This is important. In today's nuclear weapons era, America's existence depends on our nuclear weapons stockpile. The instant readiness of these weapons for launch by our deployed submarines, bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the absolute, unquestioned ability of the weapons themselves to perform meticulously to their certified military characteristics, are our nation's only guarantee of survival. This is what the Cold War was all about, avoiding global thermonuclear war. For 46 years, the Soviet Union and the United States each had tens of thousands of high-yield nuclear weapons poised for instant launch. If there had been any hint of incipient U.S. weapons failure, our nation would have ceased to exist. Our Strategic Air Command used to say that their mission was to ensure that the Kremlin's daily morning meeting ended with the leader saying "Not today, Comrades."
Nuclear weapons testing was our most important Cold War activity. It saved our lives and our nation's life. To ensure weapons reliability and performance America conducted over a thousand nuclear tests – one or more a month for a half-century. Since 1963, these were underground tests, to avoid spread of radioactive contamination.
But as soon as that war ended, a 1992 Presidential Moratorium prohibited underground nuclear testing. Since then we've relied on computer simulations. To ensure that our weapons stockpile remains reliable and effective, we require the three nuclear lab directors and the commander of the Strategic Command to certify this to the president each year.
Unfortunately, test resumption has proved just too hard, politically, to bring about; and – contrary to all reasonable standards of wisdom – that moratorium still exists today! The United States has not conducted a single nuclear weapons test in a quarter-century. Nor have we designed and built any new nuclear weapons. Every nuclear weapon in our stockpile is years beyond the end of its design life. To make matters worse, there are virtually no scientists left at our nuclear weapons labs who have ever designed and tested a nuke. It's essentially a lost art.
Aggravating the situation gravely is the fact that our adversaries, particularly Russia, China, and North Korea, have increased and improved their nuclear arsenals greatly, are acting aggressively, and are making nuclear threats.
Now, suddenly, a highly responsible, scientifically sound report appears which seriously questions whether the computer codes used in assessing nuclear performance have the capability to accurately evaluate decades-old weapons which have undergone unknown aging changes.
Here are some excerpts from the scientific paper:
"Nuclear tests gave decisive, direct evidence about the behavior of new weapons destined for the stockpile….Virtually no comparable data exist on the nuclear performance of stockpiled weapons in their current state."
"The nuclear weapons laboratories have a continuing responsibility for maintaining the safety, performance and reliability of these weapons as long as they remain in service….This responsibility cannot adequately be met within the SSP." (Stockpile Stewardship Program)
"But this approach does not take into account the facts that in the past some serious problems were revealed only as a result of a nuclear test, or that nuclear test data are required to develop and validate the scientific judgement and computer codes that must be used to assess the nuclear performance of weapons ."
"We note further that in the absence of testing the current stockpile maintenance program inevitably promotes a shift in the standard of assurance for the performance of stockpiled weapons from 'decisive, direct evidence of proper performance' to 'absence of evidence of unacceptable performance.' In so doing, the nuclear weapons program is clearly flying in the face of extensive experience concerning the standards that must be met to confirm the safety, performance and reliability of complex, high-consequence systems."
"… it is sometimes claimed that modern codes can provide the basis for accurate and reliable assessments of nuclear performance, so that vital information formerly obtained from vital nuclear tests is no longer needed…. But the claim is not correct….During the nuclear testing era there were generally significant discrepancies between the output of these codes and the nuclear test data to which they were compared."
"Current performance predictions thus rely on codes, and scientific judgement in the use of those codes, that have never undergone an actual test to see how well they work."
"However, the ability to make such predictions of the nuclear performance of weapons in their current state has not been demonstrated, and cannot be demonstrated, without a nuclear test program."
"In the absence of nuclear testing, the nuclear weapons program is exposed to the uncontrolled risk that assessments of the safety, performance, and reliability of weapons in the stockpile are significantly in error."
"Those who dismiss the need for nuclear test data pertaining to weapons in their current state are gambling with our nuclear deterrent. Is this a good bet?"
Restoring Our Nuclear Arsenal
This exceptionally important report is authored by John C. Hopkins and David H. Sharp. John is a nuclear physicist and former leader of Los Alamos nuclear weapons program. David is a Laboratory Fellow (ret'd), and guest scientist. He was chief scientist of the Science, Technology, and Engineering Directorate of Los Alamos.
The report, "The Scientific Foundation for Assessing the Nuclear Performance in the U.S. Stockpile Is Eroding," has been officially released by Los Alamos National Laboratory after extensive review.
Finally, complicating matters, our underground nuclear test site in Nevada is greatly deteriorated, probably requiring 4-5 years and about two billion dollars to reach test readiness. It will be urgently needed soon, in any case, as nukes begin to be used around the world; so America had better act decisively on this warning.
President Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which establishes America's nuclear weapons policy, defines – for the first time in history – our nuclear testing policy in the following statement: "The United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal." Thus resumption of underground nuclear testing requires no change in America's nuclear weapons policy.
Monroe is a retired vice admiral with the U.S. Navy and former director of the Defense Nuclear Agency.
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