corps in the plains could be used for raising the Mountain Strike Corps in full which somehow the Government seems to be going slow.

Hopefully the Indian Army will give a serious thought to this suggestion. 

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